Inferring social context from observing the behaviour of others by Teoh, Yvonne Kah Hooi
Teoh, Yvonne Kah Hooi (2017) Inferring social context 
from observing the behaviour of others. PhD thesis, 
University of Nottingham. 
Access from the University of Nottingham repository: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/35854/1/Yvonne%27s%20Revised%20Thesis%202.pdf
Copyright and reuse: 
The Nottingham ePrints service makes this work by researchers of the University of 
Nottingham available open access under the following conditions.
This article is made available under the University of Nottingham End User licence and may 
be reused according to the conditions of the licence.  For more details see: 
http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/end_user_agreement.pdf
For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INFERRING SOCIAL CONTEXT FROM OBSERVING THE  
BEHAVIOUR OF OTHERS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yvonne Teoh Kah Hooi, BSc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology 
 
 
April 2016 
 
 
  
ii 
 
ABSTRACT 
Past research tells us that individuals can infer information about a target’s emotional state and 
intentions from their facial expressions (Frith & Frith, 2012), a process known as mentalising. 
More recently, it has been found that this ability extends to inferring the events that caused the 
facial reaction (e.g. Pillai, Sheppard, & Mitchell, 2012; Pillai et al., 2014), an ability known as 
retrodictive mindreading. In the current thesis, we enter a new territory where a series of 
experiments was conducted to investigate whether people (perceivers) can guess a target’s social 
context by observing their response to emotional stimuli. The core findings were: 1) perceivers 
were able to discriminate whether the targets were alone or observed by another person, 2) 
without  any knowledge of the social context or what the targets were watching, perceivers 
judged whether targets were hiding or exaggerating their facial expressions, and their judgments 
discriminated between conditions in which targets were observed and alone, and  3) perceivers’ 
eye movements also systematically discriminated between conditions in which targets were 
observed and alone. Perceivers were thus able to infer – explicitly or implicitly - a target’s social 
context by observing their emotional response. Therefore, the findings demonstrate that people 
have the ability to use other people’s minds as a window onto a social context that could not be 
seen directly. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 This thesis would not have been possible without the support of many. Firstly, I would 
like to thank my PhD supervisor, Professor Peter Mitchell for his comprehensive support, 
guidance, and mentoring. Thank you for the countless advice on how to create, complete and 
convey a good piece of research, as well as, your patience with me, ensuring that I grasp a 
concept and not stray too far from the path. Furthermore, I would like to thank Dr. Ian Stephen 
for his helpful guidance, mentoring, and collaboration especially with the facial perception part 
since my undergraduate years.  I would also like to thank Dr. David Keeble for his patience and 
encouragement which enabled me to complete this thesis.   
 Additionally, I would like to thank my friends, colleagues and the staff from the School 
of Psychology, both in the Malaysia Campus and the UK Campus for their time and support. A 
special thanks to the Graduate School for all their support. I would also like to express my 
gratitude to the Faculty of Science and the University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus, without 
which this opportunity and other amazing experiences that came with it would not have been 
possible. Moreover, a special thank you to all the students who participated in the experiments 
presented in this thesis. 
 Lastly, I would also like to thank my dear friends, Ai-Suan, Treshi, and Wei Lin for your 
patience, support, and advice. The Seven for always being there. A special thanks to Ms Rika 
Imada for your mentoring and encouragement. I would also like to thank Becca and the Carr 
family for your generous support and love, the Pacers, especially Aya, Jo, and Rachel for 
keeping me sane during the final stages of this PhD. Most importantly, I would like to thank my 
family, especially my parents and siblings for their never-ending support and encouragement, 
and for believing in me for as long as I can remember – this is for you.    
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
1. General Introduction                  1 
Overview                    1 
 1.1 How Do We Mentalise? – The Development of the Theories of Mentalising        3 
 1.2 Theories of Mentalising               10 
  1.2.1 Theory-Theory               10 
  1.2.2 Simulation Theory               11 
1.3 How Able Are We At Mentalising? – Mental State Recognition & Empathic 
Accuracy                 14 
  1.3.1 Emotional Facial Expressions Recognition            15 
  1.3.2 Empathic Accuracy               18 
 1.4 The Limitations of Theory of Mind and Person Perception Research         20 
 
2. Outline and Central Questions               24 
2.1 Beyond Traditional Mentalising Tasks             24 
2.2 Social Context and Mentalising              33 
2.3 Gender Differences and Mentalising              35 
2.4 Eye-Tracking and Mentalising              37 
2.5 Aims of the Thesis                40 
 
3. Stimulus Development                44 
3.1 Introduction                 44 
3.2 Experiment 1a: Validation of Movie Clips             45 
v 
 
 3.2.1 Participants                46 
 3.2.2 Materials and Apparatus              46 
 3.2.3 Design                 47 
 3.2.4 Procedure                47 
 3.2.5 Results and Discussion              47 
3.3 Experiment 1b : Development of Target Stimuli            50 
 3.3.1 Targets                50 
 3.3.2 Materials and Apparatus              51 
 3.3.3 Design                 51 
 3.3.4 Procedure                51 
 3.3.5 Editing                52 
3.4 Experiment 1c : Testing the Effectiveness of Target Stimuli           53 
 3.4.1 Participants                54 
 3.4.2 Materials and Apparatus              55 
 3.4.3 Design                 55 
 3.4.4 Procedure                55 
 3.4.5 Results and Discussion              56 
 
      4.  Inferring Social Context and Expressiveness of Targets’ Behaviour          61 
   4.1 Experiment 2: Inferring Social Context             61 
    4.1.1 Participants                61 
    4.1.2 Materials and Apparatus              62 
 4.1.3 Design                 63 
vi 
 
 4.1.4 Procedure                63 
 4.1.5 Results and Discussion              64 
4.2 Experiment 3: Rate the Intensity of Targets’ Expressiveness          69
 4.2.1 Participants                70 
 4.2.2 Materials and Apparatus              70 
 4.2.3 Design                 70 
 4.2.4 Procedure                70 
 4.2.5 Results and Discussion              71 
4.3 General Discussion                74 
 
5.  Linking Targets’ Expressiveness with Perceivers’ Ability to Discriminate Social 
Context                  77 
  5.1 Introduction                            77 
5.2 Pilot Study 1                 79
 5.2.1 Participants                79
 5.2.2 Materials and Apparatus              79 
 5.2.3 Design                 80 
 5.2.4 Procedure                80 
 5.2.5 Results and Discussion              81 
5.3 Pilot Study 2                 86 
 5.3.1 Participants                86 
 5.3.2 Materials and Apparatus              86 
 5.3.3 Design                 87 
vii 
 
 5.3.4 Procedure                87 
 5.3.5 Results and Discussion              87 
5.4 General Discussion                91 
 
6. Inferring Social Context and Expressiveness of Targets’ Behaviour with  
Eye-Tracking                  94 
6.1 Introduction                 94
 6.2 Experiment 4: Inferring Social Context and Eye-Tracking         100 
 6.2.1 Participants              100 
 6.2.2 Materials and Apparatus            100 
 6.2.3 Design               101 
 6.2.4 Procedure              101 
 6.2.5 Results and Discussion            102 
  6.2.5.1 Behaviour Data            102 
  6.2.5.2 Eye Movement Analyses           105 
6.3 Experiment 5: Rating the Intensity of Targets’ Expressiveness and  
Eye-Tracking                111 
 6.3.1 Participants              111 
 6.3.2 Materials and Apparatus            112 
 6.3.3 Design               112
  6.3.4 Procedure              112 
 6.3.5 Results and Discussion            113 
  6.3.5.1 Behaviour Data            113 
viii 
 
  6.3.5.2 Eye Movement Analyses           115 
6.4 General Discussion              119 
 
7.  Alone, Accompanied, Observed – Perceivers’ Sensitivity to Social Context       125 
 7.1 Introduction               125 
 7.2 Stimulus Development Phase             129 
  7.2.1 Targets              130 
  7.2.2 Materials and Apparatus            130 
  7.2.3 Design               130 
  7.2.4 Procedure              131 
  7.2.5 Editing              132 
 7.3 Experiment 7: Sensitivity to Social Context and Eye-Tracking        133 
  7.3.1 Participants              134 
  7.3.2 Materials and Apparatus            135 
  7.3.3 Design               135 
  7.3.4 Procedure              135 
  7.3.5 Results and Discussion            136 
   7.3.5.1 Behaviour Data            136 
   7.3.5.2 Eye Movement Analyses           139 
 7.4 General Discussion              142 
 
8. General Discussion and Conclusion            146 
 8.1 Background Overview             146 
ix 
 
 8.2 Summary of Results              148 
  8.2.1 Chapter Three : Stimulus Development          148 
8.2.2 Chapter Four: Inferring Social Context and Expressiveness of Targets’ 
Behaviour                    150 
8.2.3 Chapter Five: Linking Targets’ Expressiveness with Perceivers’ Ability to 
Discriminate Social Context            152 
8.2.4 Chapter Six: Inferring Social Context and Expressiveness of Targets’ 
Behaviour with Eye-Tracking           153 
8.2.5 Chapter Seven: Alone, Accompanied, Observed – Perceivers’ Sensitivity 
to Social Context             156 
8.3 Implications               157 
 8.3.1 Retrodictive Mindreading            157 
 8.3.2 Eye-tracking              162 
 8.3.3 Gender Differences             164 
8.4 Limitations and Future Research            166 
8.5 Conclusion               169 
 
References                171 
Appendix 1                197 
 List of video clips used in Experiment 1a and its sources          197 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1:   Examples of target stimuli               53 
Figure 2:   Screenshot of the task in Experiment 1c               56 
Figure 3:   Mean accuracy rates for the seven emotions and social conditions in  
      Experiment 1c                   58 
Figure 4:   The mean accuracy rates of male and female perceivers for the seven emotions in    
      Experiment 1c                 59 
Figure 5:   An example of the stimuli presented to perceivers before viewing the target stimuli in   
      Experiment 2                 62 
Figure 6:   A screenshot of the task in Experiment 2               64 
Figure 7:   Mean number of times perceivers responded ‘observed’ out of 10 for alone and 
  observed conditions in Experiment 2              66 
Figure 8:   Mean number of times male and female perceivers responded ‘observed’ out of 10 for   
   both social conditions in Experiment 2              68 
Figure 9:   A screenshot of Experiment 3                71 
 
xi 
 
Figure 10: Mean ratings of how targets were controlling their expressions for the alone and  
 observed condition in Experiment 3              73 
Figure 11: The mean ratings of the intensity of the targets’ expressions for the alone and    
observed condition in Pilot Study 1              82 
Figure 12: Mean frequency of perceivers’ responses coded into the four Categories for alone and  
observed condition for the different emotions in Pilot Study 1           85 
Figure 13: The mean ratings of the intensity of targets’ expressions for the social conditions in  
Pilot Study 2                 88 
Figure 14: The mean frequency of perceivers’ responses coded into the four Categories for alone  
and observed condition for the different emotions in Pilot Study 2          90 
Figure 15: The number of times perceivers responded ‘observed’ out of 10 for alone and  
observed conditions in Experiment 4            104 
Figure 16: The predefined areas of interest (AOIs) used to analyse eye movement behaviour  106 
Figure 17: Mean percentage duration of perceivers’ fixations for alone and observed  
for the different AOIs in Experiment 4            109 
Figure 18: Mean ratings made by perceivers of how targets were controlling their expressions for  
the alone and observed condition in Experiment 5          114 
xii 
 
Figure 19: Mean percentage duration of perceivers’ fixations for conditions in which  
targets were alone and observed for the different AOIs in Experiment 5       118 
Figure 20: An example of a target stimulus created in the stimulus development phase in Chapter 
Seven                133 
Figure 21: The mean number of times perceivers responded ‘accompanied by another’ out of 20 
for the three social conditions in Experiment 7           137 
Figure 22: The male and female perceivers’ mean percentage fixation duration for the 
three conditions for the different AOIs in Experiment 7           141 
  
xiii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Frequency of the emotions selected for each clip (mean intensity) for Experiment 1a  48 
Table 2: Mean accuracy rates (Standard Deviations) for the seven Emotions for Observed and 
Alone condition for Experiment 2               65 
Table 3: Mean accuracy rates (and Standard Deviation) for the three Emotions for the Observed 
and Alone condition for Experiment 4            102 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE:  
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Overview 
We are constantly required to draw information from various sources when interacting 
with others in order to understand and engage with them. Some of this information is observable 
or available through our senses, but some is only accessible (indirectly) through the mind of 
others (Achim, Guitton, Jackson, Boutin, & Monetta, 2013). The ability to ascribe and interpret 
the mental states (i.e., beliefs, intentions, emotions) of others is known as ‘mentalising’ which is 
important for our daily social interactions since these mental states guide people’s 
actions/behaviour (Frith & Frith, 2006; Slors & Macdonald, 2008). It allows us to predict the 
behaviour of others and in turn guide our own behaviour during social interactions, to be 
empathetic towards others (Schnell, Bluschke, Konradt, & Walter, 2011), it affects our ability to 
cooperate (Sally & Hill, 2006), to compete with and manipulate others (Sher, Koenig, & 
Rustichini, 2014), and to determine what caused the mental state (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) coined the term ‘theory of mind’ in reference to this ability to 
infer and represent mental states from others and the self. The last 30 years of research into 
mentalising abilities has mainly focused on discovering how crucial theory of mind is in an 
individual’s development into a fully functional human being (Burt, Obradović, Long & Masten, 
2008). 
Arguably, research in the field of theory of mind has neglected the question of how 
accurate people (perceivers) are in mentalising and instead has focused on the processes involved 
during mentalisation (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011). This approach contrasts with work on person 
perception which has concentrated on factors that affect how accurately people make 
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interpersonal judgments. This area of research in social accuracy is much inspired by Darwin’s 
argument that human behaviour contains various functional properties which assist our 
adaptation and evolution over the millennia (Kappas, 2002). For decades, researchers have 
attempted to understand people’s ability to interpret facial expressions and behaviour to infer 
various mental states and personality traits (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robertson, 
1997; Ekman, 1965).  
Recently, researchers have begun to investigate whether people are able to infer the cause 
of a mental state after observing and interpreting the behaviour of others, something that Gallese 
and Goldman (1998) called ‘retrodictive’ mindreading, a form of mentalising. This allows us to 
access and learn things about the world through the minds of others without having to directly 
experience it ourselves. The types of information that humans can infer from observing the 
behaviour of others is still a relatively new area of research, and the research described in this 
thesis aims to further our understanding of this ability. 
Kraut (1982) claimed that facial expressions of others provide information about the 
social contexts and environment which caused the reaction in a target. Many studies have 
investigated how people behave differently (usually focusing on facial expressions) in various 
social situations; however there is a lack of research which directly examines individuals’ ability 
to identify social contexts from the behaviour of others. In other words, how able are we at 
inferring the social context (e.g. the presence or absence of the experimenter) that modified the 
target’s reactions from merely observing the target’s behaviour?  
This thesis begins with an overview of the theories of mentalising and past research in the 
area of social accuracy, and how these two fields of research should be combined in order to 
create a more comprehensive explanation and understanding of people’s ability to mentalise 
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(Chapter One). In Chapter Two, we will review recent research conducted in the area of 
retrodictive mindreading to examine people’s ability to make inferences about the cause of the 
target’s reactions towards the experimenter’s behaviour, leading on to a description of the 
general aims of this research. Chapters Three to Seven report the experiments conducted and its 
findings, and Chapter Eight offers an interpretation of the findings.  
 
1.1   How Do We Mentalise? - The Development of the Theories of Mentalising 
 Since the ability to mentalise is crucial for human development, there has been a long 
debate about when and how humans develop a theory of mind. Recent research has suggested 
that the basic components of mentalising develop during infancy, while past research in the area 
of theory of mind suggest that we only start to acquire fully developed mentalising abilities 
around the age of four (Achim et al., 2013; Frith & Frith, 2003). The onset of research into 
theory of mind and the debate surrounding it began when Premack and Woodruff (1978) 
reported experimental evidence that chimpanzees have the ability to detect intentions. The 
authors highlighted two main assumptions about when it is considered that a person or animal 
has a theory of mind. The assumptions are: 1) in order for a person to infer mental states from the 
behaviour of others, one must have some knowledge of the other’s mind, and 2) to gain this 
knowledge one needs to have a theory since mental states are not directly observable and we use 
this system to predict the behaviour of others (Povinelli & Preuss, 1995; Slors & Macdonald, 
2008). Furthermore, Premack and Woodruff’s paper raised the question of how we might be able 
to investigate the assumption that a person has knowledge of the minds of others. This discussion 
culminated in focus on tasks that test false belief since beliefs are representations which may or 
may not be accurate (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). Dennett (1978) argued that in order to 
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successfully demonstrate that one has a notion of another’s mind; one must be able to 
acknowledge that others may hold and act on false beliefs. This led to the development of one of 
the most widely used false belief tests: the ‘unexpected transfer’ task formulated by Wimmer and 
Perner (1983). This task was devised to examine at what age typically developing children begin 
to understand that others can hold a false belief, thus demonstrating that the child has a theory of 
mind. The task involves children being told a story of a child named Maxi who places a 
chocolate bar in cupboard x before leaving the room to play. Maxi’s mother then moves the 
chocolate bar from cupboard x to cupboard y. Participants were asked where Maxi will search 
for his chocolate bar when he returns home. Children who answer correctly that Maxi will look 
for the chocolate bar in cupboard x demonstrate that they understand that Maxi can have a mind 
of his own which holds a different representation of reality to the one the children hold 
themselves. The findings showed that only a few children aged four were able to make a correct 
judgment, while those three years of age performed worst; in contrast, those aged five and above 
were able to respond correctly. Therefore, Wimmer and Perner (1983) concluded that children 
above age five have developed a theory of mind.  
 Perner, Leekam, and Wimmer (1987) then created a new false belief test – the ‘deceptive 
box’ task - where children are shown a familiar candy container and are asked to guess its 
content. After the children gave the correct response (i.e., candy), the experimenter then revealed 
an unexpected item inside (e.g. pencils, crayon). The children are asked then to predict what 
another child who had no knowledge of the contents of the container would say. Similar to 
Wimmer and Perner’s (1983)’s findings, children aged three were not able to put aside their own 
beliefs and knowledge of reality and gave the wrong answer, while older children were able to 
acknowledge another child’s false belief, and gave the correct response. Even with further 
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modification to these tasks to create simpler versions, the findings still show that the 
development of theory of mind has a fairly predictable path. Wellman, Cross, and Watson’s 
(2001) meta-analysis of data from false belief tasks demonstrated that children from around the 
age of four are able to respond correctly, thus suggesting that children at four years old begin to 
grasp the concept of false belief, allowing them to predict the behaviour of others without being 
swayed by their own knowledge of the reality. These false belief tasks represent what are known 
as first-order mentalising tasks which typically require the child participant to estimate the belief 
state of a third party (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985).  
 As mentioned earlier, though, recent studies have suggested that younger children may 
already have developed the basic components of mentalising. Some studies have suggested that 
young children struggle with the standard false belief tasks because of the excessive demand on 
the child’s linguistic or cognitive abilities (Bloom & German, 2000; Onishi & Baillargeon, 
2005). For instance, Garnham and Ruffman (2001) modified the false belief task by asking 
children aged between two to four to listen and watch the story being enacted, and all that was 
required from the participants was to look at where the first character will search for the toy after 
returning to the room. The study demonstrated that most children looked at the correct location, 
indicating that these younger children have some implicit understanding of false belief. Onishi 
and Baillargeon (2005) then proceeded to test 15-months old infants’ competence in mentalising 
by devising a simpler version of a nonverbal false belief test. Infants were shown that an item 
was placed in one of two boxes by an agent, and this object was moved to the other location. 
This change of location could be viewed by the infants but not the agent. The agent then retrieves 
the object in either the original location where he placed it or they retrieve it from the current 
location of the object. The findings indicated that infants looked significantly longer when the 
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agent reached for the object in its current location, suggesting that the infants were ‘surprised’ 
and expected the agents to search for the object according the agent’s beliefs of where the object 
is (and not where it really is). Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) study supported the idea that 
children below age four have the capability to understand false beliefs. Further evidence of 
infants’ false belief understanding has been obtained through various tasks with infants as young 
as seven months old (Baillargeon, Setoh, Sloane, Jin, & Bian, 2014). 
 So, why is it that infants are capable of understanding false beliefs but fail false belief 
tests at ages three to four? It has been suggested that these false belief tasks place considerable 
demands on executive-functions (Baillargeon et al., 2014; Perner & Roessler, 2012). This 
account suggests that children have difficulties inhibiting their own knowledge of the reality 
when asked to give a verbal response during the false belief tests. Moreover, Apperly and 
Butterfill (2009) suggested a ‘two-systems’ theory of mind in which infants, children and adults 
have the necessary competence for mentalising but the capacities for infants and children are 
limited to simple tasks such as face recognition, gaze following, emotion processing, and so on. 
Older children and adults on the other hand have the capacity for reasoning in more cognitively 
demanding theory of mind tasks (Apperly, 2012). 
 Researchers then extended from first-order mentalising tasks to second-order tasks which 
take into account what the other person in the task thinks about the thoughts of a third person 
presented in the story (i.e., The child participant is asked to estimate what character A thinks 
character B is thinking). For example, A is with B and A watches B place an object in a box 
before they leave the room together. Then, C changes the location of the object in the absence of 
A and B. Unknown to A; B returns to the room and finds the object in the new location. The 
participant is asked where A thinks B thinks the object is, thus, making this false belief task a 
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more elaborate one than the previously described first-order tasks. Studies found that children six 
to seven years of age are able to pass second-order mentalising tests (Baron-Cohen, 1989; Miller, 
2009; Perner & Wimmer, 1985). Therefore, it is clear that we become more competent in 
complicated mentalising as we grow older.  
 Studies that used advanced mentalising tasks which examine individuals’ understanding 
of higher-order mental states supported the concept that people are more able to understand the 
minds of others with age. These studies investigated people’s understanding of higher-order 
mental states such as white-lies (Happé, 1994), and faux pas (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, 
Jones & Plaisted, 1999). Children aged eight to ten are more able to solve faux pas tests as they 
get older (Banerjee, Watling, & Caputi, 2011). The most well-known test is the social stories 
task, which involves stories portraying daily situations (Channon & Crawford, 2000). 
Participants are required to explain the indirect statements made by the main character of the 
stories; in order for participants to succeed, it is necessary for them to infer the mental states of 
the character, such as those associated with irony. Performance from children aged 12 on social 
stories tasks were below ceiling suggesting that we continue to develop our mentalising abilities 
beyond this age (O’Hare, Bremner, Nash, Happé, & Pettigrew, 2009). 
 However, there is a lack of research in the development of theory of mind processes 
beyond early childhood. According to Dumontheil, Apperly, and Blakemore (2010), there are a 
few reasons for this; 1) tasks created to test theory of mind are not suitable for older children and 
adolescents since ceiling effects could mask any further development, and 2) the tasks created do 
not demonstrate how theory of mind is used in daily actions and decisions. However, the 
relationship between the ability to mentalise and certain cognitive processes continues to develop 
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beyond childhood, thus, researchers have continued to investigate adults’ development of theory 
of mind. 
 Studies examining adults’ ability to infer mental states showed that adults often make 
errors when evaluating statements that involve ascribing mental states with several embeddings 
(e.g. “Simon thought Jim would believe that Susan thought Edward wanted to marry Betty”) 
(Rutherford, 2004). Moreover, studies have found that adults tend to make more errors when 
performing on another task simultaneously which were designed to utilise the working memory 
and other executive functions (e.g. McKinnon & Moscovitch, 2007). Therefore, although the 
ability to mentalise is crucial for our daily interaction, even as adults, people still make errors 
when ascribing mental states to others. 
 Keysar, Lin, and Barr (2003) argued that although adults have the ability to ascribe 
mental states to others, they do not always fully utilise this ability (i.e., adults do not reliably use 
their inferences of mental states to interpret the behaviour of others). Furthermore, Keysar et al. 
(2003) stated that adults’ ability to mentalise is not fully incorporated to allow ‘spontaneous, 
non-reflexive use.’ Keysar, Barr, Balin, and Brauner (2000) devised a referential communication 
task where adult participants are required to take into account the perspective of a ‘director’. 
Participants are shown a 4×4 grid containing various objects in different slots. Participants are 
instructed by the ‘director’ to shift certain objects around the slots of the grid. Some of the slots 
were covered, so the director could only see some of the objects, but not all that were visible to 
the participants. Some of the instructions given required participants to interpret with the 
knowledge of the director’s limited perspective. Although participants were able to understand 
that the director has a different view, participants often failed to use this knowledge to interpret 
the instructions. Furthermore, recent studies by Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite, Andrews, and 
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Bodley Scott (2010) and Qureshi, Apperly, and Samson (2010) used a computerised task where 
adults were shown a number of red circles in a room with an avatar, and some of the circles were 
visible to the avatar and some were not. Adult participants were required to make a judgment 
about the avatar’s perspective. The results are similar to Keysar et al.’s (2000) where adults 
found it difficult to judge another’s perspective when it is different from their own. In Samson et 
al.’s (2010) study, it was found that adult participants responded slower and made more errors 
when asked to make self-perspective judgments, hence they were not able to ignore what the 
avatar was seeing. This suggest that adults use rapid processes when taking into account what 
others see, since even with rapid processing, it is still sufficient to interfere with the participants’ 
self-perspective judgments. Hence, the findings from these studies illustrate that adults still make 
errors in their judgment.  
 Hindsight bias is another such example of adults’ error in judgment whereby people 
overestimate the likelihood of an outcome after gaining knowledge about the said outcome 
(Bernstein, Erdfelder, Meltzoff, Peria, & Loftus, 2011; Fischhoff, 1982). This phenomenon was 
first investigated by Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) where participants were asked about the 
possible public events during President Nixon’s overseas trips. Participants were asked to rate 
the probabilities of the possible outcomes before the trip, and again after the trip. Findings 
showed that participants recalled having performed more accurately than they actually did. These 
hindsight bias tests usually have one condition where participants who are aware of the outcome, 
were then asked to predict what others who are not aware of the outcome would think. The bias 
occurs when the knowledge of the outcome influences participants’ judgements by 
overestimating the state of knowledge of the naïve others. This inability to inhibit or ignore one’s 
own knowledge is a component of many tests of theory of mind in young children (Bernstein, 
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Atance, Meltzoff, & Loftus, 2007). Therefore, hindsight effect and theory of mind are related 
since both involve misattribution of knowledge to the less informed self and perspective taking. 
The hindsight effect is shown to be a robust effect across various settings and populations 
(Guilbault, Bryant, Brockway, & Posavac, 2004; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Pohl, 2007). 
 
1.2   Theories of Mentalising 
 Various theories have been developed over time to explain how the process of 
mentalising works, and these theories are usually divided into two categories; theory-theory and 
simulation theory. Below, we briefly describe these two theories.  
 
1.2.1 Theory-Theory 
 Researchers who subscribe to ‘theory-theory’ believe that children are born with the 
abilities and skills that they build upon from their experiences with people and the environment 
around them (Gopnik and Wellman, 1992; Meltzoff, 1999). Therefore, the social interactions and 
environment are vital in the development of a person’s mentalising skills and abilities. This 
account takes a more conceptual approach whereby children and adults are seen to have a 
conceptual understanding of mental states (i.e., beliefs, knowledge, etc.) and these concepts are 
used to form predictions, explanations and justifications of the behaviour of others (Apperly, 
2012). These concepts are seen as a “large number of universally quantified conditional 
statements, conditions with the conjunction of the relevant explanatory factors as the antecedent 
and the relevant explanandum as the consequent” (Churchland, 1991). Moreover, theory-theory 
states that the process of mentalising “is not dependent on knowledge of one’s own mind” 
(Michlmayr, 2002), all one requires are the rules and concepts which can then be used to 
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calculate and form explanations and predictions of the behaviour of others. Hence, the process of 
mentalising is based on a folk psychology perspective where people understand the minds of 
others through a set of rules and laws that “connect the explanatory conditions with the 
behaviour explained” (Churchland, 1990). We use this theory throughout our daily social 
interactions without much awareness of the principles which formed the theory; hence the 
process of mentalising is seen as implicit in nature (Michlmayr, 2002). Findings from studies that 
show young children’s gradual improvements in mentalising tasks as they grow older support the 
view that simpler concepts emerge earlier and provide a foundation for more sophisticated 
concepts (Apperly, 2012).  
 However, this account is challenged when research found infants as young as seven 
months were sensitive to another person’s mental states, as well as false beliefs (Baillargeon, 
Scott, & He, 2010; Kovács, Teglas, & Endress, 2010), since theory theorists suggest that young 
children below the age of four are unable to pass false belief tasks because of a ‘conceptual 
deficit’. Furthermore, although theory-theory shows that adults have the ability or the concepts to 
mentalise, this does not give much explanation as to how adults understand the minds of others, 
specifically the processes involved, therefore suggesting that there is more to mentalising than 
just conceptual knowledge (Apperly, 2012).  
 
1.2.2 Simulation Theory 
Those who champion simulation theory on the other hand, argue that in order for a person 
to successfully interpret and understand the mental states of others, one needs to simulate the 
other person’s behaviour or feelings (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Gordon (1986) suggested that 
in order to predict the behaviour of others, we need to answer the question, “What would I do in 
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that person’s situation?” Perceivers do this by engaging within the cognitive and somatic 
processes they would experience themselves when observing a person’s behaviour or experience 
of an internal state (Preston & de Waal, 2002). Perceivers simulate by inputting the pretend 
mental states and behaviour of the target observed into their own decision-making system to 
mentalise the target’s behaviour, hence perceivers use their own mental apparatus when 
understanding the minds of others (Michlmayr, 2002). In other words, we put ourselves in the 
shoes of others in order to mentalise or understand their behaviour and mental states. Thus, 
simulation can also be seen as ‘perspective-taking or ‘role-taking’ in Piaget’s theory which helps 
conquer children’s egocentrism (Michlmayr, 2002). Therefore, those who champion simulation 
theory argue against theory-theory’s explanation that we understand the minds of others through 
the employment of theories, rules and calculations. Instead, simulation theorists suggest that we 
use our own minds and knowledge to simulate the actions of others in order to understand them 
(Michlmayr, 2002). Gordon (1996) describes theory-theory as ‘cold’ since its methodology 
utilises intellectual processes which are dependent on concepts, rules and calculations. On the 
other hand, simulation theory is seen as a ‘hot theory’ since perceivers use their own emotional 
and mental resources to reason the behaviour of others.  Moreover, simulation theorists suggest 
that the shift in young children’s ability to pass false belief tasks is due to an increase in their 
executive function ability which enables children to perform better at the mentalising tasks over 
time (Shanton & Goldman, 2010). Simulation theory is supported by research which 
demonstrated that from observing others, people often adopt the facial expressions (Dimberg, 
Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000), bodily postures (Chartrand & Bargh, 1999), and target’s self-
reported emotional states (Neumann & Strack, 2000). 
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The discovery of mirror neurons in the frontal and parietal cortex in macaques (Rizzolatti 
& Craighero, 2004) has opened up research in the area of social cognitive neuroscience and its 
findings have provided further evidence for simulation theory. It is demonstrated that the mirror 
neuron system is activated not only when people perform an action, but also when they observe 
another person executing an action. Some studies even claimed that mirror neurons can explain 
various aspects of social cognition, from imitation to theory of mind (Frith & Singer, 2008). 
Moreover, studies in emotional contagion show that exposure to facial expressions such as 
disgust (Wicker et al., 2003) or fear (Morris et al., 1996) elicits activity in the same brain regions 
as direct contact to stimuli which provoke these responses. Therefore, Gallese and Goldman 
(1998) suggested that the function of the mirror neuron system may be linked to the simulation 
theory by stating that perceivers experience similar effects in their system when observing a 
target performing an action as when performing the action themselves, thus enabling the 
perceiver to infer the mental states of the target. Researchers also linked the mirror neuron 
system to mentalising by speculating that a deficit in the system might explain the dysfunction in 
mentalising that we see in autism. For example, Iacoboni & Dapretto (2006) argued that when 
the mirror neuron system was disrupted, this would affect one’s ability to generate any internal 
representations of others through simulation, hence inhibiting one’s ability to mentalise.  
 Gallese (2003) stated that the basic function of the mirror neuron system is often 
automatic and is involved in inferring simple mental states such as facial expressions. This is 
also known as low-level mentalising whereby people engage in automatic mental and 
behavioural mimicry when interacting with others (Goldman, 2012). Hence, the function of the 
mirror neuron system can be seen as a form of low-level mentalising. High-level mentalising on 
the other hand is more complex and involves top-down reasoning where individuals attribute 
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mental states based on prior knowledge and the mental states (Shanton & Goldman, 2010).This 
type of simulation process involves the use of imagination. Furthermore, this helps explain how 
people re-enact or recreate an experience without having to directly observe the target (Goldman, 
2012). This high-level mentalising can also be used to explain the errors individuals make when 
mentalising. This could be due to perceiver’s lack of information about target’s initial mental 
states or it might be that the perceiver is unable to inhibit his own mental states during 
simulation. Thus, evidence from hindsight bias studies demonstrates when the perceiver fails to 
inhibit their own mental states during simulation; it will then lead to egocentric biases (Shanton 
& Goldman, 2010).  
Overall, research conducted in the area of theory of mind revealed an abundance of 
information about the development of mentalising from a young age till adulthood. It also 
demonstrated how we still make errors when understanding the minds of others, thus suggesting 
that we may not be as skilled at mentalising as we would hope. In addition, studies from theory 
of mind research have discovered something about the processes underlying mentalisation, 
especially from the cognitive perspective with a rise in research in the area of cognitive 
neuroscience in order to further explain the mechanisms involved. 
  
1.3       How Able Are We At Mentalising? - Mental State Recognition & Empathic 
Accuracy 
The researchers from the mentalising perspective focused on the underlying processes of 
how perceivers infer the mental states of others, ignoring the question of how accurate perceivers 
are at making these inferences. It is imperative to know how well we are at understanding the 
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minds of others since accurate inferences lead us to behave according to the requirements of the 
situation (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011).  
Before studies on how perceivers process mentalising became popular, researchers in the 
field of social psychology focused mainly on investigating the sources of accurate judgments of 
interpersonal traits and other aspects of person perception. The aim of this was to better 
understand the characteristics of a good perceiver. These accuracy studies varied from 
perceivers’ ability to recognise emotional facial expressions to inferring personality traits of the 
targets, or perceivers’ ability to predict the target’s behaviour (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011). Here we 
will briefly discuss some of the studies conducted in this area of research. 
 
1.3.1   Emotional Facial Expressions Recognition 
 The importance of how accurate or how able we are in mentalising has led researchers to 
investigate this in various ways over the last decades. One of the most examined areas is 
people’s ability to read facial expressions. This does not come as a surprise since we tend to pay 
more attention to facial expressions than any other nonverbal signals such as body language 
(Noller, 1985). Even as infants, we prefer to look at faces than other complex stimuli, indicating 
that we are biologically prepared from an early age to focus on faces for social information 
(Fantz, 1961; Woodhead, Barnes, Miell, & Oates, 1995). The recognition and understanding of 
emotional facial expressions has been characterised as easy (Ekman, 1975), innate (Izard, 1994), 
categorical (Calder, Young, Perrett, Etcoff, & Rowland, 1996), and immediate (Ekman, 1997). In 
addition, it was demonstrated that four month old infants are able to discriminate between the 
basic emotional expressions such as happiness and sadness (Serrano, Iglesias, & Loeches, 1992).  
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 Ekman and Friesen (1971) suggested that there are six basic emotions (i.e., anger, 
disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise). Ekman (1972) and Izard (1971) then demonstrated 
that photographic stimuli of targets expressing these basic emotions can be accurately recognised 
at above chance level by various cultures, suggesting that these emotions are universally 
recognisable. A large body of research has since claimed that mental states can be inferred from 
facial expressions. These researchers usually employ photographs of targets posing various 
emotional facial expressions as the stimuli, and perceivers are then asked to guess what emotion 
the target was expressing or feeling. People’s ability to recognise emotions has been tested 
across different ages, cultures and backgrounds demonstrating that perceivers are able to do this 
systematically (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Russell, Bachorowski, & Fernandez-Dols, 2003). 
 Another aspect of emotional facial expression recognition is whether there are any gender 
differences between male and female perceivers. Early studies revealed inconsistent results as to 
whether female perceivers are actually more accurate at recognising emotional expressions 
(Coleman, 1949). Other more recent studies showed no differences in performance between the 
genders (e.g. Grimshaw, Bulman-Fleming, & Ngo, 2004; Rahman, Wilson, & Abrahams, 2004). 
However, some researchers have suggested female perceivers are better at identifying the 
emotional faces expressed by female targets (Hoffman, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina, & Traue, 
2010), a suggestion ruled out by Hall, Carter, and Horgan (2000). Another factor that researchers 
suggested could explain female perceivers’ advantage over male perceivers in recognising 
emotional expressions is that female perceivers perform better with less intense expressions than 
the male perceivers (Hall & Matsumoto, 2004). This might suggest that female perceivers are not 
only more accurate in recognising less intense emotional expressions, but they are more sensitive 
to them (Hoffman et al., 2010; Montagne, Kessels, Frigerio, De Haan, & Perrett, 2005). 
17 
 
However, this effect was not found in perceivers of both genders when recognising typical and 
exaggerated emotional expressions (Hoffman et al., 2010; Kessler et al., 2005; Rahman et al., 
2004). 
 Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, and Jollife (1997) began exploring people’s ability to 
recognise complex mental and emotional states which includes another group of emotions known 
as social emotions. Some of the complex mental states include admire, guilt, regret, and so forth. 
Baron-Cohen et al. used photographs of targets’ whole face, the eyes alone and the mouth alone. 
Perceivers are then given a choice of two mental states to choose from. The study found that for 
the basic emotions, perceivers are better at recognising the expressions when viewing the target’s 
whole face; as for the complex mental states, perceivers performed significantly better when 
viewing the eyes region alone than the mouth region and viewing the eyes was as informative as 
the whole face. The authors concluded that perceivers who focus more on the eyes region will 
outperform those who do not when inferring mental states of others. 
 However, one of the troubles with facial expression recognition studies is when the 
targets were asked to express the same emotion at varying degrees of intensity; not surprisingly, 
perceivers were more accurate when viewing intense expressions. Hence, this creates the 
question of how reliable and valid are the results of studies which used exaggerated and posed 
emotional facial expressions. Do perceivers rely on matching the expressions to an idea they 
have in mind as to what resembles an emotional expression or do perceivers mentalise the 
emotions the target was feeling? Thus, more and more studies have started to employ more 
spontaneous expressions of emotions as the stimuli, and some of these studies found a decrease 
in the likelihood of perceivers inferring the correct emotion (Motley & Camden, 1988; Russell et 
al., 2003; Yik, Meng, & Russell, 1998). Furthermore, the typical emotional facial expression 
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recognition task requires perceivers to choose one answer from a list of emotions, and when 
perceivers are provided with more options, it lowers their accuracy rates (Banse & Scherer, 
1996); and when perceivers are allowed to answer in an open-ended question format, it lowers 
their accuracy even further (Russell, 1994). Hence, by removing the categories of responses, 
perceivers find it more difficult to accurately identify the emotional expressions, which lead us to 
question whether these facial expression recognition studies actually measure our ability to 
recognise emotions. 
 Overall, based on the large body of research conducted in the area of emotional facial 
expressions recognition, we can say that to some degree humans possess the ability to recognise 
and understand various emotional expressions in order to guide our own behaviour in various 
social interactions. 
 
1.3.2  Empathic Accuracy 
 Empathic accuracy, a term coined by Ickes (1997, 2003), refers to how accurate a 
perceiver is in mentalising. Ickes’ empathic accuracy research paradigm involves perceivers 
inferring the feelings or thoughts of the target in the video stimuli. The participants usually 
interact with another participant, and they are then asked to report their feelings and thoughts at 
various points on their video recordings separately, as well as the thoughts and feelings of their 
partner at the points where their partner had stated having a thought or feeling during their own 
review of their video recordings. Hence, this paradigm allows researchers to investigate 
interpersonal sensitivity during an interaction between people. Raters then compare the  
responses provided to create an index of empathic accuracy (Ickes, 2009).One of the benefits of 
this paradigm is that it allows researchers to create a more natural social environment when 
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recording the targets, thus generating more naturalistic, unscripted and non-posed behaviour 
from targets. Ickes (2003) referred to this as “everyday mind reading” since it measures how well 
people infer mental sates when interacting with others. This paradigm allows researchers to 
assess interpersonal accuracy based on people’s holistic judgments of target’s expressive 
behaviour (Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990; Ickes, 2001). This dyadic version has 
been adapted to a standardised format where perceivers can be tested using a set of audio-visual 
stimuli where accuracy is determined by comparing perceivers’ ratings with the self-reported 
thoughts and feelings provided by the targets in the stimuli (Hall & Mast, 2007).  
 This paradigm also opened up the opportunity for researchers to investigate what are the 
vital cues for perceivers to achieve accuracy in mentalising. One of the studies which examined 
this was conducted by Hall and Mast (2007) where they presented the stimuli with different cue 
modalities (i.e., full video, transcript, audio, and silent video). Perceivers were given different 
instructions (i.e., infer feelings and thoughts, infer thoughts only, infer feelings only). The 
findings of the study suggest that verbal information led to higher accuracy, followed by vocal 
nonverbal cues, and finally visual nonverbal cues. In addition, when perceivers were asked to 
infer feelings only, they shifted the attention toward visual nonverbal cues from verbal ones, and 
the opposite effect when perceivers were asked to infer thoughts.  
 Moreover, this paradigm was also used to examine individual differences and situational 
predictors of accuracy of emotion perception (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011). For instance, Pickett, 
Gardner, and Knowles (2004) investigated whether individuals who have a higher need to belong 
(i.e., the desire to establish interpersonal attachments) would be more accurate in inferring 
mental states by employing the empathic accuracy paradigm. The study found that perceivers’ 
scores of social connectedness predicted their empathic accuracy and accuracy in facial 
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expression recognition. The researchers thus concluded that the more we have the need to belong 
and connect with others, the better we are at mentalising.  
 In summary, research in the area of mental state recognition and person perception shine 
the light on people’s ability and capacity in mentalising, specifically in how accurate we are in 
understanding the minds of others. A large body of research in this area has focused on 
emotional facial expression recognition, which led to the discovery of the as and the universality 
of recognising them. Eventually, researchers began to develop more naturalistic methodology to 
measure individuals’ ability to attribute mental states. This allowed further investigations into 
individual differences in the ability to mentalise, and how changes to the procedure could affect 
perceivers’ judgments which led us to question the reliability of these studies in measuring 
people’s capability in mentalising. 
 
1.4  The Limitations of Theory of Mind and Person Perception Research 
West and Kenny’s (2011) truth and bias (T&B) model states that in perceiver’s 
judgement, “perceptions are determined by truth or reality.” West and Kenny then went on to 
state that when studying accuracy in person perception, one must define and measure the truth in 
order to investigate how strongly the truth affects judgment. The definition and measurement of 
truth in this sense depends on the research question, the methodology, and the context in which 
the judgments are made. West and Kenny used Ickes’ empathic accuracy paradigm as an 
example of good practice in measuring perceivers’ accuracy in a dyadic interaction; the ‘truth’ in 
this example is the target’s self-report of his or her feelings and thoughts since the research 
focuses on whether perceivers are accurate in inferring the target’s feelings and thoughts. In this 
case, accuracy is measured by comparing the perceiver’s inference with the targets’ self-reports 
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of their own thoughts and feelings upon watching the video recording of their own interaction. 
This assumes that what the targets report as their feelings and thoughts at specific points of their 
recorded behaviour actually represents what they were really feeling and thinking at that point in 
time. Yet the targets’ self-reports may be affected if the targets are unable to remember what 
they were truly feeling and thinking in that they might actually base their self-reports on 
observing their own behaviour in the video recordings. This might not differ categorically from 
asking a perceiver to observe the target’s behaviour in the video and then infer the target’s 
thoughts and feelings. Therefore, this paradigm might not actually satisfy West and Kenny’s 
truth condition.  
In conclusion, the research in person perception accuracy suggests that humans have the 
ability and tendency to make interpersonal inferences when interacting with others, especially 
from facial cues. It also indicates that people’s behaviour reflects their emotions, personality 
traits, as well as their intentions. However, one of the problems with this area of research is that 
it violates West and Kenny’s (2011) truth condition since in the majority of these studies the 
target’s true mental state is imponderable and perhaps unknowable. So, how can we develop a 
task in which the perceiver’s interpersonal judgment is compared against an objective fact?  
Theory of mind research, which focuses more on examining the processes involved in 
mentalising rather than how able or accurate people are at mentalising, also violates West and 
Kenny’s (2011) ‘truth condition’. This is because in order to understand the processes involved, 
we have to compare perceiver’s performance with the actual mental state the target was 
experiencing, and this is unknowable. Therefore, the conclusions drawn from theory of mind 
research are questionable since these conclusions are based on tasks where perceivers’ 
performance is measured in a way that is similar to that of person perception. There is no way we 
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can know for sure of the target’s true mental state, and so, the perceiver’s performance is based 
on either the target’s self-reports or on a set of prototypical responses that are mapped out 
without having to take into account the target’s mental state. Therefore, the procedure we 
propose in this thesis focuses on perceiver’s ability to infer the cause of the target’s mental state 
which enables us to draw valid conclusions since it satisfies West and Kenny’s (2011) truth 
condition. 
The mentalising tasks described here have helped us to understand the basics of 
mentalising, but they often fail to test individuals’ full capacity to mentalise that resembles our 
day-to-day interaction (Achim et al., 2013). Hence, researchers have begun to create more 
ecologically valid tasks that require participants to use the immediate environmental cues and 
their prior social knowledge in order to mentalise (e.g. Barnes, Lombardo, Wheelwright, & 
Baron‐Cohen, 2009; Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Golan, 2006; Ickes et al., 1990). These 
researchers shifted from the use of static photographic stimuli to dynamic stimuli to present more 
realistic depiction of the targets. Not only are dynamic stimuli more representative of daily social 
experiences, but it allows experimenters to investigate perceivers’ ability to identify subtle 
expressions and behaviour, thus enabling us to learn more about people’s capacity and flexibility 
in understanding others’ minds. Moreover, the stimuli used in these studies usually involve 
actual or video footage or virtual reality avatars (Achim et al., 2013). This provides further 
contextual information about the environment the target is in which is something lacking from 
photographic stimuli, thus creating a more complex and realistic mentalising task. Therefore, the 
stimuli and procedure we used in the experiments described in this thesis embrace Achim et al.’s 
(2013) suggestion of using a more ecologically valid task in order to investigate our full capacity 
in mentalising while capturing the complexity involved in the process.  
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As suggested by Zaki and Ochsner (2011), by combining the strengths of both areas of 
research – theory of mind and social accuracy – it allows us to understand not only how able 
perceivers are at mentalising, it also provides an understanding of the underlying process. In 
other words, linking behavioural or neural cues that a process has taken place with perceivers’ 
accuracy in mentalising allows us to further understand the functional and adaptive nature of 
mentalising in our daily social interactions.  
In the next chapter, we will introduce a new paradigm which enables researchers to 
measure perceivers’ accuracy, in a context where the truth condition is satisfied, in a more 
naturalistic setting. This proposed paradigm also demonstrates how mentalising is functional and 
adaptive since the task requires perceivers to use the minds of others in order to learn about 
aspects of the world that they have no direct access to. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
OUTLINE AND CENTRAL QUESTIONS 
 
2.1 Beyond Traditional Mentalising Tasks 
 As discussed in Chapter One, tests of mentalising usually require perceivers to attribute a 
mental state in a context where the target’s true mental state is unknown and therefore it is not 
possible to compare perceivers’ responses with the target’s true mental state. We also discussed 
the need to create a more naturalistic procedure that allows us to measure people’s ability in 
mentalising, as well as understanding the underlying processes involved. Ickes’ (1997, 2003) 
empathic accuracy procedure comes close to achieving this with the only problem being that it 
relies on target’s self-report of their own mental states as the point of comparison for gauging the 
perceiver’s accuracy.  
 North, Todorov, and Osherson (2010) created a procedure which satisfies West and 
Kenny’s (2011) ‘truth condition’ while investigating perceivers’ ability to infer the preferences 
of targets after observing targets’ spontaneous facial expressions. By focusing on targets’ 
preferences instead of unobservable mental states, North et al. (2010) were able to measure 
perceivers’ performances based on an objective criterion (i.e., basing perceivers’ accuracy on 
targets’ preferences), thus improving on the traditional empathic accuracy methodology of 
relying on target’s self-reported mental states to calculate perceivers’ accuracy in making social 
judgments. Furthermore, North and colleagues’ method of collecting the stimuli creates 
naturalistic behaviour that could be more representative of day-to-day facial expressions 
compared with the posed and exaggerated expressions used in past research. Eight targets were 
discretely video recorded as they viewed a series of images. Targets rated their preferences over 
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48 pairs of images which were divided into four categories (people, cartoons, paintings, 
animals). Targets were given five seconds to respond to each pair of stimuli. These target stimuli 
were then edited (each clip was three seconds long with the exception of the cartoon category, 
where each stimulus was seven seconds long), producing a total of 768 video stimuli. 
Subsequently, these were shown to a group of perceivers who were asked to decide whether the 
targets preferred the first or second image. The perceivers were assigned randomly to view one 
of the four categories (people, cartoons, paintings, animals), each viewing a total of 96 pairs of 
stimuli, except for the cartoon category, with only 48 pairs of stimuli. Perceivers then judged the 
target’s preferences after viewing each target’s 12 pairs of video stimuli. Perceivers were then 
asked to rate the target’s expressiveness.  
 Results indicated that perceivers were systematically correct in inferring the target’s 
preferences, but their ratings of target expressiveness did not correlate with the success in 
guessing the target’s preference, except when targets viewed cartoon stimuli. Targets were more 
expressive in the cartoon category than in response to the other stimuli and uniquely in this case 
the level of expressiveness (as judged by perceivers) correlated with perceivers’ success in 
estimating target’s preference. Moreover, perceivers were generally more accurate in estimating 
target preferences for cartoons than for other stimuli which might be a sign that target 
preferences were more strongly differentiated for these particular stimuli. Consistent with this 
possibility, the findings suggested that it was easier for perceivers to infer preferences for stimuli 
that were preferred by majority of the targets, again suggesting that stronger target preferences 
were easier for perceivers to detect than weaker preferences. The paradigm thus extended Ickes’ 
interpersonal empathic accuracy by avoiding the need to label target’s mental states, and without 
having to rely on target’s subjective report on their own mental states. Moreover, by relying on 
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brief samples of targets’ behaviour as stimuli, North and colleagues’ study demonstrates that 
people have the capability to make accurate judgments of others based on samples of 
spontaneous behaviour.  
 Building on the many strengths of North and colleagues’ (2010) study, there seems to be 
opportunity to develop their procedure to reach its full potential. Arguably, perceivers could 
simply classify the targets’ positive or negative expressions to infer their preferences without 
having to consider any mental states. Indeed, the task presented by North et al. is one in which 
perceivers effectively had to decide which expression is more positive out of the pair of stimuli 
in order to make a judgment of the targets’ preferences. In that sense, the study does not 
contribute much to the investigation of humans’ mentalising capabilities, its functionality and its 
adaptability. The following paradigm that we will be introducing takes a step further into this 
investigation, where the nature of how the target stimuli are created produces more complex, 
spontaneous and subtle behaviour, thus demonstrating perceivers’ ability to make more complex 
inferences from targets’ reactions, the mechanisms involved and its functionality. 
 Cassidy, Ropar, Mitchell, and Chapman (2013), Cassidy, Mitchell, Chapman, and Ropar 
(2015), Pillai, Sheppard, and Mitchell (2012) and Pillai et al. (2014) devised a new procedure – a 
retrodictive mindreading task designed to examine a perceiver’s ability to infer the cause of the 
target’s reactions. Retrodiction was introduced in the context of simulation theory where 
simulation is not only used to predict the mental states of others, but can also be used to infer 
mental states that have already occurred (Gallese and Goldman, 1998). In other words, it is a 
backwards inference to a mental state based on behaviour being observed currently (Pillai et al., 
2012).  
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 One of the first studies that demonstrated retrodictive mindreading is Robinson and 
Mitchell (1995)’s study which investigated three to five-year old children’s ability to mentalise. 
Participants were told a story about identical twins who were playing with a ball. The twins 
jointly put the ball in Location A and then one of the twins we don’t know which left the scene. 
In the presence of the remaining twin, the ball was then moved to Location B. Finally, the absent 
twin returned and another protagonist asked them to fetch the ball. In response, each went to a 
different location and the experimenter then asked the observing child participant to infer which 
twin went to Location A (the empty location) – was it the twin who was present throughout or 
the twin who left the scene for a while? Children were able to successfully infer that the twin 
who searched the original location (Location A) must be the twin who was absent from the room 
when the ball was shifted. This demonstrated the ability to retrodict since participants must 
consider the twin’s previous mental state (i.e., lack of knowledge that the ball had been shifted to 
a new location) in order to explain the observed behaviour.  
 Cassidy et al. (2013, 2015) and Pillai et al. (2012, 2014) extended from Robinson and 
Mitchell’s (1995) concept of using our own knowledge of the possible reactions people could 
have to a certain scenario to create a retrodictive mindreading paradigm. This paradigm relies on 
the concept of by merely observing people’s behaviour and reactions, we are then able to 
decipher from the range of possible events that could have occurred to cause the 
behaviour/reaction. In other words, perceivers observe the target behaving or reacting in a certain 
manner, and then use simulation to imagine the possible scenarios that could have led the target 
to behave this way. The retrodictive mindreading paradigm draws from Goldman and Sripada’s 
(2005) reverse simulation framework where they suggested perceivers process their own mental 
state in reverse, in order to attribute the antecedent event which reflects the target’s mental state. 
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Goldman and Sripada’s (2005) framework also proposed that in order for perceivers to retrodict, 
they first mimic the target’s behaviour in order to experience the target’s mental state. The 
perceivers then use their own mental state from mimicking the target, to infer the target’s mental 
state. 
 Cassidy et al. (2013) used the retrodictive mindreading paradigm as a new and 
naturalistic emotion recognition task to assess people’s ability to recognise subtle emotions. 
They cited Millikan (2005)’s argument that the process of recognising emotions does not rely on 
inferring the target’s emotion, rather it depends on observing the target’s emotional reaction and 
then attempting to make sense of the reaction after the event, a process also known as 
retrodictive mindreading. Hence, Cassidy et al.’s (2013) study examined perceivers’ ability to 
accurately infer the gift (homemade novelty, chocolate, monopoly money) the target received 
based on the target’s reaction when receiving the gift. Furthermore, perceivers were asked what 
they thought the targets felt upon receiving the gift. Twenty-one targets were video recorded as 
they interacted with the experimenter, in this case, receiving a gift from the experimenter. These 
videos were then edited and shown to perceivers as stimuli. Since perceivers gave free responses 
when asked about the target’s emotion, these data were coded into four categories (i.e., positive, 
negative, pretend, and confused). The results demonstrated that perceivers were able to correctly 
infer the gifts the targets received above chance level, thus suggesting that they understood 
which emotional reactions were appropriate for the various gifts received.    
Cassidy et al. (2013) raised the possibility that perceivers may not need to infer the 
emotion of the target when retrodicting the event that caused it. However, the findings of their 
study suggested otherwise; when perceivers correctly guessed the target’s emotion, they also 
tended to accurately judge the gift received, and when they inferred the wrong emotion, they also 
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made a wrong judgment about the gift received. Hence, the relationship between the judgments 
of the emotion and gift received suggested that perceivers need to interpret the target’s emotions 
in order to infer the antecedent event. 
 Cassidy, et al. (2015) extended this study to examine how well perceivers make 
retrodictive inferences depending on whether target stimuli were videos or static photographs 
capturing the apex of their reaction on receiving the gift. The experiment was divided into two 
sessions – one for the dynamic stimuli and one for the static stimuli. Perceivers were asked to 
infer the gift the targets received, and the emotion the targets experienced upon receiving the 
gift. The static photographs appeared on the screen without any time restrictions until the 
perceivers responded. As with the results in Cassidy et al.’s (2013) study, perceivers were able to 
infer systematically the gifts the targets received, thus suggesting that the perceivers associated 
the appropriate emotions for the specific condition. However, there were differences in 
performance between the conditions when comparing between static and dynamic stimuli. 
Perceivers diagnosed with autism performed significantly better in recognising genuine and 
feigned positive emotions for static stimuli than dynamic, but were less accurate for the confused 
emotional reactions. This finding implied that dynamic information is required for autistic 
individuals when understanding confused emotional reactions, while static images were more 
effective when interpreting genuine and feigned positive emotions. Cassidy and colleagues 
(2015) suggested that these findings could be explained by the variability in targets’ behaviour 
for the various emotions. By presenting a static image of a genuine or feigned emotional 
reaction, the stimulus only represents the emotion consistent with the gift without any mixed 
reactions such as that of transforming from a confused one to a fake smile for the monopoly 
money condition. Therefore, Cassidy and colleague’s (2015) study demonstrated the underlying 
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difficulties of emotion processing for individuals with autism, and how the nature of the stimuli 
could have a significant impact on the perceivers’ mentalising ability. 
One of the benefits of the retrodictive mindreading paradigm, similar to North et al.’s 
(2010) task, is that it closely resembles real-life scenarios where people understand the behaviour 
of others without having to label the mental state. As mentioned previously, the retrodictive 
mindreading paradigm allows researchers to investigate people’s ability to infer subtler and more 
complex behaviour and emotions, since it is uncommon and complicated to label a person’s 
behaviour with specific mental states when the behaviour can represent a mix of thoughts and 
emotions. Thus, by labelling behaviour, it may interfere with people’s spontaneous ability to 
mentalise (Pillai et al., 2012). Furthermore, by measuring perceivers’ performance in judging 
what caused the target to behave a certain way, it allows researchers to compare performance 
against an objectively correct response without having to rely on cataloguing the inner mental 
states of targets (e.g. emotions). In addition, this paradigm also employs the use of dynamic 
stimuli instead of static images, where target’s spontaneous reactions towards the experimenter 
are recorded, creating subtler and more ecologically valid stimuli (Pillai et al., 2012).  
 Like Cassidy et al. (2013), Pillai et al. (2012) used the retrodictive mindreading paradigm 
to investigate perceivers’ ability to infer what happened to targets based on a brief sample of 
targets’ reactions. The study used video stimuli of targets’ natural reactions to four different 
social scenarios involving the experimenter: 1) Joke: experimenter told a simple joke to the 
target (e.g. “Why did the woman wear a helmet at the dinner table? Because she was on a crash 
diet!”), 2) Waiting: the experimenter kept the target waiting for approximately five to eight 
minutes while she busied herself with various tasks (e.g. making a phone call) in front of the 
target, 3) Story: experimenter shared a story of a series of unfortunate events that happened to 
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her earlier the day (e.g. flash drive malfunctions), and 4) Compliments: experimenter 
complimented the target at the start of the experiment (e.g. “You’ve got really good hair, what 
shampoo do you use?”). Forty target videos were edited into shorter clips (duration between 3.64 
to 8.96 seconds) and muted. The clips were edited based on the most expressive reactions. 
Perceivers were then shown a short video clip of each of the four scenarios to give them a better 
idea of the conditions. Perceivers then watched the video stimuli and were asked to infer the 
antecedent scenario based on their observations of the targets’ behaviour. The study 
demonstrated that perceivers were able to systematically infer the cause of targets’ behaviour, 
suggesting that we were sensitive enough to infer that what happened caused a subtle and 
spontaneous reaction towards a third party. This led Pillai and colleagues to suggest that this 
retrodictive ability that we possess enables us to make sense of the behaviour of others, and to 
benefit indirectly from their experiences. One could argue that perceivers merely ‘matched’ 
targets’ behaviour to the appropriate scenario without having to mentalise at all. However, this 
seems implausible since the behavioural reactions varied between targets for the different 
scenarios, therefore making it difficult for perceivers to simply match a scenario to a specific 
reaction. 
 From Pillai et al.’s (2012, 2014) and Cassidy et al.’s (2013, 2015) studies, it is clear that 
adults are capable of discriminating the cause or antecedent event from briefly observing the 
spontaneous behaviours of others. This implies that by being able to retrodict, we are able to use 
the minds of others to access a part of the social world that is not directly observable to us, thus, 
demonstrating the functionality of mentalising. Aside from predicting the behaviour of others 
through mentalising, we are able to use this skill to infer what happened previously to the target 
without having to witness or experience the event first-hand.  
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What else could we learn from observing the behaviour of others? How else is this ability to 
understand the world through the minds of others beneficial? As infants, we have learned that by 
following the eye gaze of others, we not only demonstrate that we could acknowledge that there 
might be something else happening outside of our own world or view, but we are able to use this 
knowledge from observing others to learn about the physical world. Such ability emerges very 
early in development in a basic form known as ‘social referencing’ where people use emotional 
information to understand “an event that is otherwise ambiguous or beyond that individuals’ own 
intrinsic appraisal capabilities” (Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985). Sorce et al. (1985) 
used a modified visual cliff as the ambiguous event, and 12-month old infants were observed to 
examine whether they would look at the mother’s face, and use the mother’s emotional 
expression to guide their behaviour to either approach or avoid the deep side of the cliff.  The 
study demonstrated that if a mother expressed joy or interest, most infants would cross the deep 
side, but not when the mother expressed fear or anger. When in the absence of depth, few infants 
gauge the mother’s reaction, and those who did, hesitate when the mother expressed fear. 
Therefore, at a very young age, we are able to interpret an adult’s facial expression to determine 
whether an aspect of the world is safe or dangerous which in turn has the effect of regulating 
one’s approach and avoidance behaviour towards that particular aspect of the world. Thus, we 
are able to broaden our own understanding of both the physical and social world through the 
minds of others.  
In addition, as a child observes his/her parents’ behaviour towards another individual, the 
child is able to learn whether the individual is approachable or considered as a threat. Therefore, 
from observing the behaviour of others, we are able to learn about the traits of a third party based 
on the way others react towards them. Moreover, by observing others we can learn about a third 
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party as well as a social situation or the physical world without having to directly experience any 
potential errors or harm.    
The experiments described in this thesis employed the retrodictive mindreading paradigm 
to look into another broad area of investigation – perceivers’ ability to infer social context (i.e., 
targets were observed by experimenter, targets were left alone) that moderated targets’ reactions 
when watching various movie clips. Instead of focusing on the nature of the social interaction, 
the studies conducted for this thesis focus on an aspect of the interaction – the presence or 
absence of an experimenter – which has an even subtler and indirect effect on the targets’ 
emotional reaction to a stimulus. This will be further elaborated later in this chapter.  
 
2.2 Social Context and Mentalising 
 There has been a large body of research on the effects of social context on behaviour (e.g. 
Ekman, 1972; Fridlund, 1991; Zaalberg, Manstead, & Fischer, 2004). These studies have mainly 
focused on how individuals behave and express themselves differently based on the social 
context they are experiencing. Some individuals are seen as highly expressive and others are 
more reserved in various social situations (Lee & Wagner, 2002). In addition, studies have also 
investigated peoples’ facial expressions when they are left alone in order to observe 
‘spontaneous’ behaviour without any social influences (Wagner & Lee, 1999). Kraut (1982) 
argued that facial expressions can thus indirectly provide information about the environment and 
social conditions which evoked these expressions. Furthermore, Kraut (1982) stated that if 
emotional facial expressions have evolved to allow individuals to communicate with one 
another, then one can assume that these behaviours are strongest and most informative when 
expressed in the presence of others. Fischer, Manstead, and Zaalberg (2003) added that not only 
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does social context influence the way people behave, but our behaviour also influences the social 
context we are in. Therefore, it is not surprising that there have been a large number of studies 
focusing on the effects of social context on nonverbal behaviour, especially with respect to facial 
expressions. However, it is imperative to point out that the studies reported in this thesis do not 
focus on the effects of social context on the behaviour of targets – this is something we already 
know about from past research; instead we are interested in examining perceivers’ ability to 
detect the social context which moderated the targets’ behaviour.   
 The studies conducted in this area of research have found that individuals tend to inhibit 
or exaggerate their behaviour when in the presence of others depending on the emotions felt (e.g. 
Killbride & Yarczower, 1980; Kraut, 1982). For instance, individuals who are experiencing 
negative emotions (e.g. anger, disgust) tend to inhibit their expressions (Spain, Eaton, & Funder, 
2000) when in the presence of others, but exaggerate their behaviour for positive emotions (e.g. 
happiness, surprise - Buck, 1984; Ekman & Friesen, 1975). One of the more well-known studies 
in this area was conducted by Ekman (1972) who demonstrated this social context effect on 
behaviour with Japanese and American participants. Participants were asked to watch neutral and 
distressing films, either alone or in the company of an experimenter. There was no evidence of 
any difference between the two groups of participants in their expressions when they were alone. 
However, for the observed condition, Japanese participants tended to smile more than American 
participants when viewing distressing films.  
Ekman attributed this difference in behaviour to cultural differences in display rules 
which are a set of rules for the types of behaviour deemed appropriate by society for various 
social situations (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). According to Ekman and Friesen (1969, 1975), 
display rules can affect our facial expressions in six different ways: intensifying, inhibiting, 
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masking (hiding a felt emotion with another expression), neutralising, simulation (expressing 
without any felt emotion), and qualifying (adding an expression to a displayed emotion). 
Reissland and Harris (1991) stated that there are three requirements when using display rules: 1) 
individuals must have the knowledge of the types of facial expressions deemed appropriate for a 
specific social context, 2) they must be willing to control their facial expression, and 3) they 
must possess the ability to display the appropriate expression. Therefore, it seems that social 
context does influence people’s behaviour, especially their facial expressions; hence this will not 
be part of our investigation and instead we will focus on perceivers’ ability to determine the 
social context by observing targets’ behaviour. This is an area in which relatively little research 
has been conducted to date in examining how capable people are in interpreting how the 
behaviour of others is moderated by different social contexts (Philippot & Yabar, 2005).  
 
2.3 Gender Differences and Mentalising 
 There has been a longstanding debate on whether there are any differences in 
performance between male and female perceivers in mentalising. Folk psychology has always 
supported that females are better mind readers than males (Krach et al., 2009). Furthermore, past 
research has demonstrated that females have better emotional understanding than males (Dunn, 
Brown, & Beardsall, 1991), and that females displayed more frequent and developed form of 
mental-state talk than males (Hughes & Dunn, 1998).  
This difference in performance between genders led Baron-Cohen (2002) to propose the 
Empathising/Systemising (E/S) theory of Psychological Sex Differences where a typical male 
brain is viewed to be more systematic (i.e., able to derive underlying rules that govern the 
behaviour of a system) while a typical female brain is viewed to be more empathising. Baron-
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Cohen and Wheelwright’s (2004) study further supported this theory when they found that 
females scored higher than males in the measure of one’s ability to empathise. In addition, 
females scored higher than male perceivers in the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001). A meta-analysis on gender differences in emotion recognition from facial 
expressions found that 80% of the studies showed a female advantage (Hall, Carter, & Horgan, 
2000). However, recent studies have found no gender differences in emotion recognition 
(Grimshaw, Bulman-Fleming, & Ngo, 2004). It was suggested that the inconsistency across 
studies may be due to the differences in the nature of the stimuli used (e.g. intensity of the 
expressions) (Hoffman, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina, & Traue, 2010). Moreover, Ickes, Gesn, and 
Graham (2000) argued that gender differences in empathy-related tasks are only found when 
perceivers are aware that they are being measured on an empathy related quotient, and/or when 
empathy related gender-role obligations or expectations are made obvious during the task.  
With theory of mind tasks, Banerjee (1997) investigated gender differences on the 
development of theory of mind and found that girls performed better than the boys on a task 
which measures the understanding of emotional display rules and in one of two conditions on an 
‘appearance-reality’ task. Similarly, Bosacki and Astington (1999) showed that 11-year-old 
females performed better in the assessment of story characters’ feelings and motives than the 
male participants.  A few studies with adults have found some evidence that females were better 
at mentalising than males (e.g. Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore, & Robertson, 1997). However, other studies failed to find this female advantage 
(Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, & Jimenez, 2000). Additionally, Gopnik argued that hundreds of 
theory of mind studies with children found no gender differences were found (Nash & Grossi, 
2007).  
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 Due to the conflicting nature on whether females are better mind readers than males, the 
studies described in this thesis will investigate whether there are any gender differences in 
performance. This will shed a light on whether the female or male perceivers are better at 
inferring social context from observing the target’s behaviour or both genders will yield a similar 
pattern of results.  
 
2.4 Eye-Tracking and Mentalising 
 Joint attention is crucial for the development of social relationships with others (Freeth, 
Foulsham, & Kingstone, 2013). Since joint attention is often achieved in the visual modality, 
understanding people’s eye movement behaviour as they perceive faces and the behaviour of 
others is vital and may provide information about their ability to mentalise (Hernandez et al., 
2009).  
One of the main methods of examining eye movement behaviour is eye-tracking 
(Karatekin, 2007). Eye-tracking enables an unobtrusive and continuous measure of visual and 
cognitive information processing (Lykins, Meana, & Kambe, 2006). Since visual attention can be 
defined as selectively attending to information from one region at the cost of other regions in the 
same visual field (Henderson, 1992), research in the area of visual attention has primarily 
focused on fixations (i.e., periods of time when the attended region is relatively still) (Lykins et 
al., 2006). For instance, Stoesz and Jakobson (2014) showed that children fixate less on dynamic 
faces than adults after adding more characters to a stimuli, suggesting that the processing of 
socially complex scenes are more challenging for children than adults (Holmqvist et al., 2011). 
Moreover, research in eye movements during face perception have demonstrated that people 
fixate longer on internal features (i.e., eyes, nose, mouth) than external features (i.e., hair, ears, 
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forehead, face contour) (Althoff & Cohen, 1999; Itier  & Batty, 2009). Various studies have 
found that people attended to the eye region the most as compared to the other facial features 
when perceiving various factors such as facial expressions, identity, and gender (e.g. Baron-
Cohen, 1995; Henderson, Williams, & Falk, 2005; Itier & Batty, 2009; Schyns, Bonnar, & 
Gosselin, 2002).  
We developed the ability to use the eyes and face of others as a source of social 
information when attributing the mental states of others at an early age (Itier & Batty, 2009). For 
instance, Baron-Cohen (1995) found that a four-year old is able to infer that someone is thinking 
about something when they looked upward, to nothing in particular.  Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, and Jolliffe (1997) and Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, and Plumb 
(2001a) created the ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ task using photographs of only the eye 
region to evaluate adults’ ability to mentalise, and also in children (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Spong, Scahill, & Lawson, 2001b). The task involves participants to choose one out of four 
mental states (e.g. jealous, puzzled, reassuring) that best describes the stimulus of the eye region. 
This task is particularly useful in discovering any impairment in mentalising for clinical 
populations such as individuals with autism spectrum disorders. This prompted Baron-Cohen and 
colleagues (1997, 2001a) to suggest that gaze direction is vital for mentalising. 
 Recent research in theory of mind began to use implicit theory of mind tasks to further 
our understanding of the way we process social events (e.g. Kovács, Téglás, & Endress, 2010; 
Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005). For example, Southgate, Senju, and Csibra (2007) found that two-
year-olds preferred to look at the location which the actor believes the ball to be during a free-
viewing false-belief task. With a growing number of eye movement research revealing that 
infants as young as seven to 15 months old have an understanding of the mental states of others 
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(e.g. Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). This challenges the long-
standing view that children are only able to pass the false belief task from the age of four (Perner 
& Lang, 1999). This led to Apperly and Butterfill’s (2009) proposal that there are two distinct 
systems used to develop one’s theory of mind. The first system is responsible for the monitoring 
of the mental states of others in the social world which developed earlier and operates implicitly, 
independent of the development of executive function and language. The second system is 
responsible for conscious (explicit) theory of mind inferences, and is dependent on domain-
general cognitive functions.  
Pillai et al. (2012, 2014) and Cassidy et al. (2013, 2015) have incorporated eye-tracking 
with their studies in order to understand how people infer the causes of a reaction by studying 
perceivers’ eye movement behaviour. Both of Pillai et al.’s (2012, 2014) studies revealed that 
perceivers varied their eye movements according to the scenarios the targets were experiencing, 
therefore suggesting that perceivers discriminate between the scenarios on an implicit level, by 
employing different eye movement strategies for different scenarios. In Pillai and colleagues’ 
(2012) study, perceivers tended to focus on the mouth in preference to the eyes of the targets 
across all four scenarios. However, for the waiting scenario, perceivers preferred to attend to the 
eyes more than the mouth of the targets when compared to the other three scenarios, implying 
that the targets’ eye region captures the attention of perceivers more in the waiting scenario than 
for the other scenarios. Pillai et al. (2012) suggested that the increase in duration of fixating on 
the eye region might have been caused by the eye gaze behaviour of the targets in the stimuli. 
Targets in the waiting scenario seemed to be distracted by their surroundings more than in the 
other scenarios. Therefore, perceivers are influenced by cues in targets’ behaviour, which might 
cause them to attend to the regions that will provide the most relevant information when 
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mentalising. Pillai et al.’s (2014) study demonstrated similar eye gaze patterns for the story, joke 
and compliment conditions except for the waiting condition where perceivers focused on the 
mouth and eyes region equally.  
 Cassidy et al.’s (2013) study also demonstrated that perceivers’ eye gaze patterns differed 
depending on the gift the targets received. Perceivers tended to focus more on the mouth than the 
eyes when observing targets who received the homemade novelty and chocolate as gifts. 
Conversely, they attended to the eyes more than the mouth for the monopoly money condition.  
In summary, eye-tracking studies give us an insight to where perceivers tended to fixate 
when observing the target’s behaviour. Moreover, research in theory of mind has begun to use 
eye-tracking as part of their investigation to further understand the development of theory of 
mind. These studies also showed that by examining people’s eye movement strategies, we are 
able to learn about the visual processes when people mentalise and that we are sensitive to the 
behavioural cues of others which in turn impact our ability to mentalise. 
 
2.5 Aims of the Thesis 
 As explained, with the retrodictive mindreading paradigm, researchers are now able to 
explore people’s ability to mentalise on the basis of subtle and spontaneous behaviour of others. 
By employing this paradigm, we are able to learn not only about perceivers’ mentalising 
capabilities, but the processes involved in making these inferences. The research described 
earlier in this chapter demonstrated that we are able to use the minds of others to learn indirectly 
about the social world. The experiments presented in this thesis focus on further exploring this 
capability that we possess, but instead of focusing on what we are able to infer from a target’s 
interaction with an experimenter, we aim to investigate a more complex and subtle aspect of 
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social interaction – are we able to detect the absence or presence of a person (i.e., the social 
context) from observing its effects on the target’s behaviour? 
 Since a large body of research have focused on how social context modifies one’s 
behaviour, it will be useful to examine people’s ability to detect the social context (i.e., its 
modification in behaviour). It is useful to know whether we have the ability to detect social 
context since this will influence the way we would approach a social situation, whether the 
environment is a friendly or threatening one, whether the unobservable third party is someone 
who is trustworthy or threatening. We believe that people are able to make these judgments 
based on the studies in the area of social context. Since people behave according to the social 
context they are in, either due to their awareness of the social display rules, or their intention to 
react differently in various social situations because of self-preservation, by being aware of how 
we ourselves react to different social contexts, we could use this knowledge to simulate the 
target’s mental states, in order to infer the social context which modified the observed behaviour. 
Therefore, we have employed the retrodictive mindreading paradigm in this thesis.  
 In addition, we have incorporated the use of film clips to evoke certain emotional 
reactions during the creation of the target stimuli in order to provide a context which targets have 
something to react to, and how these reactions are modified by the presence or absence of the 
experimenter. Therefore, the study described in Chapter Three will focus on the development of 
the target stimuli, as well as, whether perceivers’ emotion recognition judgments are sensitive to 
the social context the targets experienced. Chapter Four focuses on investigating perceivers’ 
ability to explicitly discriminate the social contexts, and this experiment led us to suppose that 
targets’ expressiveness may affect the perceivers’ inferences of the social contexts. Based on 
research conducted in the social context area, it is often shown that people tend to inhibit their 
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expressions of negative emotions when in the presence of others than when they are alone, 
whereas for positive emotions, people tend to exaggerate their behaviour in the presence of 
others than in the absence of others. Therefore, one of the experiments described in Chapter Four 
investigates perceivers’ ratings of targets’ expressiveness and whether their ratings reveal any 
discrimination between the two social contexts. Two pilot studies were created in Chapter Five 
to examine whether there is a direct relationship between perceivers’ judgments of the social 
contexts, and their ratings of targets’ expressiveness. 
 As demonstrated by Cassidy et al.’s (2013, 2015) and Pillai et al.’s (2012, 2014) studies, 
it is worthwhile to measure perceivers’ eye movement strategies since it reveals a rich set of 
information about the processes perceivers employ when mentalising. Hence, the experiments 
described in Chapter Six are replications of those in Chapter Four, with the addition of eye-
tracking and limiting the number of target stimuli used to help focus the investigation of 
perceivers’ capability in discriminating social context from observing the behaviour of targets. 
This led to creating subtler target reactions as stimuli in order to gauge the robustness of 
perceivers’ ability to infer social context, and whether the mere presence of an experimenter who 
was not directly observing the targets is sufficient for perceivers to detect that the target was 
accompanied (Chapter Seven).  
 Perceivers’ explicit judgments of the social context in these experiments will inform us of 
their accuracy rate, in other words, their ability in using the minds of others to learn about the 
unobservable social context. As explained in Chapter One, it is useful to not only learn about 
how accurate people are at making social judgments, but how they made these judgments. 
Hence, the eye-tracking technique will be used to give us an insight into perceivers’ sensitivity to 
the social context experienced by targets, and whether such sensitivity is implicit in their eye 
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movements. In addition, since there may be gender differences in perceivers’ ability to mentalise, 
the experiments described in this thesis will look into this factor to examine whether it will have 
any impact on perceivers’ performances.  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
STIMULUS DEVELOPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
The present study adapted the retrodictive mindreading paradigm used in Pillai et al.’s 
(2012) and Cassidy et al.’s (2013) studies. Since this research focuses on perceivers’ ability to 
infer social contexts from observing a brief sample of targets’ behaviour, when creating the 
target stimuli, we draw upon an area of research which has been widely investigated – the effect 
of various social contexts on the behaviour of individuals, especially facial expressions. Most of 
the studies conducted in this area of research use movie clips as the emotional stimuli (e.g. 
Ansfield, DePaulo, & Bell, 1995; Zhang & Parmley, 2011) and the role of the observer in 
creating a social context.  
In the current study, we employed this method of using movie clips to evoke emotional 
reactions from targets that we loosely assumed were associated with Ekman’s six basic emotions 
(i.e., anger (irritation), disgust, fear, happiness (amusement), sadness, surprise) and neutral as the 
targets experienced two different social contexts (i.e., alone, observed). It is neither easy nor 
ethical to cause a target to become angry but it is perhaps more acceptable to make them 
irritated. This was achieved by presenting a video clip containing a repetitive noise and image 
which probably caused irritation instead of anger. Similarly, it is not easy to evoke happiness 
through a video clip but we can evoke the feeling of amusement through a funny scene from a 
comedy TV show. One of the advantages of using Ekman’s basic emotions as a point of 
reference to compile movie clips was that it provided a set of expected reactions from targets, 
and this might have narrowed targets’ behaviour into categories.  
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The main aim of the research was not to investigate whether perceivers were able to infer 
the emotions targets experienced, instead we investigated whether perceivers were able to 
identify the social context the targets were experiencing. In this chapter, we focus solely on how 
the target stimuli were developed to be used in later experiments.  
In Experiment 1a, participants were asked to rate various movie clips which best 
represent the basic emotions, of which two video clips per emotion were selected for Experiment 
1b. This stage resembled that of a validation process where the video clips selected in this 
experiment would be used in the next experiment as stimuli. In Experiment 1b, targets’ reactions 
to the movie clips as moderated by the social contexts were recorded and edited to be used as 
target stimuli. Lastly, in Experiment 1c, perceivers were asked to identify the emotions targets 
were experiencing to validate the effectiveness of the stimuli developed, and whether perceivers’ 
responses revealed any differences between the two social contexts targets experienced.  
 
3.2 Experiment 1a: Validation of Movie Clips 
The aim of this experiment was to narrow down the most effective set of movie clips to 
evoke irritation, disgust, fear, amusement, sadness, surprise, and neutral from targets in the 
stimuli development stage. In addition, this stage ensured that the clips selected were not subject 
to experimenter bias since the clips selected were not solely based on the experimenter’s decision 
or intuition of what was considered as the effective clips to evoke the selected emotions. By 
asking participants to rate the intensity of the emotions felt from viewing the video clips, we 
were able to pinpoint the most and least effective clips. This also ensured the effectiveness and 
established confidence in the movie clips to evoke the targeted emotions since the selected video 
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clips would be based on the consensus of a group of individuals. Once the movie clips were 
chosen, they were then edited and presented to the targets in Experiment 1b. 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-four university students (17 females, 7 males) between the ages of 18 to 30 years 
(M = 20.1, SD = 2.4) volunteered to participate in the study. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all participants, and the experiment was approved by the University of 
Nottingham Malaysia Campus Ethics Committee. 
 
3.2.2 Materials and Apparatus 
Thirty-four video clips were obtained from various movies and YouTube with the 
intention of evoking seven different emotions (i.e., irritation, disgust, fear, amusement, neutral, 
sadness, surprise - see Appendix 1 for the complete list of video clips used). The movie clips 
were all freely available and varied in duration between one to 13 minutes long. For every 
emotion, five different video clips were presented with the exception of neutral with only four 
video clips (links to the clips are provided in the reference section). These videos were divided 
randomly into two sets and were presented via PsychoPy (Version 1.74.01; Peirce, 2012) on a 
18.5-inch HP Compax LE1902x monitor with a resolution of 1366 x 768 pixels at a data 
sampling rate of 60 Hz. Participants were then asked to fill in the response sheet after viewing 
each clip.  
 
 
 
47 
 
3.2.3 Design 
This study was a between-subjects design in which participants were randomly divided 
into two groups to view one of the sets of 17 different movie clips. 
 
3.2.4 Procedure 
Participants sat in front of the desktop at a distance which was comfortable for them. The 
movie clips were presented using PsychoPy in a randomised order. Every clip was only shown 
once. After watching each clip, participants filled in the response sheet and were asked to select 
how they felt when viewing the video clip from a choice of seven alternatives (i.e., anger, 
disgust, fear, happy, neutral, sad, surprise). They were also asked to rate on a 7-point Likert 
scale, the intensity of the emotion evoked from viewing the clip, and to briefly describe the scene 
from the video clip which evoked the emotion they stated. These responses were used to assist 
with the selection and editing of the most effective movie clip. Upon completion, participants 
were debriefed. 
 
3.2.5 Results and Discussion 
The data were coded for the frequency of the emotions selected for each clip and 
intensity ratings were averaged across the number of participants who selected the same emotion 
for each clip (Table 1). The brief descriptions provided by the participants were coded based on 
the segments of the clips mentioned.   
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Table 1 
Frequency of the emotions selected for each clip (mean intensity) for Experiment 1a.  
Emotion/ 
Clip Anger Disgust Fear Happy Neutral Sad Surprise 
Anger 1 6 (4.6)   4 (4) 1 (4)  1 (7) 
Anger 2 7 (4.86)    5 (4)   
Anger 3 1 (5)   4 (3) 4 (4) 3 (3)  
Anger 4 9 (4)    3 (4)   
Anger 5 8 (4.63)    4 (4)   
Disgust 1  9 (6.56) 3 (6.67)     
Disgust 2  11 (5.64) 1 (5)     
Disgust 3  10 (5.1)   1 (4)   
Disgust 4 1 (6) 10 (6) 1 (7)     
Disgust 5  12 (6.08)      
Fear 1   11 (6.55)    1 (7) 
Fear 2   10 (5.7)    2 (4.5) 
Fear 3   10 (5.7)    2 (6.5) 
Fear 4  1 (4) 8 (4.88) 1 (5)   2 (4) 
Fear 5  1 (7) 7 (5.29)    4 (5.75) 
Happy 1    12 (5.83)    
Happy 2    12 (5.42)    
Happy 3    12 (5.5)    
Happy 4    11 (5.27) 1 (4)   
Happy 5    12 (6.08)    
Neutral 1 1 (4)    8 (4) 2 (2.5) 1 (2) 
Neutral 2    2 (4) 9 (4)  1 (6) 
Neutral 3    2 (4) 10 (4)   
Neutral 4    1 (6) 10 (4) 1 (5)  
Sad 1      12 (6.5)  
Sad 2      12 (6.09)  
Sad 3      12 (6.17)  
Sad 4      12 (5.33)  
Sad 5    2 (5)  9 (6) 1 (5) 
Surprise 1 1 (5)  4 (6.25)    7 (5.33) 
Surprise 2  2 (6.5) 2 (4.5)    8 (5.13) 
Surprise 3   3 (3.67)  1 (4)  8 (6.38) 
Surprise 4   7 (6)    5 (5.6) 
Surprise 5   5 (4.4) 1 (5)   6 (5.33) 
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A total of 14 video clips were selected. These video clips shared the highest consensus 
and intensity among participants and this was done by dividing the mean intensity with the 
number of participants who selected the same emotion. The following movie clips were selected: 
two clips from YouTube to evoke irritation (anger) (metallicKuma, 2009; Shurken12345, 2008), 
a clip from the movie 127 Hours (Colson & Boyle, 2010), and Excision (Lewis & Bates Jr., 
2012) to evoke disgust, two clips from Insidious (Blum, Peli, Schneider, & Wan, 2010) to evoke 
fear, two scenes from the TV series, FRIENDS (Bilsing-Graham, et al., 2004; Buckner & 
Halvorson, 2004) to evoke amusement (happiness), two clips from the documentary Secrets of 
Middle-Earth: Inside Tolkien’s ‘Lord of the Rings’ (Bott & Gormlie, 2003) were chosen to 
evoke neutral, a scene from Marley & Me (Netter, Rosenfelt, & Frankel, 2008) and a Thai 
advertisement (Thai Life Insurance, 2011) to evoke sadness, and lastly, a clip from Britain’s Got 
Talent (Hurford-Jones, 2009) and an advertisement from Germany (mrsmithereen, 2005) were 
selected to evoke surprise.  
The selected clips were edited with Windows Live Movie Maker to a shorter duration 
based on the brief descriptions provided by participants, and a 15 seconds black screen was 
added before the start of every clip as a resting period between clips for targets in later 
experiments.  
By selecting the movie clips based on participants’ ratings, it ensured the effectiveness of 
the clips and avoids the problem of experimenter bias. One of the limitations of this experiment 
was that participants were given a choice of seven emotions to select from. This lack of 
flexibility in responding may have swayed participants’ answers from what they genuinely felt 
from watching the video clips. Therefore, to obtain a more accurate and reliable representation of 
participants’ mental states from viewing the clips, participants should be allowed to freely 
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respond, and from there we could narrow their responses to fewer categories and ask another 
group of participants to choose the response that best matches their mental state. Moreover, by 
forming a list of categories based on participants’ description of their mental states, it would 
provide a closer representation of the way people describe their mental states in real life than 
using the list compiled by Ekman which might seem rather constrained in some instances.  
However, the purpose of this research is not necessarily to evoke the six basic emotions; 
rather, these emotions are just a point of reference in creating stimuli that will allow us to 
determine if perceivers who observe the reactions of targets watching the movie clips can guess 
whether they were alone or being observed. On that basis, the 14 movie clips selected for future 
experiments seem fairly effective in evoking the targeted emotions. 
 
3.3 Experiment 1b: Development of Target Stimuli  
The focus of this experiment was to create a set of dynamic stimuli to be used in future 
experiments. Participants for this experiment – from here on referred to as the targets – were 
instructed to watch the movie clips selected in Experiment 1a as they were subjected to two 
social conditions (i.e., observed by the experimenter, left alone in the room).  Targets’ reactions 
were recorded throughout the experiment.  
 
3.3.1 Targets 
Forty-three students (22 males, 21 females) aged between 18 and 24 (M = 19.5, SD = 1.7) 
were recruited from the University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus. Targets were of different 
nationalities: 31 Malaysians, 2 Chinese, 2 Pakistani, 2 Indians, 1 Singaporean, 1 Egyptian, 1 
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Syrian, 1 English, 1 Sri Lankan, and 1 South Korean. Written informed consent was obtained 
from all targets.  
 
3.3.2 Materials and Apparatus 
The selected 14 movie clips were presented in full screen in a randomised order via 
PsychoPy (Version 1.74.01; Peirce, 2012) on a HP Elite Book 8460p laptop. The laptop’s HD 
Webcam was used to record the targets during the experiment. Targets sat approximately 0.6 
meters from the laptop’s screen to ensure that the targets’ face, neck and shoulders were 
captured. 
 
3.3.3 Design 
This experiment used a repeated-measures design where all targets watched all 14 video 
clips and were subjected to both social conditions (observed, alone). 
 
3.3.4 Procedure 
A spacious room within the School of Psychology was used. Targets were tested 
individually and sat with their back against a white wall, while the experimenter sat across the 
table. Upon arrival, targets were informed that the task was to watch various video clips and rate 
what they felt from each clip. Every target experienced two conditions (i.e., observed, alone) 
presented in a counterbalanced order. For the ‘observed’ condition, the experimenter sat across 
the table from the target ostensibly to observe target’s behaviour as they watched the videos. 
During the observation, the experimenter was wearing a lab coat, scribbled notes on a clipboard 
and made no communication with the target. In the ‘alone’ condition, the experimenter left the 
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target alone in the room to watch the videos after making an excuse to leave (“I have an 
important phone call to make, I’ll be right outside, just come and look for me once you’re 
done”). 
The 14 video clips were divided into two blocks for the two conditions (i.e., observed, 
alone) with seven clips in each block designed to evoke certain emotions (i.e., irritation, disgust, 
fear, amusement, neutral, sadness, surprise). The clips were presented only once in a randomised 
order using PsychoPy. The presentation of the two blocks of video clips was counterbalanced 
across targets to avoid any confound in the content of the videos and the emotions across the 
conditions. Since the aim of the study was to record targets’ spontaneous behaviour, the webcam 
was set to record when targets entered the room, hence they were unaware that they were being 
filmed when completing the task.  
As a ‘decoy activity’, after each video, targets had to select a response out of seven 
choices (anger, disgust, fear, happy, neutral, sad, surprise) that best represented their emotion 
from watching the video, and rate the intensity of the emotion on a 7-point scale, 1= least intense 
and 7 = most intense. These responses were presented on the screen in a rating scale format, and 
targets responded by using the mouse.  
Upon completion of the task, targets were debriefed about the true nature of the 
experiment, and given the opportunity to ask questions. Written consent was obtained from 
targets to use their recorded behaviour for subsequent parts of the research.  
 
3.3.5 Editing 
The video recordings of targets’ behaviour were edited to capture their reactions using 
video-editing software – Windows Live Movie Maker and VirtualDub (Version 1.9.11; Lee, 
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2010). The reactions for each video clip were edited based on the descriptions made by 
participants in Experiment 1a as the most emotionally intense part of the video clip to prevent 
any experimenter bias in selecting the most reactive behaviour. The edited clips were muted in 
case the audio revealed the context the targets were experiencing. They varied in duration 
between two to 14 seconds. The video frame was cropped to 500 pixels for both width and 
height, showing only the target’s head to the top of their shoulders against a white wall (Figure 
1). The rate of presentation was 29 frames per second. Only videos of Asian targets were used, 
out of which ten (five males, five females) were randomly selected. The use of Asian targets only 
was not intentional but due to the use of convenience sampling during the recruitment of targets. 
Therefore, a total of 140 videos were used as target stimuli, where every target had 14 videos 
generated that comprised of two videos for each of the seven emotions.  
 
   
Figure 1. Examples of target stimuli. Target was watching videos that were intended to evoke 
the feeling of disgust when target was alone (left) and observed (right). 
 
3.4 Experiment 1c: Testing the Effectiveness of Target Stimuli 
This experiment was designed to investigate the effectiveness of the target stimuli 
developed in Experiment 1b, and perceivers’ sensitivity to the social contexts the targets were 
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experiencing by asking perceivers to infer the emotions based on targets’ reactions. The main 
focus of this experiment was not to investigate whether perceivers could identify the emotions 
experienced by the targets; rather we concentrate on perceivers’ sensitivity to whether the targets 
were observed or alone based on targets’ reactions. 
Past research (e.g. Ansfield, 2007; Ekman & Friesen, 1982) has mainly focused on how 
people express their emotions in different social contexts. For instance, many have found that 
individuals tended to express more in the company of others than alone when experiencing 
positive emotions (e.g. happiness, surprise) and people express less when experiencing negative 
emotions (e.g. disgust, fear) in the presence of others as compared to when they were alone. In 
addition, research examining the function of facial expressions – whether they are a “readout” 
(Buck, 1984) of a person’s internal state (i.e., emotions) or they are an expression of one’s social 
intentions (behavioural ecology view) (Fridlund, 1991) indicated that facial expressions are 
influenced by various factors which include the person’s social intentions and internal mental 
state. Hence, the function of facial expressions should not be viewed as exclusive to one factor or 
the other. Drawing from these studies, we hypothesised that perceivers’ responses in identifying 
the emotions the targets were experiencing would be influenced by the social conditions the 
targets were in.  
 
3.4.1 Participants 
Fifty-five (26 males, 29 females) university students between 18 and 32 (M = 22.5, SD = 
2.6) were recruited for this experiment. Perceivers were of different nationalities: 39 Malaysians, 
1 Chinese, 7 Sri Lankans, 4 Vietnamese, 1 South Korean, 2 Indians, and 1 Sudanese. Six of 
perceivers’ (2 males, 4 females) data were excluded from the analysis due to technical error 
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during the recording of the responses or because they stated that they knew one or more of the 
targets personally. All perceivers gave their written informed consent to take part in the 
experiment. 
 
3.4.2 Materials and Apparatus 
A total of 140 target stimuli created in Experiment 1b were presented randomly in two 
separate blocks (male targets, female targets) using PsychoPy (Version 1.74.01; Peirce, 2012). 
Each stimulus was only displayed once. The task was conducted on a 14-inch screen, HP Elite 
Book 8460p laptop.  
 
3.4.3 Design 
This experiment was a 2 (Condition: observed, alone) × 7 (Emotion: irritation, disgust, 
fear, amusement, neutral, sadness, surprise) repeated-measures design with gender of perceivers 
as a between-subjects factor. 
 
3.4.4 Procedure 
All perceivers were tested individually in a controlled environment where they were 
instructed to identify which emotion the target in the video was expressing. The presentation of 
the two blocks of stimuli was counterbalanced across perceivers. After each stimulus, perceivers 
had to select the emotion the target in the stimulus was expressing from a choice of seven 
responses presented in a rating scale format by using the mouse (Figure 2) at their own pace. The 
responses were recorded automatically by PsychoPy. A fixation point (+) appeared in the centre 
of the screen for two seconds after every response before the presentation of the next stimulus.  
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Figure 2. Screenshot of the task in Experiment 1c where perceivers had to select the emotion 
they thought the target was expressing by selecting one of the seven choices. 
 
3.4.5 Results and Discussion 
To examine whether perceivers’ judgements of the emotions expressed by targets were 
influenced by the social conditions targets were experiencing, the responses were scored based 
on perceivers’ correct responses for each stimulus, and these scores were grouped for the seven 
different emotions for the two different conditions.  
One-sample t-tests were conducted on the accuracy rates for the seven different emotions 
for both social conditions to investigate whether perceivers were able to perform above the level 
of chance, with a test value = 1.43. The test value was 1.43 because there were a total of 10 
targets for each emotion and condition, and if perceivers performed at the level of chance, they 
would be correct 1 out of 7 for each stimulus.  It was found that for all emotions and conditions, 
perceivers were able to make correct judgments above chance (ps < .001), with observed and 
fear with a p-value < .05, and the exception of when targets were observed and irritated being 
significantly below chance (t(48) = -8.04, p < .001), while for alone and irritated (t(48) = .67, p = 
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.50), alone and surprise (t(48) = 1.15, p = .26), and observed and sad (t(48) = .11, p = .91), 
perceivers did not perform significantly above chance. 
However, the main focus for this experiment was to investigate whether perceivers’ 
judgments of targets’ emotions were influenced by the social conditions targets experienced, and 
whether there were any gender differences in perceivers’ performance, and not on how accurate 
the perceivers performed on the emotion recognition task. A 7 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, fear, 
amusement, neutral, sadness, surprise) × 2 (Conditions: observed, alone) × 2 (Gender of 
Perceivers: male, female) ANOVA was conducted. Effect sizes are reported as ηp2 for ANOVA 
results and are interpreted as follows; ≥ 0.01 is considered a small effect, ≥ 0.06 a medium effect, 
and ≥ 0.14 is a large effect (Cohen, 1992). There was a large significant main effect of Emotions, 
F(4.10, 192.69) = 228.67, p < .001, ηp2 = .83, and large significant interaction between Emotions 
and Conditions, F(4.34, 204.19) = 20.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .30 (Figure 3). Posthoc paired samples 
t–tests indicated that perceivers were significantly more accurate when targets were alone than 
observed for irritation (t(48) = 4.88, p < .001), disgust (t(48) = 4.14, p < .001), fear (t(48) = 2.11, 
p = .04), and sadness (t(48) = 5.38, p < .001), while for amusement (t(48) = -6.05, p < .001), 
neutral (t(48) = -2.11, p = .04) and surprise (t(48) = -5.16, p < .001), they were significantly more 
accurate when the targets were observed than alone. This demonstrated that perceivers’ 
judgments of the emotions expressed by targets were influenced by the social contexts the targets 
experienced. It appears that perceivers’ were more accurate when targets were observed than 
alone for the positive emotions (i.e., amusement, surprise) and neutral, and the opposite for 
negative emotions (i.e., irritation, disgust, fear, sadness). Is it possible that perceivers were 
making their judgments based on targets’ expressiveness which were affected by the different 
social conditions and the emotions experienced? If so, this is consistent with previous studies 
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which found that individuals tended to be more expressive with negative emotions when alone 
than in the company of others, and vice versa for positive emotions. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean accuracy rates for the seven emotions and social conditions in Experiment 1c. 
Standard errors of the mean are represented by the error bars.  
 
There was a medium significant interaction between Emotions and Gender of Perceivers, 
F(4.10, 192.69) = 3.33, p = .01, ηp2 = .07 (Figure 4). Posthoc independent samples t-tests 
revealed that female perceivers were more accurate than male perceivers in judging targets 
reacting to fearful videos (t(47) = -5.07, p < .001). Pairwise comparisons of the estimated 
marginal means with Bonferroni adjusted α levels of the main effect of Emotions revealed that 
there were significant differences between perceivers’ correct responses, except between fear and 
sadness, fear and surprise, and between sadness and surprise.   
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Figure 4. The mean accuracy rates of male and female perceivers for the seven emotions in 
Experiment 1c. Standard errors of the mean are represented by the error bars. 
 
There was no significant main effect of Conditions, F(1,47) < 1, p = .37, no significant 
interaction between Conditions and Gender, F(1,47) < 1, p = .89, and no significant interaction 
between all three factors, F(4.34, 204.19) < 1, p = .62.  
Overall, perceivers’ judgments of the emotions expressed by the targets demonstrated 
that perceivers were sensitive to the social contexts the targets experienced. This was supported 
by the variations in accuracy rates between the emotions and social conditions targets 
experienced. These findings reflect Hess et al.’s (1995) argument that facial expressions are 
affected by different factors which include the target’s emotions and social conditions. Hence, 
the function of facial expressions can be seen as a representation of the person’s internal state 
and social intentions.  This implies that perceivers’ judgments of the emotions targets were 
expressing were influenced by the social context the targets experienced, suggesting that 
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perceivers are able to not only interpret the emotional expressions of others, but that their level 
of success in doing so is also dependent on the social contexts the targets were experiencing. 
Furthermore, this demonstrated the effectiveness of the target stimuli where perceivers were able 
to gauge the emotions of the targets and this judgment is influenced by the social contexts which 
modified the targets’ behaviour. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
INFERRING SOCIAL CONTEXT AND EXPRESSIVENESS OF TARGETS’ 
BEHAVIOUR 
 
The findings of Experiment 1c described in the previous chapter, suggested that 
perceivers’ judgments of targets’ emotional displays were moderated by the social contexts (i.e., 
observed, alone) the targets experienced. Moreover, perceivers’ accuracy rates varied across the 
different emotions and social contexts, which led us to question whether perceivers’ judgments 
relied on the targets’ expressiveness. In this chapter, we examined perceivers’ ability to correctly 
identify the social contexts based on targets’ reactions (Experiment 2), and whether perceivers’ 
ratings of the intensity of targets’ reactions are influenced by the target’s social context 
(Experiment 3). 
 
4.1 Experiment 2: Inferring Social Context 
The aim of this experiment was to investigate perceivers’ ability to correctly detect the 
social contexts (i.e., observed, alone) based on a few seconds of targets’ emotional reaction (i.e., 
irritation, disgust, fear, amusement, sadness, surprise, neutral). In addition, this experiment also 
took into account the role of gender differences in the ability to interpret the targets’ behaviour.  
 
4.1.1 Participants 
Fifty-one students (25 males, 26 females) aged between 17 and 36 (M = 20.2, SD = 3.9) 
were recruited from the University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus. Participants comprised of 
various nationalities: 42 Malaysians, 2 Indians, 2 Mauritians, 1 Indonesian, 1 British, 1 
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Kazakhstani, 1 Pakistani, and 1 Egyptian. Written informed consent was obtained from all 
participants. However, eight (six males, two females) of the participants noted that they knew 
one or more of the targets personally and their data were eliminated from the analysis.  
 
4.1.2 Materials and Apparatus 
To demonstrate the two possible social contexts the targets experienced, the 
experimenter’s behaviour during the stimuli development stage (Experiment 1b in Chapter 
Three) was recorded using a Nikon Coolpix S5100. The experimenter sat across the table from a 
confederate who acted as a target. The video camera was positioned next to the confederate, 
aimed at the experimenter to record how the social condition appeared from the perspective of 
the target. These recorded video clips were edited using VirtualDub (Version 1.9.11; Lee, 2010) 
and Windows Live Movie Maker. The clips were five seconds long with the audio muted, and 
were labelled at the top centre to indicate the social condition (observed, alone, see Figure 5). 
The video clips were 856 pixels in width and 480 pixels in height, with a rate of presentation at 
29 frames per second. 
 
    
Figure 5. An example of the stimuli presented to perceivers before viewing the target stimuli in 
Experiment 2 (Left: Observed condition, Right: Alone condition). 
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The 140 target stimuli created in Experiment 1b as described in Chapter Three were used 
in this experiment. The stimuli consisted of five female and five male targets reacting to videos 
that might elicit irritation, disgust, fear, amusement, sadness, surprise and neutral in two different 
social conditions (i.e., observed, alone). These stimuli were presented randomly in two blocks 
(i.e., male faces, female faces) via PsychoPy (Version 1.74.01; Peirce, 2012) on a 14-inch screen, 
HP Elite Book 8460p laptop. 
 
4.1.3 Design 
This experiment employed a 7 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, fear, amusement, sadness, 
surprise, neutral) × 2 (Conditions: observed, alone) × 2 (Gender of Perceivers: male, female) 
design where all perceivers were shown the same set of stimuli. 
 
4.1.4 Procedure 
Perceivers were tested individually in a quiet room. They were presented with two blocks 
of stimuli which were counterbalanced across perceivers. Before the start of the experiment, 
perceivers were shown two videos of the experimenter’s behaviour in the observed and alone 
condition to give perceivers an idea of the social conditions the targets experienced. Perceivers 
were instructed to rate whether the target was alone or observed for each of the 140 video stimuli 
based on the target’s behaviour. A fixation point (+) was presented in the centre of the screen for 
two seconds to direct perceivers’ attention to the screen where the next stimulus would appear. 
The stimuli were presented in a randomised order with each stimulus only viewed once by the 
participants. After every clip, perceivers were given a two-alternative forced choice question to 
decide whether the target was alone or observed, and were required to answer using the mouse 
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(Figure 6). The responses were recorded automatically by PsychoPy. Participants were allowed 
to answer each question at their own pace. 
 
 
Figure 6. A screenshot of the task in Experiment 2 where perceivers had to select the social 
condition the targets experienced after watching each stimulus. 
 
4.1.5 Results and Discussion 
To examine whether perceivers were able to correctly detect when targets were observed 
or alone above the level of chance, responses were coded based on the number of correct 
responses for each stimulus. Table 2 shows the mean accuracy rates for the different emotions 
and conditions. One-sample t-tests were conducted on the accuracy rates with a test value of five, 
and it was found that perceivers were able to perform significantly above the level of chance 
when targets were observed when watching the irritation, neutral and sadness videos, and when 
targets were alone when watching the disgust and fear videos. However, accuracy rate does not 
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account for any biases in perceivers’ responses (i.e., tendency to select one response over the 
other), thus, the responses were then coded based on the number of times perceivers responded 
‘observed’ for the different emotions and conditions.  
 
Table 2 
Mean accuracy rates (Standard Deviations) for the seven Emotions for Observed and Alone 
condition for Experiment 2. 
 Mean (SD) 
 Alone Observed 
Irritation 5.49 (2.26) 5.98 (1.73) 
Disgust 3.80 (1.45) 4.79 (1.96) 
Fear 6.00 (1.81) 4.79 (1.95) 
Amusement 4.63 (2.37) 5.11 (2.66) 
Neutral 4.65 (1.73) 5.91 (2.36) 
Sadness 5.58 (2.30) 5.91 (2.42) 
Surprise 5.37 (1.89) 4.79 (1.64) 
 
 
A 7 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, fear, amusement, neutral, sadness, surprise) × 2 
(Conditions: observed, alone) × 2 (Gender of Perceivers: male, female) ANOVA was conducted. 
Effect sizes are reported as ηp2 for ANOVA results and are interpreted as follows; ≥ 0.01 is 
considered a small effect, ≥ 0.06 a medium effect, and ≥ 0.14 is a large effect (Cohen, 1992). 
There was a medium significant main effect of Emotions, F(2.91, 119.49) = 3.29, p < .05, ηp2 = 
.07, and a large significant main effect of Conditions, F(1, 41) = 6.61, p < .05, ηp2 = .38. The 
main effect of Conditions was due to perceivers judging that the targets were observed 
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significantly more often when that was true than when it was not true. Pairwise comparisons of 
the estimated marginal means with Bonferroni adjusted α levels of the main effect of Emotions 
revealed that perceivers tended to judge that the targets were observed significantly more for 
neutral than fear. In addition, there was a medium significant interaction effect between 
Emotions and Conditions, F(6, 246) = 3.36, p < .005, ηp2 = .08 which suggests that the 
discrimination of social conditions varied between the emotions (Figure 7). Posthoc paired-
samples t-tests revealed that perceivers significantly discriminated between observed and alone 
for three emotions: irritation, t(42) = 3.53, p < .005, fear, t(42) = 2.08, p < .05, and sadness, t(42) 
= 5.49, p < .001.  
 
 
Figure 7. Mean number of times perceivers responded ‘observed’ out of 10 for alone and 
observed conditions in Experiment 2. Standard errors of the mean are represented by the error 
bars. 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Irritation Disgust Fear Amusement Neutral Sad Surprise
M
e
a
n
 
Emotions 
Alone
Observed
67 
 
There was a medium significant interaction effect between Emotions and the Gender of 
the Perceivers, F(2.91, 119.49) = 4.37, p = .006, ηp2 = .096. Posthoc independent-samples t-tests 
suggest that female perceivers tended to respond ‘observed’ significantly more than the male 
participants when targets were watching the neutral, t(41) = 2.30, p < .05 and sadness, t(41) = 
3.39, p < .005 clips. Moreover, there was a large significant interaction effect between 
Conditions and the Gender of the Perceivers, F(1, 41) = 6.61, p < .05, ηp2 = .14 (Figure 8). 
Posthoc independent-samples t-tests revealed that overall, females had a higher tendency to 
judge targets as observed than the male perceivers, t(41) = 2.59, p < .05. Additionally, posthoc 
paired-samples t-tests suggest that there was a significant difference within the females 
judgments where they tended to respond ‘observed’ when that was true than when targets were 
alone, t(23) = 6.13, p < .001. Lastly, there was no significant interaction between Emotions, 
Conditions and the Gender of the Perceivers, F(6,246) = 2.05, p = .06 suggesting there was no 
evidence of variation in the discrimination between the emotions and genders of the perceivers.  
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Figure 8. Mean number of times male and female perceivers responded ‘observed’ out of 10 for 
both social conditions in Experiment 2. Standard errors of the mean are represented by the error 
bars. 
 
In summary, the findings suggest that the perceivers were able to distinguish when targets 
were being observed by another and when they were alone. Moreover, perceivers’ performance 
varied based on the emotional clips the targets watched and the social conditions they 
experienced: specifically when targets watched the irritation, fear and sadness video clips. Is it 
possible that the reactions to negative emotional videos are easier to discriminate? Did perceivers 
rely on the targets’ expressiveness when making these judgments?  
Furthermore, could perceivers have used a low-level strategy to determine the social 
contexts targets experienced? For instance, did targets look away from the laptop screen (and 
thus the camera) and shift their gaze towards the experimenter more often in the observed than 
the alone condition? If so, perceivers might have inferred the social context based on the 
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frequency targets looked away from the screen. In order to investigate this possibility, we coded 
the number of times targets looked away from the screen but found no evidence to suggest that 
targets looked away from the screen more often in the observed than in the alone condition, t(58) 
= .63, p = .53. Therefore, there is no basis for suggesting that perceivers used this low-level cue 
to infer whether the targets were observed or alone. 
 
4.2 Experiment 3: Rate the Intensity of Targets’ Expressiveness 
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to seek converging evidence in support of perceivers’ 
sensitivity to the social context targets experienced. Past research has demonstrated that when 
people experience positive emotions (e.g. happiness, surprise) they tend to be more expressive 
when in the presence of others than when alone (Buck, 1984). On the other hand, when people 
experience negative emotions (e.g. disgust, fear) they tend to inhibit their expressions more when 
in the company of others than when alone (Spain, Eaton, & Funder, 2000). Is it possible that 
perceivers rely on the targets’ expressiveness to discriminate between the social conditions?  
In this experiment, perceivers were asked to rate the degree to which targets were 
controlling their expressions (inhibiting or exaggerating), with the prediction that they might 
interpret that targets tend to inhibit their expressions when observed by another and experiencing 
a negative emotion (i.e., irritation, disgust, fear, sadness) but exaggerate their expressions when 
being observed and experiencing a positive emotion (i.e., amusement, surprise). Lastly, we 
expect that perceivers might judge targets to be neither hiding nor exaggerating their expressions 
when observed by another or alone and experiencing a neutral emotion. 
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4.2.1 Participants 
Twenty-five male and twenty-four female university students aged between 17 and 29 (M 
= 18.7, SD = 2.2) were recruited. Perceivers were of different nationalities: 42 Malaysians, 2 Sri 
Lankans, 2 Pakistani, 1 Kazakhstani, 1 Indonesian, and 1 Indian. All perceivers gave their 
written informed consent to participate in the experiment.  
 
4.2.2 Materials and Apparatus 
The 140 target stimuli used in Experiment 2 were also used in this experiment. Similarly, 
the stimuli were divided into two blocks (i.e., male and female faces) and were presented using 
PsychoPy (Version 1.74.01; Peirce, 2012). A 14-inch screen, HP Elite Book 8460p laptop was 
used.   
 
4.2.3 Design 
A 7 (Emotion: irritation, disgust, fear, amusement, neutral, sadness, surprise) × 2 
(Condition: observed, alone) repeated-measures design was used with the gender of the 
perceivers (male, female) as the between-subjects factor. 
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that in Experiment 2 with the exception that perceivers 
were not shown the videos of the two social conditions, and were not asked to detect whether 
targets were alone or observed. Indeed, perceivers were not given any information of the social 
contexts the targets experienced. After each target clip, perceivers were asked to decide the 
degree to which the target was controlling their expression on a rating scale of 1-7 (1 = 
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inhibited… 4 = neither … 7 = exaggerated, Figure 9). The rest of the procedure was identical to 
that of Experiment 2. 
 
 
Figure 9. A screenshot of Experiment 3 where perceivers were asked to rate the intensity of the 
target’s expressions on a rating scale of 1-7 (1 = inhibited… 4 = neither… 7 = exaggerated).  
 
4.2.5 Results and Discussion 
Perceivers’ ratings of the intensity of targets’ expressions were averaged across the 
different emotions and conditions before conducting a 7 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, fear, 
amusement, neutral, sadness, surprise) × 2 (Conditions: observed, alone) ×2 (Gender of 
Perceivers: male, female) ANOVA. Effect sizes are reported as ηp2 for ANOVA results and are 
interpreted as follows; ≥ 0.01 is considered a small effect, ≥ 0.06 a medium effect, and ≥ 0.14 is 
a large effect (Cohen, 1992). There was a large significant main effect of Emotions, F(3.14, 
147.70) = 85.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .64, which resulted from perceivers judging that targets were 
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exaggerating their expressions more for amusement than other emotions (ps < .001) except for 
disgust, and a similar pattern of judgment was shown with disgust when compared to the other 
emotions (ps < .001) except for surprise. On the other hand, perceivers rated that targets tend to 
inhibit their expressions more when irritated than other emotions (ps < .001) except for neutral 
and sadness. When targets were watching the fear clips, perceivers rated that targets tended to 
exaggerate their expressions more than irritation, neutral, and sadness (ps < .001), but inhibiting 
when compared to disgust, amusement, and surprise. For targets who watched the sadness clips, 
perceivers rated them to be inhibiting their expressions more than others (ps < .001) except when 
compared with irritation and neutral. Additionally, perceivers judged targets were exaggerating 
their expressions more in surprise than other emotions (ps < .001) except for amusement and 
disgust.  
There was no significant main effect of Conditions, F(1,47) = 2.91, p = .09, but there was 
a large significant interaction between Emotions and Conditions, F(6,282) = 10.10, p < .001, ηp2 
= .18 (Figure 10). Posthoc paired-samples t-tests revealed a significant difference between 
disgust alone and observed, t(48) = 4.02, p < .001, which was due to perceivers’ judgments that 
targets were inhibiting their expressions more in the observed than in the alone conditions. There 
was also a significant difference between surprise alone and observed, t(48) = -5.59, p < .001, 
which resulted from perceivers judging that targets were exaggerating their expressions more in 
the observed condition than in the alone condition. Therefore, perceivers were able to effectively 
discriminate whether targets were observed or alone by inferring the extent to which targets were 
controlling their expressions. However, these findings demonstrated that it was not always the 
case that perceivers judged targets were hiding their expressions more when observed than when 
alone; instead the direction of the effect also relied on the emotions the targets was experiencing.  
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Figure 10. Mean ratings of how targets were controlling their expressions (1 = inhibited… 4 = 
neither… 7 = exaggerated) for the alone and observed condition in Experiment 3. The standard 
errors of the mean are represented by the error bars. 
 
The gender of the perceivers did not significantly interact with Emotions, F(3.14, 147.70) 
< 1, p = .83, or with Conditions, F(1, 47) = 2.91, p = .09. There was also no significant three-way 
interaction between Emotions, Conditions and the Gender of the Perceivers, F(6, 282) = 1.54, p 
= .17. This suggests that there were no variation between the male and female perceivers in the 
way they rated the targets’ expressiveness in regards to the emotions and the social conditions 
the targets were experiencing. 
The results from this experiment were consistent with expectations. Generally, perceivers 
tended to judge that targets were exaggerating their expressions when experiencing a positive 
emotion (surprise) when observed by another than when alone. In contrast, they judged that 
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targets inhibited their expressions more often when experiencing a negative emotion (disgust) 
when observed than alone. These patterns of ratings are consistent with past research on the way 
individuals control their expressions in different social conditions (Buck, 1984; Spain et al., 
2000), thus suggesting that perceivers were sensitive to this phenomenon and that their 
judgments effectively distinguished between the two social conditions targets experienced. 
However, these findings suggest that this effect is stronger when targets experienced certain 
emotions (disgust, surprise) than others. To further investigate perceivers’ ability and sensitivity 
to detect the social conditions targets experienced based on their emotional reactions, we used 
stimuli where targets reacted to videos intended to evoke disgust, surprise and irritation. Even 
though, in the results reported above, there was no significant difference in perceivers’ ratings 
when targets were alone and observed when watching the irritation clips, it was the only emotion 
approaching a significant difference, t(48) = 1.92, p = .06. Hence, in future experiments 
described in the next few chapters only 60 target stimuli were used. By narrowing the list of 
emotional expressions, this would aid in further understanding perceivers’ ability in interpreting 
the behaviour of others in order to discriminate the social conditions others experienced.  
 
4.3 General Discussion 
The purpose of the experiments described in this chapter was to investigate whether 
perceivers have the ability to infer social context from observing a brief sample of targets’ 
behaviour. The results in Experiment 2 suggest that perceivers were able to distinguish when 
targets were alone or observed after watching targets’ behaviour, especially with irritation, fear, 
and sadness. Therefore, implying that people are not only able to interpret the behaviour of 
others, but they are also able to determine the social context experienced by others.  
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Were perceivers using a low-level strategy to determine whether the target was observed 
or alone? For example, did targets look away from the screen and look up (at the experimenter) 
more often when the experimenter was present than absent? If so, this might have cued 
perceivers’ judgements to the social context, without the need to interpret the target’s reaction to 
the emotional video clips. There was no evidence to suggest that targets looked away from the 
screen more often in the observed than in the alone condition, suggesting that perceivers could 
not have used the targets’ eye gaze as a clue to social context. Moreover, in Experiment 3 
perceivers had no knowledge of the social context the targets experienced yet it was implicit in 
their ratings of targets’ expressiveness that they were sensitive to the two social contexts of the 
targets.  
In addition, perceivers’ ratings of the targets’ expressiveness did not reveal a similar 
pattern for a specific social context: for instance they did not always judge that targets tended to 
hide their expressions more when being observed than alone. Rather, perceivers’ ratings were 
that targets tended to inhibit their expressions more when experiencing negative emotions (i.e., 
irritation, disgust) and exaggerate when experiencing positive emotions (i.e., surprise) when in 
the company of another. Hence, this shows that targets’ reactions toward the emotional video 
clips were moderated by the presence or absence of the experimenter. These findings suggest 
that perceivers are attuned to this complex relationship between social contexts and targets’ 
emotional expressivity. Perhaps perceivers’ awareness of this link between social context and the 
expressiveness of an individual enabled them to discriminate between when the target was 
observed or alone. If so, this implies that people have a natural understanding of the relationship 
between social conditions and its effect on another person’s expressiveness of positive and 
negative emotions. Granted, these findings are not sufficient to establish a direct link as to 
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whether perceivers’ judgements of targets’ social context is dependent on their judgments of the 
intensity of targets’ emotional expressions.  
In Experiment 2, we found a significant difference in performance between female and 
male perceivers where the females tended to judge the targets as observed when it is true more 
than the male perceivers. This lends its support to the debate on whether there is a female 
advantage in mentalising abilities (e.g. Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997; Bosacki & Astington, 
1999) – our findings suggested that female perceivers were better at discriminating targets’ 
social context. Does it mean that females are more sensitive to identifying subtler expressions as 
argued by Hall and Matsumoto (2004), thus enabling them to perform better when discriminating 
the target’s social context? However, this possibility gained no support from Experiment 3’s 
findings where there were no gender differences in the rating of the intensity of the target’s 
expressions. This is similar to previous research which found no female advantage in mentalising 
tasks (e.g. Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, & Jimenez, 2000; Rahman, Wilson, & Abrahams, 2004). 
Therefore, it is difficult to conclude whether there are any gender differences in performance for 
our task.  
In summary, Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that perceivers have the ability to 
discriminate when targets were alone and when they were observed, and that perceivers’ 
judgments of targets’ expressiveness were also moderated by the social context the targets 
experienced. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
LINKING TARGETS’ EXPRESSIVENESS WITH PERCEIVERS’ ABILITY TO 
DISCRIMINATE SOCIAL CONTEXT 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The findings reported in the previous chapter suggest that perceivers have the ability to 
discriminate between the different social contexts (i.e., alone, observed) from observing a 
target’s behaviour. In other words, perceivers are able to use the clues from the target’s 
behaviour and guess the social condition that the target was experiencing. This demonstrates 
people’s ability to mentalise by accessing the minds (through observable behaviour) of others 
and indirectly learn about the social world. Moreover, from the previous chapter, we found that 
this ability to discriminate between social conditions might be based on an interpretation of the 
target’s expressiveness. The findings revealed that perceivers judged targets to be inhibiting their 
expressions more when they were observed and experiencing a negative emotion (e.g. irritation, 
disgust) than when they were alone in the room. Conversely, perceivers rated that targets were 
more expressive when in the company of another when experiencing a positive emotion (e.g. 
surprise) as compared to when they were alone. These judgements of the intensity of targets’ 
behaviour can be interpreted in the context of past research which examined the way people 
control their expressions in different social contexts.  
For years research in the area of facial expressions has been examining how people 
behave and control their facial expressions in different social situations (e.g. Ansfield, 2007; 
Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Wagner & Lee, 1999). A series of studies found that social presence 
influences individuals to either inhibit or exaggerate their facial expressions depending on the 
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emotions they felt (e.g. Ekman, 1972, Killbride & Yarczower, 1989). For instance, people who 
are experiencing positive emotions (e.g. happiness, surprise) tend to exaggerate their expressions 
when in the presence of others than when left alone (e.g. Buck, 1984; Ekman & Friesen, 1975). 
Conversely, people tend to inhibit their expressions when experiencing negative emotions (e.g. 
anger, disgust) when in the company of others than when left alone (Spain, Eaton, & Funder, 
2000). Furthermore, Ekman and Friesen (1969) claimed that our behaviour is governed by 
display rules (i.e., a set of rules on the types of behaviour deemed as appropriate by society for 
different social situations).  
Therefore, we are interested in investigating the basis of perceivers’ judgments on the 
intensity of the targets’ expressiveness, and whether perceivers’ ability to detect social presence 
or absence is based on targets’ expressiveness. The two pilot studies described in this chapter 
were conducted to examine this. 
In both pilot studies, perceivers were asked to rate the extent to which targets were 
controlling their expressions, followed by an open-ended question of what the perceivers thought 
caused the targets to control their expressions. Open-ended question was used to allow perceivers 
to respond in their own words (Brennan, 1997). The open-ended question was worded differently 
for Pilot Study 1 and 2 to investigate whether similar range of responses would be obtained from 
perceivers. Thus, if the range of responses from both pilot studies concurs with the suggestion 
that perceivers’ judgment of target’s social context is based on target’s expressiveness, we are 
then able to link perceivers’ ability to infer social context from targets’ behaviour is based on the 
intensity of targets’ behaviour.  
These pilot studies used the same set of target stimuli as in the previous experiments, 
specifically for the stimuli in which the targets watched the movie clips intended to evoke 
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irritation, disgust and surprise. These stimuli were selected because the findings from 
Experiment 3 showed significant differences in perceivers’ ratings of the targets’ expressiveness 
for both disgust and surprise, with irritation approaching significance. By narrowing the number 
of emotional expressions to those that perceivers were more sensitive to would hopefully aid in 
furthering our investigation into understanding perceivers’ ability to gauge social conditions 
from observing a brief sample of behaviour. 
 
5.2 Pilot Study 1 
This pilot study was conducted to examine how perceivers make a judgment of the extent 
to which the target was inhibiting or exaggerating his/her expression. Perceivers were asked to 
rate the targets’ expressiveness and what they thought caused the targets to control their 
expressions. 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
Ten female and three male university students, all of whom were 18 years old and Malaysian, 
were recruited for this study. Written informed consent was obtained from all perceivers. No 
perceivers were excluded from the analysis of this study. 
 
5.2.2 Materials and Apparatus 
Sixty of the 140 stimuli created in Experiment 1b as described in Chapter Three were 
used in this experiment. The stimuli consisted of ten male and ten female targets’ reactions to the 
irritation, disgust and surprise movie clips when they were observed and when they were alone. 
All stimuli were presented using PsychoPy (Version 1.74.01; Peirce, 2012) on an 18.5-inch HP 
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Compax LE1902x monitor with a resolution of 1366 × 768 pixels at a data sampling rate of 60 
Hz.  
 
5.2.3 Design 
The pilot study was a within-subjects design where all perceivers were shown the same 
set of stimuli. 
 
5.2.4 Procedure 
Perceivers were tested individually. Before the start of the experiment, perceivers were 
given the response sheet and were asked to write down their answers after watching each 
stimulus. Perceivers were instructed to rate the extent to which the target was controlling his/her 
expression on a rating scale of 1-7 (1 = inhibited… 4 = neither … 7 = exaggerated), and answer 
an open-ended question; ‘What do you think caused this person to control their expression?’ 
after viewing each stimulus. There were no time limit for the perceivers to respond and they 
were able to complete the task at their own pace. Once they had responded to the questions for a 
stimulus, they pressed ‘space bar’ to proceed to the next stimulus. A fixation point (+) was 
presented in the centre of the screen for 1 second before each stimulus was presented.  
After perceivers had completed the task, they were asked whether they knew any of the 
targets personally, and the data of the participants who stated that they knew one or more of the 
targets were excluded from the analysis.  
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5.2.5 Results and Discussion 
Perceivers’ ratings of the intensity of the targets’ expressions were averaged across the 
different emotions and conditions, then analysed by conducting a 3 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, 
surprise) × 2 (Conditions: observed, alone) repeated-measures ANOVA. Effect sizes are reported 
as ηp2 for ANOVA results and are interpreted as follows; ≥ 0.01 is considered a small effect, ≥ 
0.06 a medium effect, and ≥ 0.14 is a large effect (Cohen, 1992). There was a large significant 
main effect of Emotions, F(2, 24) = 15.82, p < .001, ηp2 = .57. Pairwise comparisons of the 
estimated marginal means with Bonferroni adjusted α levels revealed that perceivers tended to 
rate that targets were inhibiting their expressions when viewing the irritation clip more than 
disgust (p < .005), and surprise (p < .05). There was no significant main effect of Conditions, 
F(1, 12) < 1, p = .66, but there was a large significant interaction between Emotions and 
Conditions, F(2, 24) = 8.70, p < .005, ηp2 = .42 (Figure 11). Posthoc paired-samples t-tests 
showed that perceivers tended to rate the targets to be significantly more expressive when they 
were alone than being observed while watching the irritation clips, t(12) = 2.65, p < .005. In 
addition, their ratings indicated that targets tended to exaggerate their expressions when observed 
by another than alone for surprise, t(12) = 3.29, p < .05.  
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Figure 11. The mean ratings of the intensity of the targets’ expressions (1 = inhibited… 4 = 
neither… 7 = exaggerated) for the alone and observed condition in Pilot Study 1. The standard 
errors of the mean are represented by the error bars. 
 
For the qualitative data, perceivers’ responses fell broadly into four main categories – 
internal, external, social condition, and event. ‘Internal’ responses referred to internal states such 
as mental states, emotions, etc. (e.g. ‘She’s in disbelief’, ‘She’s happy’). The ‘external’ category 
referred to responses involving the target’s observable behaviour such as facial expressions and 
body movements (e.g. ‘She is purposely doing some strange expression’, ‘Funny face’). The 
third category, ‘social condition’ referred to the social presence or absence (e.g. ‘Someone is 
watching her’, ‘Someone wants to slap her jokingly’). Lastly, ‘event’ included responses which 
involved other external situations or scenarios experienced by the target (e.g. ‘She is watching 
movie’, ‘She just hear shocking or bad news’).  
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Responses were coded into these four categories by two independent raters. Cohen’s 
κ was run to examine if there was agreement between the two coders on the coding of the 
qualitative data. There was a moderate agreement between the coders for ‘internal’, κ = .59, p < 
.001, ‘external’, κ = .57, p < .001, ‘event’, κ = .60, p < .001, and an almost perfect agreement for 
‘social condition’, κ = .92, p < .001.  
Perceivers’ coded responses were classified across the target stimuli for each category 
(internal, external, social condition, event), the conditions (observed, alone) and emotional video 
clips (irritation, disgust, surprise) the targets experienced. A preliminary one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted on the number of times perceivers referred to a particular 
category to investigate which category perceivers referred to more. It was found that there was a 
large significant main effect of Categories, F(2.14, 25.67) = 14.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .55. Pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that perceivers tended to refer to targets’ 
mental states than the social condition or external events (p < .005). Furthermore, it was found 
that perceivers referred to the external events more than the social condition (p < .05).  
Separate 3 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, surprise) × 2 (Conditions: observed, alone) 
repeated-measures ANOVA were conducted for the four Categories (i.e., internal, external, 
social condition, event) (Figure 12). Gender was not included in the analysis due to the unequal 
number of male and female perceivers. 
For ‘internal’, there was no significant main effect of Emotions, F(2, 24) < 1, p = .45, and 
no significant main effect of Conditions, F(1, 12) = 1.16, p = .30. There was a large significant 
interaction between Emotions and Conditions, F(2, 24) = 6.43, p < .05, ηp2 = .35. Posthoc paired-
samples t-tests suggested that perceivers tended to refer to the mental states more often when 
targets were alone than observed when viewing the surprise video clips, t(12) = 3.42, p < .05.  
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For ‘external’, there was no significant main effect of Emotions, F(2, 24) < 1, p = .98, no 
significant main effect of Conditions, F(1, 12) < 1, p = .35, nor was there a significant interaction 
between the two factors, F(2, 24) = 2.05, p = .15.  
For ‘social condition’, there was a large significant main effect of Emotions, F(2, 24) = 
6.00, p < .05, ηp2 = .33. Pairwise comparisons using Bonferroni correction revealed that 
perceivers tended to refer to the social conditions of the targets significantly more when targets 
were feeling irritated than disgust (p < .05). Conversely, there was no significant main effect of 
Conditions, F(1, 12) < 1, p = .74, and no significant interaction between Emotions and 
Conditions, F(1.30, 15.59) < 1, p = .47.  
 Lastly, for ‘event’, there was no significant main effect of Emotions, F(2, 24) = 2.55, p = 
.10, Conditions, F(1, 12) < 1, p = .54, and no significant interaction between the two factors, F(2, 
24) = 3.53, p = .05.  
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Figure 12. Mean frequency of perceivers’ responses coded into the four Categories (internal, 
external, social condition, event) for alone and observed condition for the different emotions in 
Pilot Study 1. The standard errors of the mean are represented by the error bars. (Top left: 
Internal, Top right: External, Bottom left: Social Condition, Bottom right: Event). 
 
In summary, perceivers’ ratings of the intensity of targets’ expressions were similar to 
that found in the previous experiment, where perceivers judged that targets tended to inhibit their 
expressions when viewing a disgusting clip while being observed than alone, and when viewing 
a surprise video alone than observed. However, perceivers’ descriptive responses as to what they 
thought caused the targets to control their expressions suggest that perceivers’ tended to refer to 
the internal mental states (e.g. emotions the targets felt) of the targets rather than referring to the 
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social conditions or any external events that the targets experienced. However, when perceivers’ 
qualitative responses were examined more closely, no distinctive pattern was found within each 
category between the emotions and social context, indicating that perceivers did not lean on a 
particular explanation when asked what caused the targets to control their expressions.  
 
5.3 Pilot Study 2 
This pilot study was conducted to investigate how perceivers judge the extent to which 
the target was inhibiting or exaggerating his/her expression, similar to that of Pilot Study 1 with 
the difference being the open-ended question. Perceivers were asked to rate the targets’ 
expressiveness and why they thought the targets were controlling or not controlling their 
expressions. 
 
5.3.1 Participants 
Eleven university students (4 males, 7 females) were recruited for the study. All 
perceivers were Malaysian and aged 19 years old and all gave their written informed consent.  
 
5.3.2 Materials and Apparatus 
The study used sixty target stimuli similar to those used in Pilot Study 1. The video 
stimuli were presented randomly via PsychoPy (Version 1.74.01; Peirce, 2012) on an 18.5-inch 
HP Compax LE1902x monitor. The screen resolution was set to 1366 × 768 pixels and stimuli 
were presented at a data sampling rate of 60 Hz.  
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5.3.3 Design 
A repeated-measures design was used for this experiment where all perceivers were 
shown the same 60 target stimuli and then asked the same questions after each stimulus. 
 
5.3.4 Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that in Pilot Study 1 with the only difference being the 
open-ended question. After rating the extent to which the target was controlling his/her 
expression, perceivers were asked, ‘Based on your answer above, why did you think the person 
was controlling or not controlling his/her expression?’ 
 
5.3.5 Results and Discussion 
Perceivers’ ratings of the intensity of the targets’ expressions were averaged across the 
three different emotions (i.e., irritation, disgust, surprise) and conditions (i.e., observed, alone). 
These were then subjected to a 3 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, surprise) × 2 (Conditions: 
observed, alone) repeated-measures ANOVA (Figure 13). Effect sizes are reported as ηp2 for 
ANOVA results and are interpreted as follows; ≥ 0.01 is considered a small effect, ≥ 0.06 a 
medium effect, and ≥ 0.14 is a large effect (Cohen, 1992). The analysis revealed a large 
significant main effect of Emotions, F(2, 20) = 10.83, p < .005, ηp2 = .52. Pairwise comparisons 
with Bonferroni correction showed that perceivers judged that targets inhibited their expressions 
significantly more for irritation than disgust (p < .05) and surprise (p < .005). However, there 
was no significant main effect of Conditions, F(1, 10) = .05, p = .83, and no significant 
interaction between the two factors, F(2, 20) = 3.61, p = .05.   
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Figure 13. The mean ratings of the intensity of targets’ expressions (1 = inhibited… 4 = 
neither… 7 = exaggerated) for the social conditions in Pilot Study 2. The standard errors of the 
mean are represented by the error bars. 
 
Perceivers’ descriptive responses were coded in a similar fashion by two independent 
raters to that described in Pilot Study 1. The responses were categorised into four groups – 
internal, external, social condition, and event. The first category, ‘internal’ referred to the target’s 
mental states, emotions, etc. (e.g. ‘She was unhappy’, ‘She was frightened’), while the ‘external’ 
category referred to target’s observable behaviour such as facial expressions (e.g. ‘Reacts too 
suddenly’, ‘Trying to laugh wholeheartedly’). ‘Social condition’ included responses referring to 
the social absence or presence of others (e.g. ‘Being watched by others’, ‘Was alone’), and the 
‘event’ category included responses involving any external scenarios experienced by the target 
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(e.g. ‘Boyfriend made a joke’, ‘Being scolded’). Cohen’s κ was conducted to determine if there 
was agreement between the two coders on the coding of the qualitative data. There was a 
substantial agreement between the coders for ‘internal’, κ = .73, p < .001, ‘external’, κ = .70, p < 
.001, a moderate agreement for ‘event’, κ = .60, p < .001, and an almost perfect agreement for 
‘social condition’, κ = .88, p < .001.  
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the number of times perceivers 
referred to a particular category to investigate which category perceivers referred to more. It was 
found that there was no significant main effect of Categories, F(3, 30) = 2.08, p = .12. Thus, 
indicating that perceivers did not have a specific preference to a category over the other three 
when asked why they thought the targets were controlling their expressions.  
Separate 3 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, surprise) × 2 (Conditions: observed, alone) 
repeated-measures ANOVA were carried out for the four different categories (i.e., internal, 
external, social condition, event) (Figure 14.)  
For ‘internal’, there was no significant main effect of Emotions, F(2, 20) = 3.01, p = .07, 
Conditions, F(1, 10) < 1, p = .72 and no interaction between Categories and Conditions, F(2, 20) 
= 1.02, p = .38. Similarly for ‘external’, there was no significant main effect of Emotions, 
F(1.23, 12.29) = 3.65, p = .07, no significant main effect of Conditions, F(1, 10) = 1.68, p = .22, 
and no interaction between the two factors, F(2, 20) < 1, p = .97.  
For ‘social condition’, there was large significant main effect of Emotions, F(2, 20) = 
4.96, p < .05, ηp2 = .33. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that there was 
a near significant difference between irritation and surprise (p = .06) where perceivers tended to 
refer to the social condition more when targets were irritated than disgusted. However, there was 
no main effect of Conditions, F(1, 10) = 1.12, p = .32, and no interaction between Emotions and 
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Conditions, F(2, 20) = 1.11, p = .35. Lastly, for the ‘event’ category, there was no significant 
main effect of Emotions, F(2, 20) < 1, p = .82, Conditions, F(1,10) < 1, p = .67, nor was there an 
interaction between the two factors, F(2,20) < 1, p = .69.  Therefore, this suggests that there was 
no distinct pattern or preference in perceivers’ responses as to why they thought the targets were 
controlling their expressions.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 14. The mean frequency of perceivers’ responses coded into the four Categories (internal, 
external, social condition, event) for alone and observed condition for the different emotions in 
Pilot Study 2. The standard errors of the mean are represented by the error bars. (Top left: 
Internal, Top right: External, Bottom left: Social Condition, Bottom right: Event). 
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5.4 General Discussion 
For both of the pilot studies described here, perceivers rated the extent to which the 
targets were controlling their expressions. The results showed a similar pattern to those obtained 
in Experiment 3 of Chapter Four where perceivers judged that targets tended to inhibit their 
expressions when viewing the irritation clips than disgust and surprise. In Pilot Study 1, it was 
also found that perceivers’ ratings were influenced by the social conditions (i.e., alone, observed) 
the targets experienced, and the emotional video clips they were watching. For instance, 
perceivers rated that targets were more expressive when alone than observed for irritation and the 
opposite for surprise. These were consistent with past research on the way individuals control 
their expressions in different social contexts. However, in Pilot Study 2, there was no significant 
interaction between the Emotions and Conditions, and this could be largely due to the small 
number of perceivers tested, since the interaction effect was approaching significance. 
Nonetheless, the findings in Pilot Study 1 suggested that perceivers’ ratings were moderated by 
the social conditions and emotional video clips that the targets experienced. 
However, the main focus of these pilot studies was to gain a better understanding of how 
perceivers made a judgment of the expressiveness of the targets’ behaviour. In particular, we are 
interested in discovering when perceivers judged the targets’ social context is this judgment 
influenced by the targets’ expressiveness?  
From both pilot studies, perceivers’ responses can be categorised into four main 
categories (i.e., internal mental states, external observable behaviour, social condition, external 
events). In Pilot Study 1, perceivers tended to refer to the internal mental states of the targets, 
such as the targets’ emotions and intentions significantly more than the social conditions (e.g. 
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alone, with someone) or events (e.g. watching a movie, listening to a joke). However, this pattern 
of responses was not found in Pilot Study 2 where there was no distinct pattern in perceivers’ 
descriptions of why they thought the targets were controlling their expressions.  
When we examined each category’s responses closely, no significant differences were 
found, suggesting that perceivers did not lean towards a particular category of responses when 
targets were experiencing a specific emotion or social context. Instead, the descriptive data 
suggest that perceivers’ responses were largely influenced by the way the question was phrased. 
For instance, in Pilot Study 1, perceivers were asked what they thought caused the targets to 
control their expressions, and they tended to describe the emotions or intentions of the targets. 
Conversely, in Pilot Study 2, perceivers were asked why they thought the targets were either 
controlling or not controlling their expressions, and in majority of the responses, perceivers 
mostly referred to whether the targets were controlling or not controlling their expressions and/or 
describe what the targets’ behaviour was, and the targets’ mental states.   
Furthermore, from perceivers’ responses, it was clear that perceivers prefer to use the 
term ‘hiding’ than ‘inhibiting’; hence for future experiments involving perceivers rating the 
targets’ expressiveness, the term ‘hiding’ would be used, to ensure that all perceivers grasp the 
concept of inhibiting an expression.  
Moreover, these pilot studies suggest that asking perceivers to describe how they made a 
judgment of the intensity of the targets’ behaviour may not be an ideal way of furthering our 
understanding of perceivers’ ability to discriminate social conditions from observing the 
behaviour of others. In future studies, we should employ a more objective method of 
measurement, such as the eye-tracking technique which would be able to give insight to 
perceivers’ eye movement patterns as they made these judgments. This would provide an 
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understanding of a more implicit nature of the way perceivers mentalise than the explicit method 
used in the pilot studies described here. In other words, by asking perceivers to describe or 
explain why they thought the targets were inhibiting or exaggerating their expressions might cue 
or disrupt the way perceivers would usually make such judgments. By using eye-tracking, 
perceivers would be able to rate the expressiveness of targets’ without having to be cued to 
consider why exactly they have made this particular judgment, thus resembling a more realistic 
social situation. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
INFERRING SOCIAL CONTEXT AND EXPRESSIVENESS OF TARGETS’ 
BEHAVIOUR WITH EYE-TRACKING1 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Over the past century researchers have struggled to understand people’s ability to read 
others’ minds. This ability has variously been called mentalising, mindreading, mind perception, 
empathic accuracy, mental simulation and theory of mind amongst other things. Inspired by the 
work of Charles Darwin (1872), researchers have investigated the ability to interpret facial 
expressions to infer underlying psychological states and traits (e.g. Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, 
Mortimore & Robertson, 1997; Wu, Sheppard & Mitchell, 2016). Such ability has great value in 
professional counselling as recognized by Carl Rogers (1957), who set the goal of finding people 
with a talent for ‘accurate empathy’, in other words the ability to infer what a client is thinking 
and feeling. This stimulated a research tradition extending far beyond its origins in counselling 
psychology to determine how accurately people can read other minds, but, according to Zaki and 
Ochsner (2011), the early work in the field of person perception devoted little attention to the 
process of how people read minds. Subsequently, researchers working in a different tradition 
investigated the development of a ‘theory of mind’ (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), and how that 
development might be adversely affected by autism (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985). These 
researchers expended much effort in trying to understand the processes of mentalising but did 
not, until recently, give much attention to how accurately mature mentalisers perform (Zaki & 
Ochsner, 2011). 
1This chapter is adapted from Teoh, Y., Wallis, E., Stephen, I. D., & Mitchell, P. Seeing the World through Others’ Minds: 
Inferring Social Context from Behaviour. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
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 In determining how accurately a person (the perceiver) can mentalise, it is useful to know 
the true mental state of the person whose mind is being read (henceforth the target). West and 
Kenny (2011) recognize that knowing the true state of the target’s mind presents a difficult 
problem and they champion the procedure devised by Ickes (e.g. 2001, 2009) as offering a 
solution. In the procedure, the target is videoed in conversation with another person. The video is 
then played back to the target who recalls and records what they were thinking and feeling 
during the conversation. Subsequently, perceivers watch the video of the target and are asked to 
infer what the target is thinking and feeling; they are adjudged to be correct if their responses 
correspond with what the target declared at any given moment.  
The trouble with this procedure, though, is that it presumes that the target’s mind is 
transparent to itself. In other words, it presumes that when the target declares that they are 
thinking and feeling X and Y then they are really thinking and feeling these things. Another 
possibility is that targets do not know or at least do not recall what they were thinking and 
instead merely guess at these things based on visible clues in the recordings of their own 
observable behaviour. If so, then investigating how well the perceiver’s judgment corresponds 
with the target’s declaration is formally the same as investigating judgments made by two 
independent perceivers about the behaviour of a target. Arguably, then, Ickes’ procedure, 
although valuable in many ways, does not strictly satisfy West and Kenny’s (2011) condition of 
knowing the target’s true state against which we can then compare the perceiver’s judgment. 
A procedure which does satisfy West and Kenny’s (2011) condition was developed by 
North, Todorov and Osherson (2010). In their procedure, targets were surreptitiously videoed 
while viewing two photographs presented one after the other. Perceivers subsequently watched 
the videos of the targets and were systematically able to infer which photo the target preferred 
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(the first or the second), presumably by recognising that the target had a more positive 
expression when viewing one of the photographs than the other. In this procedure, we know 
objectively which preference the target expressed (thus satisfying the ‘truth condition’ as defined 
by West and Kenny). Perhaps this raises a question about the functional purpose of mentalising 
as explained below. 
In addition to inferring what others are thinking and feeling, how well can people use 
others’ minds as a lens onto an otherwise inaccessible view of the world? Such ability was 
fictionalised in Sherlock Holmes (Conan Doyle, 1902), who was able to observe and interpret 
fleeting clues in behaviour to infer what the person had been doing, where they had been and 
with whom. While ordinary people might not perform at the extraordinary level of Sherlock 
Holmes, based on findings described above, perhaps they can nevertheless achieve something 
similar by a matter of degree.  
The mind is embodied in observable behaviour, especially in the facial expressions that 
are made in reaction to some event. Kraut (1982) claimed, moreover, that facial expressions 
potentially provide information about the environmental and social contexts that caused the 
reaction in the target. It is for this reason, presumably, that perceivers tested by North et al. 
(2010) were able to infer the preferences of targets who viewed pairs of photos. Facial 
expressions might also reveal other information about targets’ states and the aspects of the world 
they inhabit that caused those states. For example, Cassidy, Ropar, Mitchell, and Chapman 
(2013) reported that perceivers were correctly able to infer which gift had been offered to a target 
(chocolate, homemade novelty and monopoly money) by observing their reactions.  
In another study, Pillai et al., (2012; 2014) examined perceivers’ ability to guess what the 
experimenter had said to the target after viewing the target’s reaction for a few seconds. Either 
97 
 
the experimenter told a joke, gave a compliment, related her difficult day or rudely used her 
mobile phone to speak with a friend instead of attending to the target. As with the study by 
Cassidy et al. (2013), perceivers were systematically able to guess what the experimenter had 
said to the target after observing the target’s reaction for a few seconds. Perceivers were thus 
able to infer the antecedent event based on a small sample of the target’s behaviour. This ability, 
known as retrodictive mindreading (Gallese & Goldman, 1998), is reputed to be a common form 
of mentalising that allows people to determine (a) the target’s mental state and (b) what caused 
the mental state in question. Hence, among the various practical benefits of mentalising, one of 
the foremost is using another mind as a lens onto aspects of the world that are not apprehended 
directly. Such ability emerges very early in development in a basic form known as ‘social 
referencing’ (Sorce, Emde, Campos, & Klinnert, 1985): From about the age of 18 months it 
seems infants can interpret an adult’s facial expression to determine their attitude on whether an 
aspect of the world is safe or dangerous which in turn has the effect of regulating the infant’s 
approach and avoidance behaviour towards that particular aspect of the world. 
The current study investigated a new phenomenon - people’s ability to infer social 
context (was the target alone or accompanied by the experimenter?), along with perceivers’ 
sensitivity to how this social context moderated target’s reactions to positive or negative stimuli. 
The presence of the experimenter would surely have a subtle effect on the target’s behaviour. A 
large body of research has demonstrated that individuals behave differently in different social 
contexts (e.g., Ekman, 1972; Fridlund, 1991; Zaalberg, Manstead, & Fischer, 2004) by inhibiting 
or intensifying their behaviour when in the presence of others depending on the emotions 
experienced (e.g., Kilbride & Yarczower, 1980; Kraut, 1982). Specifically, when individuals 
experience negative emotions (e.g., irritation, disgust), they tend to inhibit their behaviour 
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(Spain, Eaton, & Funder, 2000), but when experiencing positive emotions (e.g., happiness, 
surprise) they tend to be more expressive (Buck, 1984; Ekman & Friesen, 1975). We already 
know that social context influences people’s behaviour, and re-confirming such a finding was not 
the purpose of the current research; rather we take it as given that social context will have an 
effect on the target’s behaviour and we move beyond this basic assumption to explore whether or 
not perceivers can determine social context from the target’s behaviour. If they could do so, then 
it would raise the possibility that perceivers have some understanding (implicitly or explicitly) of 
how social presence regulates behaviour, an understanding they might use to good effect in 
guessing whether the target is alone or accompanied. In so far as retrodictive mindreading is 
possible, it thus implicates a well-developed albeit informal understanding of social processes, 
such as how social presence impacts upon the way one behaves. Hence, a further aim was to 
shed light on the process by which perceivers made inferences of social context as elaborated 
below. 
If perceivers understand (either implicitly or explicitly) that social presence suppresses 
the expression of negative emotions but intensifies the expression of positive emotions then this 
should be reflected not only in their judgments of whether the target is accompanied or alone; it 
should also be apparent in their explicit judgments of how expressive the target is. The latter was 
tested explicitly in Experiments 5, reported below, allowing us to test the possibility that 
perceivers infer social presence on the basis of sensing that targets were regulating their 
expressions of negative and positive emotions relative to whether they were alone or 
accompanied. In this respect, the current research forms a bridge between the tradition of 
investigating accuracy in person perception (which in the past has neglected the question of 
process) with the tradition of investigating process under the umbrella of research into ‘theory of 
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mind’ (which in the past has neglected to consider the findings of ‘accuracy research’ in the area 
of person perception). 
 In addition to asking perceivers to make judgments about the targets, Experiments 4 and 
5 were replications of those described in Chapter Four with the addition of eye movement 
recordings and the use of fewer stimuli. We recorded the eye movements of the perceivers, 
principally to rule out any low-level strategies in judging the social context of targets. In addition 
to ruling out the use of low level strategies, we might also find that sensitivity to social context is 
implicit in more subtle features of the eye movements of perceivers. Both of Pillai et al.’s (2012, 
2014) studies revealed that perceivers varied in their eye movements according to the scenarios 
the targets were experiencing. Pillai et al.’s (2012) study showed that perceivers tended to focus 
on the mouth more than the eyes for the joke, story and compliment scenarios, but for the 
waiting scenario, perceivers preferred to look at the eyes than the mouth. Meanwhile, Pillai et al. 
(2014), found similar patterns for the joke, story and compliment scenarios, but perceivers 
focused equally on the mouth and eyes in the waiting scenario. Cassidy et al.’s (2013) study 
suggested that perceivers’ eye movements differed depending on the gift the targets received, 
where perceivers tended to look at the mouth more than the eyes when targets received 
homemade novelty and chocolate gifts, but focused more on the eyes than the mouth when 
targets received monopoly money. These studies collectively demonstrated that perceivers’ 
sensitivity to what had happened to the target was apparent, albeit implicitly, in their eye 
movements.  
 In Experiments 4 and 5, we showed film clips to targets with the aim of evoking a range 
of emotions while targets experienced two different social contexts (observed, alone). Targets’ 
reactions to the stimuli during the different social situations were video recorded and used as 
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stimuli. Since targets were filmed surreptitiously via the laptop’s webcam, their natural and 
spontaneous reactions were captured unobtrusively and without awareness. This approach might 
have some benefits over methods in which targets were deliberately enacting emotional states 
(Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar, & Cohen, 2002; Pillai et al., 2012). Experiment 4 investigated 
whether or not perceivers could correctly identify the social context based on targets’ reactions. 
In Experiment 5, perceivers rated the degree to which targets were hiding or exaggerating their 
behaviour and we investigated whether the ratings varied according to the social contexts and 
emotions the targets experienced. Perceivers’ eye movements were also recorded in both 
experiments. 
 
6.2 Experiment 4: Inferring Social Context and Eye-Tracking 
6.2.1 Participants 
Seventeen male and sixteen female students aged between 18 and 23 (M = 19.8, SD = 
1.3) were recruited from the University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus. Perceivers were of 
different nationalities: 28 Malaysians, 1 Hong Konger, 1 Indonesian, 2 Maldivians, and 1 
Tanzanian. Perceivers gave written informed consent and were compensated RM5 for taking 
part. Three participants (2 males, 1 female) had less than 50 percent of their gaze sample 
collected by the eye-tracker and their data were excluded from the analysis.  
 
6.2.2 Materials and Apparatus 
Two video clips of the experiment’s behaviour during the stimuli development stage were 
used to demomstrate the two possible social contexts in which the targets were recorded. The 
details of these two clips were described in Experiment 2 of Chapter Four. Sixty of the 140 target 
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stimuli produced in the stimuli development stage (Experiment 1b, Chapter Three) were used. 
The chosen stimuli comprised of five male and five female targets watching videos that might 
elicit irritation, disgust and surprise as they were observed by the experimenter and when they 
were alone. These stimuli were presented randomly through Tobii Studio Software on a 17-inch 
TFT monitor integrated with the Tobii T60 eye tracking system. The participants’ eye 
movements were recorded at a data sampling rate of 60Hz. 
 
6.2.3 Design 
A repeated-measures design with 3 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, surprise) × 2 
(Conditions: observed, alone) was used, whereby the Gender of Perceivers (male, female) was 
the between-subjects factor. 
 
6.2.4 Procedure 
Perceivers were tested individually in a quiet room. They sat approximately 60 cm from 
the monitor of a Tobii T60 eye tracker and a nine-point calibration was conducted to ensure 
accurate recording of the eye movements. After successfully calibrating, perceivers were shown 
two videos of the experimenter’s behaviour in the alone and observed condition 
(counterbalanced across perceivers). The purpose was to give perceivers an idea of the social 
conditions the targets experienced. Perceivers were then instructed to rate whether the target was 
alone or observed in each of the 60 video clips, based on the target’s behaviour. A fixation point 
(+) was presented for one second pseudorandomly in one of the four quadrants of the screen to 
prevent fixation bias before each stimulus. The video stimuli were then presented to the 
perceivers in random order. Each clip was viewed only once by each perceiver. After every clip, 
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perceivers were presented with a two-alternative forced choice question to decide whether the 
target was alone or observed, and were required to respond using the mouse. The responses were 
recorded automatically by Tobii Studio. Perceivers were allowed to answer each question at their 
own pace. 
 
6.2.5 Results and Discussion 
6.2.5.1 Behaviour Data 
One-sample t-tests (test value = 5) were conducted to examine whether perceivers were 
able to detect the social conditions the targets experienced. Table 3 shows the mean accuracy 
rates for the different emotions and conditions. The results revealed that perceivers performed 
significantly above chance when targets were observed while watching the irritation clip, t(29) = 
3.98, p < .001, and significantly below chance level when targets were alone while watching the 
disgust clip, t(29) = - 4.54, p < .001, and when targets were watching the surprise video alone, 
t(29) = - 4.75, p < .001, and when observed by another, t(29) = -2.22, p < .05.  
 
Table 3  
Mean accuracy rates (and Standard Deviation) for the three Emotions for the Observed and 
Alone condition for Experiment 4. 
 Mean (SD) 
 Alone Observed 
Irritation 5.43  (2.25) 6.23 (1.70) 
Disgust 3.80 (1.45) 4.70 (1.40) 
Surprise 3.87 (1.31) 4.33 (1.65) 
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However, accuracy rate does not account for any biases in perceivers’ responses (i.e., 
tendency to select one response over the other), thus, the responses were then coded based on the 
number of times perceivers responded ‘observed’ for the different emotions and conditions to 
examine whether perceivers were able to discriminate when targets were observed by another or 
alone. 
A 3 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, surprise) × 2 (Conditions: observed, alone) × 2 
(Gender of Perceivers: male, female) ANOVA was performed. Effect sizes are reported as ηp2 for 
ANOVA results and are interpreted as follows; ≥ 0.01 is considered a small effect, ≥ 0.06 a 
medium effect, and ≥ 0.14 is a large effect (Cohen, 1992). There were large significant main 
effects of Emotions, F(1.49, 41.83) = 18.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, and Conditions, F(1,28) = 8.22, 
p < .005, ηp2 = .23. There was no significant interaction between Emotions and Conditions, 
F(2,56) = .29, p = .75 (Figure 15). The main effect of Conditions resulted from perceivers 
judging that the target was observed significantly more often when that was true than when it 
was not true; the absence of an interaction effect suggests there is no reason to suppose that the 
ease of such discrimination varied between the three emotions. Pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni correction of the main effect associated with the factor Emotions revealed that 
perceivers tended to judge that the target was observed significantly more often when the target 
was viewing the irritation clip than the disgust and surprise clips (ps < .001).  
 
104 
 
 
Figure 15. The number of times perceivers responded ‘observed’ out of 10 for alone and 
observed conditions in Experiment 4. Standard errors of the mean are represented by the error 
bars. 
In addition, there was no significant between-subjects effect for the Gender of the 
Perceivers, F(1, 28) = .002, p = .96. There were also no significant interactions between the 
Gender of the Perceivers with Emotions, F(2,56) = .43, p = .65, and Conditions, F(1,28) = .16, p 
= .69. Moreover, there was no significant interaction between the three factors, Emotions, 
Conditions and the Gender of the Perceivers, F(2,56) = .73, p = .49. This indicates that there was 
no evidence of any difference between the male and female perceivers’ tendency to judge 
‘observed’ for the three emotions and the two social conditions.  
Did perceivers use a low-level strategy to determine whether targets were observed or 
alone? For example, did targets look away from the laptop screen (to shift their gaze towards the 
experimenter) more often in the observed than in the alone condition? If so, perhaps perceivers 
based their guess of social context on whether or not the target frequently looked away from the 
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screen (and thus the camera). To find out, we coded the number of times targets looked away 
from the screen but found no evidence to suggest that this was more common in the observed 
than in the alone condition, t(58) = 0.63, p = 0.53. Apparently, then, this potentially low-level 
cue did not offer any basis for perceivers to guess whether the target was observed or alone. 
 
6.2.5.2 Eye Movement Analyses  
Areas of interest (AOIs) were created using Tobii Studio 3.1.6. The AOIs were drawn 
onto each stimulus independently to delineate the eyes, nose and mouth, following Tan, Stephen, 
Whitehead, and Sheppard (2012), with the addition of an AOI for the Body (Figure 16). The 
Total Fixation Duration (seconds) for each AOI was obtained from Tobii Studio which calculates 
the total duration for all fixations within an AOI. Fixation is defined by the standard Tobii 
fixation filter as two or more consecutive samples falling within a 35 pixel radius. Only fixation 
duration was examined since the aim of the eye tracking analyses was to investigate whether 
perceivers’ ability to discriminate the social context was associated with attending to specific 
parts of the target. Since each stimulus varied in duration, the percentage duration of fixations on 
each AOI were calculated [(fixation duration of an AOI/total duration of the video) × 100]. 
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Figure 16. The predefined areas of interest (AOIs) used to analyse eye movement behaviour. 
 
The main point of interest lies in whether or not the patterns of eye movements at the 
different regions vary depending on the social context. Because the variance differed 
considerably between the different areas of interest it was appropriate to conduct separate 3 
(Emotions: irritation, disgust, surprise) × 2 (Conditions: observed, alone) × 2 (Gender of 
Perceivers: male, female) ANOVA for the four different AOIs (Body, Mouth, Nose, Eyes) 
(Figure 17). 
For the Body region, there were large significant main effect of Emotions, F(1.39, 38.98) 
= 147.89, p < .001, ηp2 = .84, Conditions, F(1, 28) = 113.05, p < .001, ηp2 = .80, and a large 
significant interaction between the factors Emotions and Conditions, F(2, 56) = 128.61, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .82. Posthoc paired-samples t-tests indicated that perceivers looked longer at the Body 
region for disgust, t(29) = 12.60, p < .001, and irritation, t(29) = 7.31, p < .001 when targets were 
alone than when observed, and surprise when targets were observed than alone, t(29) = -6.50, p < 
.001. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that perceivers attended 
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significantly less to the Body region when the targets were viewing the irritation clips than 
disgust and surprise clips (ps < .001), and perceivers attended to the Body more when targets 
were viewing the disgust clips than surprise (p < .001). Moreover, perceivers focused on the 
Body region significantly more when targets were left alone than when they were observed (p < 
.001). For the between-subjects effect of the Gender of the Perceivers, there was no significant 
effect, F(1, 28) < 1, p = .99. There were no significant interactions between the Gender of the 
Perceivers with Emotions, F(2,56) < 1, p = .68, Conditions, F(1,28) < 1, p = .78, and between the 
three main factors, F(2, 56) < 1, p = .73. This suggests that there was no variation between the 
male and female perceivers in the way they attended to the Body region of the targets. 
For the Mouth region, there was a large significant main effect of Emotions, F(2, 56) = 
43.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .61, and an interaction between Emotions and Conditions, F(2, 56) = 4.50, 
p < .05, ηp2 = .14. Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction showed that perceivers 
attended to the Mouth region significantly more for surprise than irritation and disgust (ps < 
.001), and for disgust than irritation (p < .05). Posthoc paired-samples t-tests revealed that 
perceivers looked longer at the Mouth for disgust alone than observed, t(29) = 3.61, p = .001. 
However, there was no significant main effect of Conditions, F(1,28) < 1, p = . 54. As with the 
Body region, there was no significant main effect for the Gender of the Perceivers, F(1, 28) < 1, 
p = .77, no significant interaction between the Gender of the Perceivers with Emotions, F(2,56) < 
1, p = .61, no interaction between Gender with Conditions, F(1, 28) = 1.31, p = .26, and no 
interaction between all three factors, F(2, 56) < 1, p = .46.  
For the Nose region, there was a medium significant main effect of Emotions, F(2, 56) = 
4.18, p < .05, ηp2 = .13, and a large significant interaction associated with the factors, Emotions 
and Conditions, F(2, 56) = 16.64, p < .001, ηp2 = .37. Posthoc t-tests showed that perceivers spent 
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more time looking at the Nose region for irritation alone than observed, t(29) = 4.34, p < .001, 
and disgust observed than alone, t(29) = -3.50, p = .002. Additionally, there was no significant 
main effect of Conditions, F(1, 28) < 1, p = .68, and no significant between-subjects effect of 
Gender of the Perceivers, F(1, 28) < 1, p = .65. Comparable with the Mouth region, there was no 
significant interactions between the Gender of the Perceivers and Emotions, F(2, 56) = 2.29, p = 
.11, no significant interaction between Gender and Conditions, F(1, 28) < 1, p = .68, and no 
significant interaction between the three factors, F(2, 56) = 1.71, p = .19.  
For the Eyes region, there were large significant main effects of Emotions, F(2, 56) = 
22.59, p < .001, ηp2 = .45, Conditions, F(1, 28) = 55.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .67, and a large 
significant interaction between Emotions and Conditions, F(1.67, 46.86) = 6.91, p < .005, ηp2 = 
.20. Posthoc paired-samples t-tests showed that perceivers attended more to the Eyes for 
irritation observed than alone, t(29) = 5.08, p < .001, and disgust observed than alone, t(29) = 
5.72, p < .001. Moreover, pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that 
perceivers attended to the Eyes significantly more for irritation than disgust and surprise (ps < 
.001), and when the targets were observed than alone (p < .001). As with the Nose region, there 
was no significant between-subjects effect for the Gender of the Perceivers, F(1, 28) = 2.50, p = 
.13. There were no significant interactions between the Gender of the Perceivers and Emotions, 
F(2, 56) < 1, p = .86, and no significant interaction between Gender and Conditions, F(1, 28) < 
1, p = .84. However, there was a large three-way interaction between Emotions, Conditions and 
the Gender of the Perceivers, F(1.67, 46.86) = 5.23, p < .05, ηp2 = .16. Posthoc paired samples t-
tests revealed that male and female perceivers attended to the Eyes region significantly more 
when targets were observed than alone. (ps < .001), and male perceivers attended to the Eyes 
significantly more when targets were watching the irritation than disgust, t(14) = 5.57, p < .001, 
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and surprise clip, t(14) = 4.34, p < .005. On the other hand, the female perceivers attended to the 
Eyes significantly more for irritation than surprise, t(14) = 4.07, p < .005, and for disgust than 
surprise, t(14) = 4.16, p < .005.   
 
 
Figure 17. Mean percentage duration of perceivers’ fixations for alone and observed conditions 
for the different AOIs in Experiment 4. The standard errors of the mean are represented by the 
error bars. (Top left: Body region, Top right: Mouth region, Bottom left: Nose region, Bottom 
right: Eyes region).  
 
Another way to calculate the percentage of fixation duration in order to control for the 
varied stimuli duration is to divide the fixation duration of an AOI with the total fixation 
duration, instead of the total duration of each stimulus × 100. The findings have similar patterns 
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to that reported above with the exception of the Nose region where there was no significant main 
effect of Emotions, F(2, 56) = F < 1, p = .52, but there was a large significant three-way 
interaction between  Emotions, Conditions and the Gender of the Perceivers, F(2, 56) = 3.65, p < 
.05, ηp2 = .12. Posthoc paired-samples t-tests revealed that male perceivers focused on the Nose 
region significantly more when targets were viewing the irritation than disgust clips, t(14) = 
2.68, p < .05. Similarly, the female perceivers attended to the Nose significantly more when 
targets were watching the irritation than disgust clips, t(14) = 3.16, p < .05, and when they were 
viewing the surprise than disgust videos, t(14) = 5.06, p < .001. In addition to the difference in 
findings for the Nose region, there was a slight difference for the Eyes region. The posthoc 
paired-samples t-tests conducted to examine where the differences were in the three-way 
interaction, the female perceivers attended to the Eyes significantly more for irritation than 
disgust, t(14) = 4.34, p < .005.  
In summary, the eye movement data showed that the time perceivers spent looking at the 
different regions varied systematically depending on whether targets were alone or observed. It 
was not that perceivers simply looked more at any particular region when the target was alone 
than observed, suggesting that perceivers were not influenced by any low-level clues in the 
behaviour of targets that might reveal their social context; rather, the relationship between the 
time perceivers spent looking at a region and whether the target was alone or observed depended 
on the particular kind of emotion the target was experiencing. 
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6.3 Experiment 5: Rating the Intensity of Targets’ Expressiveness and Eye-Tracking 
One purpose in Experiment 5 was to begin to illuminate the process by which perceivers 
had inferred the social context of the target in Experiment 4.  Previous research has established 
that when people experience positive emotions (such as surprise) they tend to be more expressive 
in the company of others than when alone (Buck, 1984); conversely, when people experience 
negative emotions (such as irritation and disgust) they tend to hide their expressions more in the 
company of others than when alone (Spain et al., 2000). In Experiment 5 we asked perceivers to 
judge the degree to which targets were controlling their expressions (hiding or exaggerating), 
with the expectation that they might judge that targets are hiding their expressions when they 
were observed and experiencing a negative emotion (irritation, disgust) but exaggerating their 
expression when observed and experiencing a positive emotion (surprise). They should judge in 
this way if their explicit judgments of whether the target is observed or alone, as measured in 
Experiment 4, were based on an understanding (either implicitly or explicitly) of how social 
presence differentially influences the expression of positive and negative emotions. At the very 
least, Experiment 5 has potential to demonstrate that sensitivity to the social context of the target 
is also implicit in perceivers’ judgments of how targets are controlling their emotions. 
 
6.3.1 Participants 
Thirty-nine university students (20 males, 19 females) between 18 and 24 (M = 19.4, SD 
= 1.1) years were recruited. Perceivers were of different nationalities: 32 Malaysians, 3 
Singaporeans, 2 Vietnamese, 1 Indian, and 1 Bangladeshi. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all perceivers who were compensated RM5 for taking part in the experiment. Less 
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than 50% of the gaze sample was collected by the eye-tracker for four male and two female 
perceivers, the data from these six perceivers were excluded from the analysis.  
 
6.3.2 Materials and Apparatus 
The sixty video stimuli used in Experiment 4 were utilised. The target stimuli were 
presented in random order through Tobii Studio Software. A 17-inch TFT monitor that is 
equipped with the Tobii T60 eye tracking system was used to record eye movements at a data 
sampling rate of 60Hz. 
 
6.3.3 Design 
This experiment used a mixed design with 3 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, surprise) × 2 
(Conditions: observed, alone) as the repeated measures factors and the Gender of Perceivers 
(male, female) as the between-subjects factor. 
 
6.3.4 Procedure 
The procedure was similar to that used in Experiment 4, except perceivers were not 
presented with the videos of the experimenter demonstrating the observed and alone conditions, 
and were not asked to judge whether the target was alone or observed. Hence, unlike in the 
previous experiment, perceivers were not given any information about the two possible social 
contexts. A nine-point calibration was performed and then, for each stimulus clip, perceivers 
were instructed to decide the degree to which the target was controlling their expression on a 
rating scale of 1-7 (1 = hiding… 7 = exaggerated). The rest of the procedure was identical to that 
in Experiment 4. 
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6.3.5 Results and Discussion 
6.3.5.1 Behaviour Data  
Perceivers’ ratings of how the targets were controlling their expressions were submitted 
to a 3 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, surprise) × 2 (Conditions: observed, alone) × 2(Gender of 
Perceivers: male, female) ANOVA. Effect sizes are reported as ηp2 for ANOVA results and are 
interpreted as follows; ≥ 0.01 is considered a small effect, ≥ 0.06 a medium effect, and ≥ 0.14 is 
a large effect (Cohen, 1992). There was a large main effect of Emotions, F(2, 62) = 30.86, p < 
.001, ηp2 =.50, which resulted from perceivers judging that targets were hiding their expressions 
more in the irritation condition compared with the other two emotions (ps< .001). There was no 
main effect of Conditions, F(1, 31) = 1.03, p = .32. However, there was a large significant 
interaction between Emotions and Conditions, F(2, 62) = 6.49, p < .005, ηp2 = .17 (Figure 18). 
Posthoc paired-samples t-tests revealed a significant difference between disgust alone and 
observed, t(32) = 2.81, p = .008, which resulted from perceivers judging that targets were hiding 
their expressions more in the observed than in the alone condition. Moreover, there was a 
significant difference between surprise alone and observed, t(32) = 2.54, p = .02 where 
perceivers judged that targets were exaggerating their expressions more in the observed than 
alone condition. Hence, perceivers were effectively able to discriminate when targets were alone 
and observed by judging the extent to which targets were controlling their expressions. However, 
it was not the case that perceivers consistently judged that targets were hiding their expressions 
more when observed than when alone; rather, the direction of the effect also depended on the 
particular emotion the target was experiencing. 
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Figure 18.  Mean ratings made by perceivers of how targets were controlling their expressions 
(1= hiding… 7= exaggerated) for the alone and observed condition in Experiment 5. The 
standard errors of the mean are represented by the error bars. 
 
The findings were consistent with expectations. Generally, perceivers tended to judge 
that targets were exaggerating when the target was experiencing a positive emotion (surprise) 
and was observed rather than alone. Conversely, they tended to judge that targets were hiding 
their expressions when the target was experiencing a negative emotion (irritation or disgust) and 
was observed rather than alone. Such behaviour in the targets is consistent with what we might 
have expected from the literature (Buck, 1984; Spain et al., 2000) and the novel finding 
presented here suggests that perceivers were attuned to this phenomenon, for their judgments of 
how the targets were controlling their expressions effectively discriminated between the two 
social conditions experienced by the targets. 
0.0
1.0
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
Irritation  Disgust  Surprise
M
e
a
n
 R
a
ti
n
g
 
Emotions 
Alone
Observed
115 
 
It was found that there was no significant between-subjects effect of Gender, F(1, 31) < 
1, p = .40. However, there was a medium-sized interaction between Emotions and the Gender of 
the Perceivers, F(2, 62) = 3.34, p < .05, ηp2 = .10. Posthoc independent-samples t-tests revealed 
that there was a significant difference between male and female perceivers’ ratings for irritation, 
t(31) = 2.19, p < .05, which resulted from male perceivers rating higher than their female 
counterparts when targets felt irritated. However, there was no significant interaction between 
Conditions and Gender of the Perceivers, F(1, 31) < 1, p = .86, nor was there a 3-way interaction 
between the factors, Emotions, Conditions and the Gender of the Perceivers, F(2, 62) = 1.01, p = 
.37.  This suggests that there was not much variation between the ratings of male and female 
perceivers on the intensity of targets’ expressions.  
 
6.3.5.2 Eye Movement Analyses  
Areas of interest (AOIs) for the stimuli were created using Tobii Studio 3.1.6 to calculate 
perceivers’ total fixation duration (seconds) on each target AOI (Eyes, Nose, Mouth, Body). The 
standard Tobii fixation filter defined a fixation as two or more consecutive samples falling within 
a 35 pixel radius. Since the aim of the eye tracking analyses was to investigate whether 
perceivers’ judgment of the intensity of target’s expression was associated with attending to 
specific areas of the target.  In order to control for any differences in the stimulus duration, the 
percentage of fixation duration was calculated [(fixation duration of an AOI/total duration of the 
video) × 100].  
Separate 3 (Emotions: irritation, disgust, surprise) × 2 (Conditions: observed, alone) × 2 
(Gender of Perceivers) ANOVAs were conducted for the four different AOIs (Body, Mouth, 
Nose, Eyes, Figure 19). For the Body region, the ANOVA showed a large significant main effect 
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of Emotions, F(2, 62) = 87.07, p < .001, , ηp2 = .74, Conditions, F(1, 31) = 43. 12, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.58, and an interaction between Emotions and Conditions, F(1.48, 45. 91) = 151.52, p < .001, ηp2 
= .83. Posthoc paired-samples t-tests revealed that perceivers fixated longer for irritation, t(32) = 
8.47, p < .001, and disgust, t(32) = 11.96, p < .001, when targets were alone than observed, and 
surprise, t(32) = 9.55, p < .001, when targets were observed than alone. Pairwise comparisons 
with Bonferroni correction suggest that perceivers focused on the Body region significantly less 
for irritation than disgust and surprise (ps < .001) and for surprise than disgust (p < .001). 
Moreover, perceivers attended to targets that were alone significantly more than observed (p < 
.001). There was no gender effect in perceivers’ eye movements, F(1, 31) < 1, p = .93, and there 
were no significant interactions between Gender and Emotions, F(2, 62) < 1, p = 8.3, Gender 
with Conditions, F(1, 31) = 2.29, p = .14, and no interaction between the three factors, F(1.48, 
45.91) = 2.16, p = .14.  
For the Mouth region, there was a large significant main effect associated with the factor, 
Emotions, F(2, 62) = 43.26, p < .001,  ηp2 = .58, and a large-sized interaction between Emotions 
and Conditions, F(2, 62) = 21.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .40. Posthoc paired-samples t-tests revealed that 
perceivers spent less time looking at the Mouth region when targets felt irritated when alone than 
observed, t(32) = -5.91, p < .001, and looked longer at the Mouth for surprise alone than 
observed, t(32) = 2.91, p = .007.  Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction indicated that 
perceivers attended to the Mouth significantly more when targets were watching the surprise 
clips than irritation and disgust clips (ps < .001). However, there was no significant main effect 
of Conditions, F(1, 31) = 1.54, p = .23. As with the Body region, there were no gender 
differences in perceivers’ eye gaze patterns, F(1, 31) < 1, p = .48. Furthermore, there were no 
significant interactions between the Gender of the Perceivers and Emotions, F(2, 62) < 1, p = 
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.38, nor between Gender and Conditions, F(1, 31) = 2.80, p = .10, and there was no three-way 
interaction between the factors, F(2, 62) = 1.50, p = .23.  
For the Nose region, there were large main effects of Emotions, F(1.66, 51.37) = 12.26, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .28, Conditions, F(1,31) = 19.36, p < .001, ηp2 = .38, and an interaction between 
Emotions and Conditions, F(2, 62) = 5.02, p < .05, ηp2 = .14.  Posthoc t-tests showed that 
perceivers spent less time focusing at the Nose for disgust alone than observed, t(32) = -3.47, p = 
.001, and surprise alone than observed, t(32) = -2.76, p = .01. Pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni correction also revealed that perceivers attended to the Nose significantly less for 
disgust than irritation and surprise (ps < .001), and when the targets were alone than observed (p 
< .001). Conversely, there were no gender effects on perceivers’ eye movements, F(1, 31) = 
3.21, p = .08. There were no significant interactions between Emotions and Gender of the 
Perceivers, F(1.66, 51.37) < 1, p = .58, nor between Conditions and the Gender, F(1,31) = 3.08, 
p = .09. Also, there was no significant interaction between the three main factors, F(2, 62) = 
1.43, p = .25.  
Lastly, the Eyes region revealed a large significant main effect associated with 
Conditions, F(1, 31) = 13.52, p < .005, ηp2 = .30, which resulted from perceivers attending to the 
Eyes more when targets were observed than alone (p < .005).  However, there was no significant 
main effect of Emotions, F(2, 62) = 2.79, p = .07, and no significant interaction between 
Emotions and Conditions,  F(2, 62) = 1.84, p = .17. As with the Nose region, there were no 
significant differences between male and female perceivers’ eye gaze patterns when attending to 
the Eyes, F(1,31) < 1, p = .92. Furthermore, there was no significant interaction between 
Emotions and Gender, F(2, 62) < 1, p = .76, between Emotions and Conditions, F(2,62) = 1.84, p 
= .17, and between Emotions, Conditions and Gender, F(2, 62) = 1.04, p = .36.  
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Figure 19.  Mean percentage duration of perceivers’ fixations for conditions in which targets 
were alone and observed for the different AOIs in Experiment 5. The standard errors of the mean 
are represented by the error bars. (Top left: Body region, Top right: Mouth region, Bottom left: 
Nose region, Bottom right: Eyes region). 
 
As mentioned previously, the percentage fixation duration can be calculated by dividing 
the fixation duration of an AOI with the total fixation duration × 100 to control for the different 
durations of the stimuli. The results revealed similar patterns to those reported above with the 
exception of the Nose region where there was no significant main effect of Conditions, F(1, 31) 
= 2.92, p = .10. Moreover, perceivers only attended to the Nose significantly more when the 
targets were viewing the irritation clips than disgust (p < .001), and the paired-samples t-tests 
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revealed only a significant difference for disgust alone than observed, t(32) = -3.67, p < .005. For 
the Eyes region, there was a large significant main effect of Emotions, F(2, 62) = 18.14, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .37 which was due to perceivers attending to the Eyes significantly less for surprise 
than irritation (p < .001) and disgust (p < .005). There was a large significant interaction between 
Emotions and Conditions, F(2, 62) = 9.16, p < .001, ηp2 = .23.  Posthoc paired-samples t-tests 
revealed that perceivers attended to the targets significantly more when they were observed than 
alone when viewing the disgust clips.  
In summary, the eye-tracking results revealed that perceivers’ gaze time differed between 
the different regions when targets were observed and alone for the various emotions. As with the 
first experiment, it was not the case that perceivers simply looked more at any particular region 
when the target was alone, suggesting that perceivers were not influenced by any low-level clues 
in the behaviour of targets that might reveal their social context; rather, the relationship between 
time perceivers spent looking at a region and whether the target was alone or observed depended 
on the particular kind of emotion that the target was experiencing. 
 
6.4 General Discussion 
The purpose of this research was to explore the scope and process of human ability in 
knowing the world through other minds, a process known as ‘retrodictive’ mindreading (Gallese 
& Goldman, 1998). Previous research (e.g., Pillai et al., 2012, 2014) suggests that people are 
capable of making a sequence of two ‘backwards’ inferential steps from the behaviour of a target 
to their mental state and then from their mental state (as embodied in their behaviour) to the 
antecedent cause of that mental state. In that research, perceivers could make systematically 
accurate inferences about the content and manner of the experimenter’s communication with the 
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target. The results presented here take us into new territory: From the manner of the target’s 
emotional reaction to a video or photo, perceivers were able to distinguish whether the target was 
alone or accompanied. People can thus interpret another person’s expression of a mental state to 
determine their social context. This is consistent with the findings reported in Chapter Four.  
 The results, particularly Experiment 5, speak to the process by which perceivers inferred 
the social context of targets from an embodiment of their mental states. When targets were 
viewing positive stimuli, perceivers judged that targets were more expressive (or ‘exaggerating’ 
their expressions) when it so happened the target was accompanied than when alone. When 
targets were viewing negative stimuli, in contrast, perceivers judged that targets were less 
expressive (or ‘hiding’ their expressions) when targets were accompanied than when alone. 
These results thus show that perceivers were sensitive to the social context of the targets in their 
judgments of how targets controlled their expressions. Furthermore, the results might also 
provide information about the basis on which perceivers explicitly judged that targets were 
observed or alone in Experiment 4, though the relationship between perceivers’ judgments of 
target expressivity and judgments of target social context requires careful consideration, as 
explained below. 
 It could have been that perceivers linked target expressivity with target social context in a 
more sophisticated way. We know from classic research in social psychology that people are 
more expressive when accompanied than when alone if they are experiencing positive emotions 
(e.g. Buck, 1984); conversely, it seems people are less expressive when accompanied than when 
alone if experiencing negative emotions (Spain et al, 2000). Perceivers in our studies might have 
had sufficient insight into this social process to be able to determine target social context from 
their perception of how the target’s emotional reaction seems to be moderated (or controlled) 
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depending on whether the target seemed to be having a positive or a negative emotion. However, 
the results of Experiment 5 merely suggest that perceivers might have utilised this relationship 
between target’s expressivity and the social context the target was experiencing to infer the 
target’s social context. A further study can be conducted to inspect the direct link between these 
two factors by asking the perceivers to rate the expressiveness of the target and the likelihood of 
the target being observed or alone.  
Notwithstanding, we should consider whether perceivers were using a low-level strategy 
to determine whether the target was observed or alone. For example, did targets look away from 
the screen (and look instead at the experimenter) more often when the experimenter was present 
than absent? If so, perhaps perceivers were judging social context not based on the manner of the 
target’s emotional reaction but on whether the target seemed to be distracted by the presence of 
another person in the room. There was no evidence to suggest that targets looked away from the 
screen more often in the accompanied than in the alone condition, meaning that perceivers could 
not use the apparent distractibility of the target as a clue to social context. Besides, in Experiment 
5 perceivers were told nothing of the social context that sometimes the target was alone and 
sometimes observed; indeed, they were not even told anything about the videos being watched 
by the targets in any of the experiments. In Experiment 5 they merely had to judge whether the 
target was hiding or exaggerating their expression and they did so in a way that effectively 
showed they were sensitive to the two social contexts of the target.  
Data from Experiments 4 and 5 are consistent in showing that eye movements of the 
perceivers were systematically different for several different areas of interest depending on the 
social context. It was not that the perceiver simply looked more at certain areas when the target 
was observed than alone (or the opposite); rather the patterns of eye movements revealed a 
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complicated relationship between the social context of the target and the particular emotion that 
he or she was experiencing. This suggests once again that the social context mediated the target’s 
response to the video; and this in turn impacted upon the visual attention of the perceiver in a 
way that demonstrated sensitivity in the perceiver to the context (and the emotions experienced 
by the target) at the level of eye movements. 
In Experiment 4, perceivers were explicitly asked about the target’s social context. One 
might think that this instruction could have influenced the perceivers’ eye movements. For 
example, they could have looked for clues as to whether the target was looking away from the 
screen and (by implication) at the observer. If so, one might expect the eye movement patterns to 
be quite different in Experiments 4 and 5 in that perceivers were not given any information about 
the targets’ social context in the latter. While the patterns of data are not identical in the two 
experiments, nevertheless perceivers’ eye movements suggested they were sensitive to the 
target’s social context in both: This effect was not confined to Experiment 4. Notably, perceivers 
were demonstrably sensitive to conditions in which targets were alone and observed even in a 
circumstance where it is implausible to suppose that the perceiver was trying to detect if the 
target was looking away from the screen (Experiment 5). Moreover perceivers were not simply 
looking more at a particular region (such as the eye region) in the observed than in the alone 
condition; how much they looked at any particular region also depended upon the particular 
emotion the target was experiencing. This variation in perceivers’ eye gaze behaviour supports 
Pillai et al.’s (2012, 2014) and Cassidy et al.’s (2013, 2015) findings that perceivers find 
different regions of the face informative based on the social situation targets were experiencing, 
in this case it was the social context and the nature of the movie clip watched by targets.  
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Having discussed how perceivers infer target social context by interpreting an 
embodiment of the target’s mental state, we now turn to why they make such inferences. 
Assuming that any given ability develops because it is functional and adaptive (in most cases), it 
seems fair to consider the value of the particular ability that allows us to infer social context by 
interpreting clues in the target’s behaviour (Tinbergen, 1963). Presumably, the ability in question 
broadly enables perceivers to know things about the world inhabited by the target; making 
inferences about social context is but a specific implementation of this broader ability. Other 
examples demonstrated in past research are guessing what another person said to the target 
(Pillai et al, 2012, 2014), guessing what gift had been offered to the target (Cassidy et al, 2013, 
in press) and guessing which stimulus a target selected as their preferred choice (North et al, 
2010). The full scope of the ability to infer events in the world from a target’s embodied mental 
state awaits further exploration: Perceivers might be able to guess the gender of a person 
interacting with the target, they might be able to guess the expression (positive or negative) of a 
person the target is interacting with and they might be able to guess which cue word a target is 
looking at (pride, embarrassment, happiness, shame) in a context where targets are instructed to 
think of a time they experienced the emotion indicated by the cue word. 
In essence, the results presented here might speak to the broader ability of people 
knowing the world through the lens of another mind. Perhaps this basic process serves as the 
foundation for a more advanced ability to learn from other people. In its most highly developed 
form this could include the kind of explicit instruction from others that is formalised in 
education. Here, students learn things about the world that extends well beyond what they could 
reasonable expect to know from their own personal discovery. Accordingly, the expansive 
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knowledge and wisdom enjoyed by humans depends on a basic ability to apprehend aspects of 
the world through the lens of other minds (cf Vygotsky, 1978). 
 Such ability seemingly has its roots in early development. From the age of about 18 
months, infants begin to show signs of ‘social referencing’ (Sorce et al., 1985), meaning that 
they look to their caregiver and are influenced by the mental state or attitude that is embodied in 
his or her facial expression. If the caregiver’s mental state is positive then the infant is likely to 
be more adventurous in an unfamiliar environment; if the mental state is negative they will be 
less adventurous. Apparently, then, the infant seems to learn something about the status of the 
environment (whether or not it is safe) by interpreting the caregiver’s attitude towards that 
particular aspect of the environment. Perhaps the basic capacity to learn about the world from 
other minds becomes refined during development, ultimately to determine such things as 
whether a target is alone or accompanied, what a third party said to a target or what a third party 
gave to a target. 
 In summary, the two experiments reported here yielded a variety of data which converge 
in showing that perceivers are sensitive to the social context of the target. This is apparent in 
their explicit judgments on whether the target is observed or alone and it is implicit in their 
judgments of how the target was controlling their expressions and in their eye movements. The 
explicit judgments might be made on the basis of knowledge (either explicit or implicit) that 
people display their emotions differently in the presence or absence of others depending on the 
particular emotion in question. Such an intuition, if it deserves to be called that, accords with 
research into the effect an audience has on the intensity of emotional displays (e.g. Ansfield, 
2007; Spain et al., 2000). In consequence, the evidence testifies to the ability of our perceivers as 
natural psychologists.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
ALONE, ACCOMPANIED, OBSERVED –  
PERCEIVERS’ SENSITIVITY TO SOCIAL CONTEXT 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The findings of the experiments described in previous chapters demonstrated that 
perceivers were able to discriminate the social contexts (i.e., observed, alone) the targets were 
experiencing from briefly observing targets’ behaviour. To what extent does the target need to be 
observed for the perceivers to be able to infer the social context the target experienced? During 
the stimuli development stage (Experiment 1b in Chapter Three), the experimenter scrutinised 
the targets while jotting down notes in the ‘observed’ condition. For the experiment described in 
this chapter, we investigated whether perceivers would still be able to distinguish when targets 
were alone or observed if they were merely accompanied without being scrutinised by the 
experimenter. Is it necessary for the targets to be overtly observed in order for perceivers to 
detect clues in targets’ behaviour that reveal social presence? Or perhaps the presence of another 
person would be sufficient even if this person is not scrutinizing the target. We created a new set 
of target stimuli for the experiment described in this chapter, which instead of only employing 
two social conditions (i.e., observed, alone), the targets experienced three different conditions – 
observed, accompanied, alone (Stimulus Development Phase). 
There has been a longstanding debate among researchers investigating the audience effect 
on facial expressions - whether facial expressions are merely a “readout” (Buck, 1984) of a 
person’s internal state (i.e., emotions) or to express one’s social intentions (behavioural ecology 
view) (Fridlund, 1991). Fridlund (1991) tested the hypothesis that facial expressions are solely 
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used as communicative acts by inviting participants to watch a humorous video clip in one of the 
four social conditions: 1) alone, 2) alone but under the impression that a friend was in another 
room completing a different task, 3) alone but under the impression that a friend was watching a 
similar video clip, and 4) accompanied by a friend in the same room during the task). The 
findings indicated that the intensity of a participant’s expression covary with the sociality of the 
social condition, but not with participant’s self-reported emotion. Thus, this led to Fridlund 
(1991) to conclude that facial expressions serve as acts of communication, dependent on the 
social motives and the social conditions, without any reference to the expresser’s internal state.  
However, Hess, Banse, and Kappas (1995) argued that the function of facial expressions 
should not be exclusive to either one of the views; instead facial expressions are affected by 
various factors which include the person’s internal state and social intentions.  Hess et al. (1995) 
conducted an experiment where participants viewed film clips intended to elicit varying levels of 
happiness or amusement in one of three different social conditions: 1) alone and under the 
impression that another participant was in a nearby room performing a different task, 2) alone 
but believed that another participant was in nearby room performing a similar task, 3) 
accompanied by another participant while conducting a similar task. The results suggested that 
participants’ facial expressions varied as a function of the intensity of the stimulus and the social 
conditions the participants were experiencing. Moreover, Jakobs, Manstead, and Fischer (1999) 
replicated Hess et al.’s (1995) results, thus supporting that both social condition and stimulus 
intensity influenced participants’ facial expressions. Jakobs et al. (1999) found that the presence 
or absence of another person affected the intensity of participants’ expression, where when 
participants were left alone, they smiled less than participants who were experiencing implicit or 
explicit presence of a friend. The greater social awareness (i.e., participant’s awareness of others) 
127 
 
and stronger social motivation (i.e., participant’s concern with other’s evaluation of the stimulus 
and participant’s motives to communicate) were linked with participants being more expressive 
in the explicit presence condition (i.e., a friend’s physical presence), but not in the implicit 
presence (i.e., participant believed that a friend is in a nearby room) or alone condition. In 
addition, the study also found that the varying social conditions did not affect participants’ 
intensity of emotional feelings. Therefore, Jakobs et al. (1999) concluded that facial expressions 
are influenced by the social condition the person is experiencing, as well as the emotional 
stimuli, and the extent of either factor on one’s facial expression is dependent on the situation.  
How about the effect of social context on the expression of negative facial expressions? 
Wagner and Smith (1991) stated that when participants are accompanied by strangers, 
participants can view as either co-acting participants or an evaluating audience, depending on the 
context and task set up by the researcher. For instance, some studies reported that participants 
tended to inhibit their facial behaviour when in the presence of a stranger (e.g. Kleck et al., 1976, 
Kraut, 1982) where the strangers are regarded as an evaluative audience. Meanwhile, Wagner 
and Smith (1991) reasoned that when the stranger shares an activity with the participant, this 
would elicit stronger expressions of negative facial behaviour because the stranger is considered 
as a co-actor, which evokes stronger social motives. Thus, Wagner and Smith (1991) conducted 
a study where pairs of strangers and pairs of friends (i.e., targets) were videoed as they watched 
emotional slides, and were asked to report the emotions experienced from the stimuli. These 
videoed reactions were shown to participants who were asked to identify the emotions 
experienced by the targets. Participants’ ratings were compared with the ratings reported by the 
targets. The results suggested that pairs of strangers were less expressive (i.e., less recognised by 
participants) than pairs of friends, especially for expressions of amusement, sadness, and 
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tenderness, while expressions of anger, disgust, happiness, puzzlement and peacefulness showed 
no differences in expressions by either pairs of targets.  
Conversely, Buck, Losow, Murphy, and Constanzo (1992) recruited targets to watch 
emotional (i.e., scenic, unpleasant, unusual, sexual) slides either alone, in the presence of a 
friend, or in the presence of a stranger. The targets’ reactions were videoed, and participants had 
to rate what type of slide the targets were viewing. The findings contrasted from Wagner and 
Smith’s (1991) where participants were more accurate when targets were alone than in the 
presence of a stranger. Furthermore, participants’ judgements were more accurate when targets 
were viewing sexual slides in the presence of friends, and less accurate when targets were 
viewing unpleasant slides in the presence of friends. Hence, Buck et al.’s (1992) study suggested 
that when accompanied by friends, one would either enhance or inhibit one’s facial expressions 
dependent on the type of stimuli presented.  
Jakobs, Manstead, and Fischer (2001) expanded their investigation of the effect of social 
context on facial behaviour to include negative emotions. They found that participants inhibited 
their facial expressions of sadness more when in the presence of friends or strangers in either the 
same or different room as compared to when they were in the alone condition. The intensity of 
their expressions was also affected by the intensity of the stimulus. Moreover, the findings 
showed that participants tended to smile when in the presence of a friend (implicit/explicit) than 
a stranger or when left alone. Jakobs et al. (2001) stated that this was because the presence of a 
friend elicited stronger motivation within the participants to communicate and stronger 
awareness as compared to the presence of a stranger. Therefore, suggesting that the role and/or 
identity of the person present affects the way participants respond to negative stimuli. Parkinson 
(2005) summarised that the effects of a real or imagined presence on facial behaviour depended 
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on a varying factors such as the relationship between the participant and the person present, the 
stimuli used to evoke the reaction, and the strength of the social motives. Hence, in some social 
contexts, the presence of another person evokes a more exaggerated facial expression, while in 
other social contexts; it causes an inhibitory effect on the participant’s facial expressions.  
Other research investigating the effect of social context on emotional expressions mainly 
focused on the type and identity of the audience present, and it is now widely assumed that we 
have learned through socialisation, how to control our facial behaviour in various social 
situations (Zaalberg, Manstead, & Fischer, 2004). Thus, the research conducted on this chapter is 
not to examine how people control their facial behaviour in different social contexts, but to 
further our investigation of people’s ability to judge social context from observing the behaviour 
of others. We utilised the concept of an evaluative observer, a co-acting (accompanying) 
stranger, and the alone condition as varying levels of social context, in order to further 
understand perceivers’ sensitivity to gauge the social context the targets experienced. Are 
perceivers still able to detect the presence of another when targets were merely accompanied by 
the experimenter?  
In Experiment 7 described in this chapter, perceivers were instructed to judge whether the 
targets were accompanied by another person or left alone. The perceivers’ eye movements were 
also recorded during the experiment to examine whether perceivers’ eye gaze was influenced by 
the social contexts the targets experienced (i.e., observed, accompanied, alone).  
 
7.2 Stimulus Development Phase 
The aim of this experiment was to create a new set of stimuli for the next experiment. 
Targets were instructed to watch movie clips selected in Experiment 1a in Chapter Three as 
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targets were randomly assigned to one of the three conditions (i.e., observed , accompanied, left 
alone in the room). Targets’ behaviour was recorded during the experiment.  
 
7.2.1 Targets 
Sixty-four (31 males, 33 females) university students aged between 17 and 24 years (M = 
19.2, SD = 1.8) participated in the experiment. Targets were recruited from the University of 
Nottingham Malaysia Campus and comprised of various nationalities: 59 Malaysians, 1 Sri 
Lankan, 1 Mauritian, 1 English, 1 Singaporean, and 1 American. Written informed consent was 
obtained from all targets, who were compensated RM5 for taking part in the experiment. Four of 
the targets’ recorded behaviour was excluded due to technical difficulties encountered during the 
recordings. 
 
7.2.2 Materials and Apparatus 
The highest rated movie clips intended to evoke irritation, disgust, and surprise which 
were selected in Experiment 1a in Chapter Three were used as stimuli in this study. These three 
video clips were presented randomly through PsychoPy (Version 1.74.01; Peirce, 2012) on a HP 
Elite Book 8460p laptop.  Targets were positioned approximately 0.6 meters from the laptop’s 
screen to ensure that their face, neck and shoulders were captured by the laptop’s HD Webcam.  
 
7.2.3 Design 
This experiment was a between-subjects design with targets randomly assigned to one of 
the three social conditions (observed, accompanied, alone) as they watched all three movie clips.  
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7.2.4 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in a quiet room within the School of Psychology. Targets 
were tested individually and informed that the task involved watching three video clips while 
they rated what they felt and the intensity of the emotion felt after each clip. Upon arrival, targets 
were assigned randomly to one of the three conditions (observed, accompanied, alone). In the 
‘observed’ condition, the experimenter sat adjacent the target and ostensibly observed the target 
as they watched the video clips. During the observation, the experimenter jotted down notes on a 
clipboard and made no communication with the target. In the ‘accompanied’ condition, the 
experimenter sat next to the target and watched the videos. After each video clip, the 
experimenter noted down the target’s response to the questions of what they felt from watching 
the clip and the intensity of the emotion felt. For the ‘alone’ condition, target was left alone in 
the room to watch the video clips.  
The three video clips shown were intended to evoke certain emotions (irritation, disgust, 
surprise) and each clip was presented once in a randomised order using PsychoPy. After each 
clip, targets had to choose a response out of seven options (anger, disgust, fear, happy, neutral, 
sad, surprise) that best represented what they felt from watching the video, and then rate the 
intensity of the emotion on a 7-point scale, 1 = least intense and 7 = most intense. These 
responses were presented on the laptop’s screen in a rating scale, and targets responded by using 
the mouse. Since the purpose of the experiment was to capture targets’ spontaneous behaviour, 
the webcam was set to record before targets entered the room.  
Once targets completed the task, they were debriefed of the true nature of the experiment. 
Targets were asked for their written consent to use the recordings of their behaviour for 
subsequent experiments. 
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7.2.5 Editing 
The recordings of targets’ behaviour were edited using VirtualDub (Version 1.9.11; Lee, 
2010) and Sony Vegas Pro (Version 11.0) to capture the targets’ reactions. The reactions to each 
clip were edited based on the descriptions made by participants in Experiment 1a in Chapter 
Three as the most emotionally intense section of the video clip to avoid any experimenter bias in 
editing the most reactive expressions. Once a target’s reactions were edited according to each 
movie clip, the three reactions of the target were arranged to appear in a specific order - 
irritation, disgust, and surprise – and stitched as one stimulus. To help the participants in future 
experiments to identify what the targets were reacting to, a screenshot of each movie clip was 
placed on the top right corner of the stimulus (Figure 20). To ensure that the transition between 
each target reaction was smooth, a ‘fade to black’ effect was added between each reaction. In 
addition, all target stimuli were muted to prevent the audio revealing the social conditions the 
targets were experiencing. Each target stimulus was approximately 26 seconds long. The video 
frame was cropped to 500 pixels for both width and height with a rate of presentation of 29 
frames per second, and only the target’s head to the top of their shoulders was visible against a 
white wall. In total, there were 60 video stimuli; 20 for each of the three conditions, out of which 
ten were male targets, and ten were female targets.   
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Figure 20. An example of a target stimulus created. The screenshots of each of the movie clips 
targets watched were placed on the top right corner of the stimulus to help participants identify 
what targets were reacting to. 
 
7.3 Experiment 7: Sensitivity to Social Context and Eye-Tracking 
The aims of this experiment were to investigate perceivers’ sensitivity to the social 
context the targets experienced and whether perceivers’ eye movements were influenced by the 
social contexts the targets were in as they made judgments. Perceivers were instructed to decide 
whether the targets were accompanied by another person or were alone in the room from 
observing a few seconds of targets’ reactions to three emotional video clips intended to evoke 
irritation, disgust and surprise. If the mere presence of another person is sufficient for perceivers 
to distinguish between accompanied and alone, then this would further demonstrate perceivers’ 
ability to infer social contexts from observing the behaviour of others.  
From the body of research in the effects of social context on facial expressions, we used 
the observed and alone conditions as the anchor points in this experiment. The accompanied 
condition was added to investigate whether the judgments made by perceivers for this condition 
would be similar to that for the observed condition or the alone condition. If perceivers’ 
judgments in the accompanied condition mirrored that of the observed condition, then this would 
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suggest that perceivers are sensitive enough to use the clues left by targets’ behaviour to detect 
the presence of another person, even when this presence is merely a co-actor, not an observer. 
This would also corroborate with the body of research investigating the effect of social context 
on people’s behaviour which found that the presence of another person, be it implicit or explicit, 
still have an effect on the way people behave as compared to when they are left alone. However, 
if perceivers’ judgments reflect that of the alone condition, then it would suggest that perceivers 
were not able to detect the presence of another when targets were not observed directly by 
another person. In addition, this would reveal perceivers’ limit in the ability to detect social 
context from observing targets’ behaviour. In addition, perceivers’ eye movements were 
recorded to give an insight to perceivers’ visual processes when making their judgments on 
social context.  
 
7.3.1 Participants 
Sixty-four (28 males, 36 females) students aged between 17 and 24 years (M = 20.5, SD 
= 2.4) were recruited to participate in the experiment. Perceivers were of varying nationalities: 
49 Malaysians, 1 Sri Lankan, 1 Iranian, 1 Maldivian, 7 Vietnamese, 1 South Korean, 1 
Tanzanian, 1 Singaporean, and 2 Chinese. Thirty-four of the perceivers were recruited from 
University of Nottingham Malaysia Campus and these perceivers had their eye-movement 
recorded during the experiment and were compensated RM5 for taking part.  The remaining 30 
perceivers were recruited from University of Nottingham, UK Campus and their eye movements 
were not recorded for the experiment due to technical reasons, and were compensated £5 for 
participating in the study. Four perceivers’ data were excluded from the final analysis because 
less than 50 percent of their gaze sample was recorded by the eye-tracker. 
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7.3.2 Materials and Apparatus 
The three movie clips targets watched in the Stimulus Development Phase (described 
above) were shown to perceivers to give them a clearer idea of what the targets were reacting to 
since each of the target stimulus shown in this experiment comprised of all the target’s reactions 
to all three movie clips. These movie clips were presented only once in the same order – 
irritation, disgust, surprise – to every perceiver using Windows Media Player. The order of the 
presentation was similar to the arrangement of the target’s reactions for each stimulus. The 60 
target stimuli created in the Stimulus Development Phase which comprised of 20 targets for each 
of the three conditions (observed, accompanied, and alone) with 10 male and 10 female targets 
for each condition. For the Malaysian Campus perceivers, these target stimuli were presented 
randomly through Tobii Studio Software on a 17-inch TFT monitor that was integrated with the 
Tobii T60 eye-tracking system. The perceivers’ eye movements were recorded at a data sampling 
rate of 60Hz. The UK Campus perceivers were presented with the stimuli in a random order via 
PsychoPy (Version 1.74.01; Peirce, 2012) on a 14-inch screen, HP Elite Book 8460p laptop.  
 
7.3.3 Design 
This experiment used a 3 (Conditions: observed, accompanied, alone) × 2 (Gender of 
Perceivers: male, female) design where all perceivers were tested with the same set of stimuli.  
 
7.3.4 Procedure 
Perceivers were tested individually in a quiet environment. Perceivers who were tested 
with the eye-tracker sat approximately 60 cm from the monitor. All perceivers were shown the 
three movie clips in the same order – irritation, disgust, and surprise. Then, for the perceivers 
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who had their eye movements recorded, a nine-point calibration was conducted to ensure 
accurate recording of their eye gaze. All perceivers were instructed to infer whether the target 
was accompanied by another person or alone for each of the 60 stimuli based on the target’s 
behaviour. In the eye-tracking condition, a fixation point (+) was presented for one second 
pseudorandomly in one of the four quadrants of the screen to prevent fixation bias before each 
stimulus. For the non-eye-tracking condition, a fixation point (+) was also presented before each 
stimulus but was positioned in the centre of the screen. The target stimuli were shown only once 
and in a random order to all perceivers. After each stimulus, perceivers were asked a forced 
choice question of whether the target was alone or accompanied by another person, and they 
responded by using the mouse; perceivers were given as much time as they needed to respond to 
each question. These responses were recorded automatically by Tobii Studio (in the eye-tracking 
condition) or PsychoPy (in the non-eye-tracking condition). 
 
7.3.5 Results and Discussion 
7.3.5.1 Behaviour Data 
To examine whether perceivers were able to distinguish between the social conditions 
above the level of chance, perceivers’ correct responses were tested with one-sample t-tests with 
a test value of 30. The test value was 30 because there were a total of 60 target stimuli, and if 
perceivers performed at a chance level, on average, they would be correct 30 out of 60. It was 
found that perceivers were able to correctly distinguish when the targets were accompanied by 
another person and when they were alone above the level of chance, t(59) = 2.71, p < .05.  
To take into account the possibility of response bias in perceivers’ answers, responses 
were coded based on the number of times perceivers responded ‘accompanied by another 
137 
 
person.’ A 3 (Conditions: observed, accompanied, alone) × 2(Gender of Perceivers: male, 
female) ANOVA was conducted. Effect sizes are reported as ηp2 for ANOVA results and are 
interpreted as follows; ≥ 0.01 is considered a small effect, ≥ 0.06 a medium effect, and ≥ 0.14 is 
a large effect (Cohen, 1992). There was a large significant main effect of Conditions, F(2, 116) = 
19.69, p < .001, ηp2 = .25 (Figure 21). Pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction revealed 
that perceivers tended to respond ‘accompanied’ more often when targets were observed and 
accompanied than alone (ps < .001). However, there was no significant difference in perceivers’ 
tendency to respond ‘accompanied’ when targets were observed than accompanied (p = .75). 
This suggests that the mere presence of another individual was enough for perceivers to detect 
that targets were accompanied.   
 
 
Figure 21. The mean number of times perceivers responded ‘accompanied by another’ out of 20 
for the three social conditions (i.e., observed, accompanied, alone) in Experiment 7. Standard 
errors of the mean are represented by the error bars. 
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There was no significant between-subjects effects for the Gender of the Perceivers, F(1, 
58) < 1, p = .73. Also, there was no significant interaction between the Conditions and the 
Gender of the Perceivers, F(2, 116) = 1.69, p = .19. This suggests that there was no variation 
between male and female perceivers in their rating of social context. 
A 3 (Conditions: observed, accompanied, alone) × 2 (Venue: Malaysia Campus, UK 
Campus) ANOVA was performed to examine any difference in performance between perceivers 
from the two campuses. There was no significant difference in performance between perceivers 
from UK and Malaysia Campus, F(1, 58) < 1, p = .43 and neither was there a significant 
interaction between the factors, Conditions and Venue, F(2, 116) = 2.71, p = .07. It seems 
perceivers from both campuses performed in a similar pattern when discriminating whether 
targets were alone or accompanied by another. 
Overall, perceivers demonstrated that they were able to distinguish between the social 
conditions the targets experienced above the level chance. Moreover, perceivers’ judgments 
systematically discriminated when targets were in the presence of another, and when they were 
alone in the room. This suggests that perceivers were able to discriminate when someone was in 
the presence or absence of another from the targets’ behaviour, and the mere presence of a 
person who did not overtly observe the targets was sufficient for perceivers to detect that the 
target was accompanied. This demonstrates perceivers’ sensitivity and ability to use the 
behaviour of others to infer an aspect of the social world that perceivers were not able to directly 
experience themselves. 
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7.3.5.2 Eye Movement Analyses  
Areas of interest (AOIs) were created on Tobii Studio 3.1.6. The AOIs were drawn on 
each stimulus independently to delineate the eyes, nose, mouth and body, similar to that in 
Experiment 4 and 5 described in Chapter Six. The Total Fixation Duration (seconds) for each 
AOI was obtained from Tobii Studio which measures the total duration for all fixations within an 
AOI. Fixation is defined by the standard Tobii fixation filter as two or more consecutive samples 
falling within a 35 pixel radius. Only fixation duration was examined in this study since the aim 
of the eye tracking analyses was to investigate whether or not the patterns of eye movements at 
the different regions vary depending on the social context. The Total Fixation Duration (seconds) 
for each AOI was calculated as the percentage fixation duration for each AOI [(fixation duration 
of an AOI / total duration of the video) × 100] to take into account the varying duration of the 
stimuli. 
Four separate 3 (Conditions: observed, accompanied, alone) × 2 (Gender of Perceivers: 
male, female) ANOVAs were conducted for the four different AOIs (Body, Mouth, Nose, Eyes) 
(Figure 22), as detailed below. 
For the Body region, there was a large significant main effect of Conditions, F(2, 56) = 
40.35, p < . 001, ηp2 = .59. Pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction revealed differences 
in perceivers’ eye gaze between observed, accompanied and the alone conditions (ps < .001), 
where perceivers attended to the Body region significantly more when the targets were alone. 
Moreover there was a large significant interaction between Conditions and Gender of Perceivers, 
F(2, 56) = 7.33 p < .005, ηp2 = .21. Paired-samples t-tests revealed that male perceivers attended 
to the Body region significantly more when targets were alone than observed and accompanied 
(ps < .005). Female perceivers attended significantly more to the Body for alone than observed 
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and accompanied (ps < .001), and for observed than accompanied (p < .05). However, there was 
no significant main effect for the Gender of the Perceivers, F(1, 28)< 1, p = .53.  
For the Mouth region, there was a large significant main effect of Conditions, F (2, 56) = 
17.88, p < .001, ηp2 = .39 and pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed that 
perceivers attended to the Mouth the least when targets were alone than accompanied (p < .001) 
and observed (p < .005).  However, there was no significant interaction between the Conditions 
and the Gender of the Perceivers, F(2, 56) < 1, p = .72, and there was no significant between-
subjects effect of the Gender of Perceivers, F(1, 28) < 1, p = 87, suggesting there were no 
significant variations in the way male and female perceivers attended to the Mouth region of the 
targets. 
As for the Nose region, there was a large significant main effect of Conditions, F(2, 56) = 
9.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .25. Pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction showed that perceivers 
tended to focus on the Nose region more when the targets were observed and accompanied by 
the experimenter than when alone (ps < .005).  There was also a large significant effect 
associated with the Gender of the Perceivers, F(1, 28) = 5.10, p < .05, ηp2 = .15, where the female 
perceivers attended to the nose region significantly more than the male perceivers (p < .05). 
However, there was no significant interaction between the Conditions and the Gender of the 
Perceivers, F(2, 56) = .97, p = .39.  
Lastly, for the Eyes region, there was a large significant main effect of Conditions, F(2, 
56) = 12.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .31. This was due to perceivers attending to the Eyes significantly 
less when the targets were observed than when alone (p < .001), and accompanied (p < .005). 
There was no significant interaction between the Conditions and Gender of the Perceivers, F(2, 
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56) < 1, p = .46, and no significant main effect for the Gender of the Perceivers, F (1, 28) < 1, p 
= 57.  
 
 
 
Figure 22. The male and female perceivers’ mean percentage duration of fixations for observed, 
accompanied and alone conditions for the different AOIs in Experiment 7. The standard errors of 
the mean are represented by the error bars. (Top left: Body region, Top right: Mouth region, 
Bottom left: Nose region, Bottom right: Eyes region).  
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Perceivers: male, female) ANOVAs for the four different AOIs revealed similar results to those 
reported above with a few differences. For the Body region, the pairwise comparisons with 
Bonferroni correction for the main effect of Conditions showed that perceivers attended to this 
region significantly more when the targets were alone than when accompanied by another or 
observed (ps < .001), and when they were observed than accompanied by the experimenter (p < 
.001). Furthermore, there was no significant interaction between the Conditions and the Gender 
of the Perceivers, F(1.64, 46.04) = 2.19, p = .13. For the Nose region, the pairwise comparisons 
with Bonferroni correction for Conditions revealed that perceivers attended to the region 
significantly less when the targets were alone than accompanied (p < .05), and there was no 
significant between-subjects effect, F(1, 28) = 3.69, p = .07. Lastly, for the Eyes region, the 
pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction suggest that perceivers attended significantly 
more to the Eyes when the targets were observed than alone (p < .05). 
In summary, the eye movement data revealed that the duration perceivers fixated on the 
different regions of the targets’ body and face varied according to the social conditions and the 
emotional video clips the targets experienced. In other words, there was no evidence of a 
particular pattern when looking at the targets’ behaviour and making a judgment of whether they 
were alone or accompanied by another person. Rather, the relationship between the fixation 
duration on a region and the social condition the targets experienced was also influenced by the 
emotional video clip the targets were reacting to.  
 
7.4 General Discussion 
The aim of the experiment in this chapter was to further explore the scope of perceivers’ 
ability to mentalise, specifically the ability to discriminate between social contexts (i.e., 
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observed, alone). Previous experiments have shown that perceivers were able to infer when 
targets were alone in the room or observed by an experimenter after observing a brief sample of 
targets’ behaviour. How sensitive are perceivers to the social contexts targets experienced? To 
investigate this, we developed a new set of stimuli in which targets were left alone in the room, 
observed ostensibly by the experimenter, and where targets were merely accompanied by the 
experimenter to watch the video clips together. With the additional social condition, perceivers 
were asked to judge whether targets were alone or accompanied by another person.  
The results of Experiment 7 show that perceivers can detect the mere presence of another 
person by observing the target’s behaviour. The results for the accompanied condition yield a 
similar effect to the observed condition. This suggests that perceivers were sensitive enough not 
only to interpret the behaviour of others, but they are also able to learn about the social presence 
or absence of others. Perceivers’ judgments matched that of the research conducted in the area of 
social psychology that focused on the effects of social context on facial expressions which found 
that people acted differently in the presence of others; regardless it was implicit or explicit 
presence, as compared to when they were alone. These studies indicated that people either 
facilitated or inhibited their facial behaviour when in the presence of another person, depending 
on the emotions experienced and the role played by the accompanying presence. This suggests 
that perceivers might have used targets’ behavioural cues and perceivers’ own knowledge of how 
people behave in various social situations when experiencing different emotions to help 
mentalise whether the target was accompanied by another person or left alone.  
In addition, the perceivers’ results were similar across campuses. This could be due to the 
use of Asian perceivers from both campuses, reducing any possible cross-cultural differences in 
judgments. Therefore, for future studies, perceivers and targets from the Western population 
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could be examined to investigate whether it would yield similar results. If yes, it could suggest 
that perceivers from different cultures use similar techniques to infer social context from 
observing target’s behaviour. Moreover, it could imply that targets use similar display rules 
when expressing themselves in various social situations. To further test perceivers’ ability to 
mentalise, it would be useful to use a mix of Western and Asian perceivers and targets in a 
similar experiment to investigate whether there are any cultural differences in mentalising by 
incorporating in-group (targets and perceivers from similar cultures) and out-group (targets and 
perceivers from different cultures) factors. This would shed some light on perceivers’ ability to 
infer social context, and the underlying processes involved during mentalising.  
Furthermore, perceivers’ sensitivity to the presence of another person is implicit in their 
eye movements. However, participants did not simply attend to a particular region for a specific 
social context. As with the pattern of results found in Chapter Six, the eye movements were 
systematically different for the different areas of interest depending on the social context the 
targets experienced and depending on the particular emotion the target was experiencing.  
It is possible that in the accompanied condition, the experimenter’s presence with the 
targets viewing the video clips created a similar effect or social motivation for the targets to 
when the targets were observed directly. As demonstrated by many of the studies investigating 
the effects of social context on facial expressions, the role and identity of the person being 
present with the target, as well as the implicit or explicit nature of the presence, also affect the 
way the targets behave (Parkinson, 2005). Hence, it would be useful in future studies to create 
various social conditions with the person accompanying the target, and varying the role and 
identity of the person, as well as the implicit or explicit nature of the presence, to examine 
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whether perceivers are still able to detect social context from target’s behaviour. This would 
inform us of the scope of perceivers’ ability in mentalising social context.  
In summary, this study further supports previous findings that perceivers are sensitive to 
the social context of the targets. This is not only apparent in their judgements of the social 
context itself, but also in perceivers’ visual attention. Furthermore, this experiment demonstrated 
that by having the experimenter accompany the target was sufficient for perceivers to 
discriminate when targets were alone or accompanied. This demonstrates perceivers’ ability to 
‘know’ the social world through the minds of others without having to directly experience it 
themselves.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Background Overview 
 Humans can obtain a rich amount of information when interacting with others. This helps 
them to make sense of the interaction and in turn respond accordingly. Some of this information 
is directly observable, such as facial expressions, and some can only be accessed indirectly 
through the mind of others (Achim, Guitton, Jackson, Boutin, & Monetta, 2013). Mentalising 
refers to the ability to infer and interpret the mental states (i.e., beliefs, intentions, and emotions) 
of others. A central tenet of this thesis is that the process of mentalising is deployed in order to 
access information about the world, indirectly through the lens of other minds. 
 A large body of research in the area of theory of mind has focused on the processes 
involved in mentalising by investigating the factors involved in making these inferences. 
Research in the tradition of ‘person perception’ is somewhat different, focusing less on the 
process and more efforts to determine how accurately people make interpersonal judgments. 
Recently, some studies have begun to combine both approaches with the aim of establishing a 
more comprehensive understanding of people’s ability to mentalise.  
 Kraut (1982) stated that we can learn about the social contexts and the environment from 
the facial expressions of others; and there has been lots of research examining how people 
behave differently in different social contexts. However there is little evidence on how well 
people can infer the social context of a target (e.g. absence or presence of the experimenter in the 
company of the target). Social presence is likely to modify the target’s expression of emotions 
(Wagner & Lee, 1999) and so long as perceivers can sense that the target’s expression is being 
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modified then this might be sufficient for the perceiver to judge correctly when the target is 
accompanied and when the target is alone. The research described in this thesis thus aimed to 
investigate people’s (perceivers’) ability to detect the social context of the target. We employed 
the retrodictive mindreading procedure in which perceivers observed the reaction of targets to 
provocative stimuli and then had to infer whether the target was observed or alone.  The 
provocative stimuli were film clips that we assumed caused an emotional reaction in targets, a 
reaction that could have been affected by the presence or absence of the experimenter. We 
assume that the facial expression of the target is effectively an embodiment of their mental state. 
Hence, in so far as the perceiver can interpret the facial expression, they can effectively interpret 
the underlying mental state. We also assume that perceivers might be able to detect whether this 
embodied mental state is being constrained in some way (by the presence of a third party 
observing the target). If so, it follows that perceivers are making the secondary inferential step of 
inferring something about the social context through the mind of the target. 
 Chapter Three describes the development of target stimuli in which perceivers were 
asked to infer the emotion the target was expressing to investigate whether this judgment is 
influenced by social context. Experiments in Chapter Four examined whether perceivers were 
able to effectively discriminate social contexts and whether the level of targets’ expressiveness 
influences the perceivers’ inference of social context. Chapter Five investigated how perceivers 
rated the intensity of targets’ expressions to find whether there is any relationship between 
perceivers’ inference of social context and their ratings of targets’ expressiveness. Chapter Six 
replicated the experiments described in Chapter Four with the incorporation of eye-tracking and 
a reduced number of target stimuli to further our understanding of the scope of perceivers’ ability 
to discriminate social context from observing the behaviour of others. Lastly, in Chapter Seven, a 
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new set of target stimuli was created to determine whether the mere presence of an experimenter 
is sufficient for perceivers to detect social context.  
 This chapter begins with a summary of the findings reported in Chapters Three to Seven, 
followed by a discussion of the implication of these findings, the limitations of this research, the 
future direction of this research, and a conclusion from the experiments described in this thesis. 
 
8.2 Summary of Results 
8.2.1 Chapter Three: Stimulus Development 
 Studies described in Chapter Three focused on the development of the target stimuli. We 
considered Ekman’s six basic emotions as a point of reference when creating the target stimuli 
which allows us to investigate whether perceivers are able to detect the social contexts from 
observing target’s emotional reactions to movie clips.  
Experiment 1a was a validation of the movie clips where perceivers rated what they felt, 
the intensity of the emotion, and briefly described the scene that evoked the emotion for 34 
different movie clips. The data obtained from this experiment helped select 14 movie clips to be 
used as stimuli when creating the target stimuli, and the description provided by the perceivers 
were used to aid the editing of the target stimuli. Meanwhile, Experiment 1b described the 
procedure involved when developing the target stimuli. This generated a total 140 stimuli which 
consisted of 10 targets reacting to seven different emotions (irritation, disgust, fear, amusement, 
neutral, sadness, surprise) in two different social contexts (alone, observed). 
Experiment 1c investigated the effectiveness of the target stimuli created and perceivers’ 
sensitivity to social contexts by asking them to infer the emotions expressed by the target. 
Perceivers were able to discriminate between the seven emotions for the two social contexts. 
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Furthermore, the findings indicated that perceivers were significantly more accurate when targets 
were alone than observed for irritation, disgust, fear and sadness. Meanwhile, for amusement, 
neutral and surprise, perceivers performed significantly better when targets were observed than 
when alone. In addition, female perceivers were significantly more accurate than male perceivers 
when judging that targets were expressing fear. Therefore, the variation in perceivers’ accuracy 
of the emotions expressed by targets suggests that perceivers were sensitive to the social contexts 
targets experienced. 
 
Interpretation 
 The experiments described in Chapter Three not only showcased how the target stimuli 
were developed, but also perceivers’ sensitivity to the social contexts targets experienced from 
judging the emotions expressed by targets. Is it possible that the perceivers’ judgments of 
emotions expressed were affected by the social contexts targets experienced? The findings from 
Experiment 1c seem to have demonstrated this effect since perceivers’ accuracy in the judgments 
of the emotions expressed by targets varied according to the social contexts targets experienced. 
For instance, perceivers were more accurate when targets were observed than alone for positive 
emotions (amusement, surprise) and the opposite effect was found for negative emotions 
(irritation, disgust, fear, sadness). This pattern of results corroborate with studies conducted to 
investigate the effects of social contexts on behaviour. Specifically, these studies have 
demonstrated that when in the presence of others, individuals tend to exaggerate their behaviour 
for positive emotions (e.g. Ekman & Friesen, 1975) and inhibit their expressions of negative 
emotions (e.g. Spain et al., 2000). From our findings, it seems that perceivers have some sort of 
insight into this phenomenon; hence their accuracy in rating the emotions expressed by targets 
150 
 
was also dependent on the social contexts targets experienced. Thus, is it possible that perceivers 
relied on targets’ expressiveness to infer the emotions targets experienced? This will be 
addressed when reviewing further studies reported in this thesis. 
 In addition, it was found that female perceivers were more accurate than males when 
targets were watching fearful movie clips. This gender difference in accuracy rates supports 
research which suggests that females are more sensitive and accurate in recognising less intense 
emotional expressions (Hall & Matsumoto, 2004). However, there have been inconsistent results 
reported in various studies in the area of gender differences in emotional facial perception 
(Coleman, 1949). This seems to be the case for the performance for the other emotions involved 
in our study. Therefore, it might be premature to conclude that there are differences in 
performance between male and female perceivers. This effect is further explored in the 
remaining studies described in this thesis.  
 
8.2.2 Chapter Four: Inferring Social Context and Expressiveness of Targets’ Behaviour 
 The experiments described in Chapter Four examined perceivers’ ability to identify the 
two different social contexts (observed and alone) from observing the targets’ emotional 
reactions and whether their judgments are dependent on the targets’ expressiveness. Findings 
from Experiment 2 suggested that perceivers were able to distinguish when targets were alone 
and when they were observed. Their performance varied depending on targets’ emotional 
reactions and the social context they were experiencing, especially when targets were watching 
movie clips depicting irritation, fear and sadness. In addition, the results showed that female 
perceivers were more likely to respond ‘observed’ when it was true compared with the male 
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perceivers, and this was mainly due to conditions in which targets were experiencing neutral or 
sad emotions.  
 Since perceivers’ inferences of social context varied based on the emotional reaction of 
targets, Experiment 3 was conducted to investigate whether the expressiveness of targets’ 
reactions influenced the perceivers’ judgments of social context. Perceivers’ ratings of the 
intensity of targets’ expressions revealed that perceivers were effectively discriminating between 
conditions in which targets were alone and observed. Perceivers tended to judge that targets were 
inhibiting their expression of disgust when observed than when alone, but when targets 
experienced positive stimuli, perceivers judged that targets exaggerated their expression more 
when observed than when alone.  
 
Interpretation 
 The experiments described in Chapter Four suggested that perceivers were able to 
distinguish the social contexts targets experienced from observing targets’ emotional reactions. 
Perceivers’ performance varied based on the emotion and the social contexts the targets were 
experiencing in both experiments. This led us to question whether it was possible that certain 
emotions were easier to discriminate than others, and whether perceivers relied on targets’ 
expressiveness when making inferences of the social contexts targets experienced. Findings from 
Experiment 3 revealed that perceivers were sensitive to targets’ expressiveness in a way that 
effectively discriminated between social contexts. This effect was stronger for certain emotions 
(disgust, surprise) than others. The judgments made by perceivers thus mirrors findings reported 
in social psychology research on how a target’s emotional expressions are moderated by the 
presence of an audience (e.g. Ekman, 1972; Kraut, 1982; Kilbride & Yarczower, 1980). In turn, 
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this raises the possibility that perceivers in Experiment 2 made inferences about the target’s 
social context based on an implicit understanding of how an audience affects the emotional 
expression of the target depending on whether the emotion is positive or negative. 
An alternative explanation is that perceivers used low-level cues such as targets’ eye gaze 
to infer social context – for example, perhaps the target looked away from the screen (and 
towards the observer) more often when an observer was present than when absent. However, it 
was demonstrated in Experiment 2 that the number of times targets looked away from the 
monitor did not lead to easier discrimination of the social context they were in, suggesting that 
perceivers were using other cues when making such judgments. Nevertheless, eye-tracking was 
incorporated into later experiments to further investigate and understand the implicit processes 
involved when identifying the social contexts targets experienced.  
Moreover, findings from Experiment 2 indicated that female perceivers may be better at 
identifying social contexts than the male perceivers; however data from Experiment 3 did not 
reveal any gender differences in identifying the social contexts. This is consistent with previous 
studies in the area of facial expressions recognition, which have failed to identify any differences 
in performance between male and female perceivers (e.g. Hoffman et al., 2010; Kessler et al., 
2005).  
 
8.2.3 Chapter Five: Linking Targets’ Expressiveness with Perceivers’ Ability to 
Discriminate Social Context 
Two pilot studies were conducted to gain a better understanding of how perceivers rate 
targets’ expressiveness. In addition, we narrowed the number of stimuli used to irritation, disgust 
and surprise because the findings in Experiment 3 showed that these emotions yielded stronger 
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results. In both pilot studies, perceivers were asked to rate the intensity of targets’ expressions, 
and write down why they thought the target was controlling his/her expressions. The intensity 
ratings from both studies revealed similar pattern of results to what was found in Experiment 3. 
In addition, the results from the open-ended questions from both pilot studies suggested that 
perceivers’ responses were largely influenced by the way the question was phrased, instead of 
reflecting how the perceivers made such judgments. Thus, this method of measurement was 
abandoned in future experiments for a more objective measurement that gives an insight on the 
processes involved in making such inferences – eye-tracking.  
 
8.2.4 Chapter Six: Inferring Social Context and Expressiveness of Targets’ Behaviour 
with Eye -Tracking 
 Experiments described in Chapter Six were similar to those reported in Chapter Four but 
with the addition of eye-tracking. As with the pilot studies described in Chapter Five, we only 
used target reactions to stimuli that provoked irritation, disgust and surprise 
 The behavioural data for both experiments described in Chapter Six replicated that of 
previous experiments where perceivers were able to distinguish when targets were alone and 
when they were observed, and their ratings of targets’ expressiveness varied according to the 
social contexts and the emotions experienced by the targets; there were no gender differences in 
perceivers’ judgments.  
 Eye-tracking data for both experiments revealed that perceivers’ eye gaze at the different 
regions varied depending on the social context. For the Body region, it was found that perceivers 
tended to attend to the region longer for irritation and disgust when targets were alone than when 
observed, and longer for surprise when targets were observed than alone. Meanwhile for the 
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remaining three regions, there were slightly different results between the two experiments. In 
Experiment 4, it was found that perceivers attended to the Mouth and Nose regions more when 
targets were alone than observed for disgust. Meanwhile, perceivers spent more time looking at 
the Eyes region when targets were observed than when alone for irritation and disgust. In 
Experiment 5, it was revealed that perceivers looked longer at the Mouth region when targets 
were alone than observed for surprise, and the reverse effect was obtained for irritation. For the 
Nose region, perceivers spent more time on the region when targets were alone than when 
observed for both disgust and surprise. Lastly, for the Eyes region, perceivers attended to it more 
when targets were observed than when alone. There was no gender difference in the time spent 
on the different regions. Therefore, the relationship between the time spent on a region for a 
particular social context is a complex one since the amount of time perceivers spent looking at a 
region depended not only on the social context but also on the valence of the emotion 
experienced by targets (positive or negative).  
 
Interpretation 
Both experiments presented in Chapter Six demonstrated that perceivers were able to 
discriminate between the two social contexts from targets’ emotional reactions. For instance, 
perceivers judged that targets were inhibiting their negative (disgust, irritation) expressions to a 
greater degree when observed than when alone. Conversely, perceivers rated that targets tended 
to exaggerate their positive (surprise) expression to a greater degree when observed than when 
alone. It seems therefore, that perceivers were sensitive to the social contexts targets were 
experiencing in their ratings of targets’ expressiveness. Furthermore, perceivers’ judgments of 
whether targets were alone or observed indicated that they were explicitly discriminating the two 
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social contexts. These findings suggest that perceivers seem to have an understanding of the 
effect of social context on targets’ emotional expression. Therefore, it is plausible to suppose that 
perceivers used targets’ expressiveness as a basis to infer the social context.  
The eye-tracking data from both experiments revealed that perceivers’ eye gaze patterns 
were systematically different for the various regions depending on the social context of the 
targets. Perceivers did not simply look at specific regions more when targets were alone than 
observed (or the opposite); instead the eye gaze pattern showed a complex relationship between 
the social context of the targets and the particular emotion the targets were experiencing. For 
instance, for both experiments described in the chapter, the body region was attended to more 
when the target was alone than observed for irritation and disgust and the opposite effect was 
observed for surprise. This looking behaviour could be due to the increased movement among 
the targets in the alone condition for the negative emotions and observe condition for the positive 
emotion. This matches the perceivers’ judgment of the intensity of target’s emotional reactions. 
Furthermore, in Experiment 4, perceivers attended to the mouth and nose regions more for 
disgust when the target was alone than observed. This could be explained by the facial 
movements involved when expressing disgust which mostly involve the central region of the 
face. Meanwhile, in Experiment 5, perceivers attended to the eyes region more when targets 
were observed than alone, suggesting the possibility that perceivers relied on the region to judge 
the intensity of the targets’ expressions which in turn was influenced by the targets’ social 
contexts.  In addition, regardless of the question posed to the perceivers (whether they were 
asked about social context or whether they were asked about the target’s expressiveness); their 
eye gaze pattern suggested that perceivers were influenced by the targets’ social contexts, as well 
as the emotion the targets were experiencing. Hence, it seems that the social context influenced 
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the targets’ emotional reactions, which in turn affected the perceivers’ eye movement behaviour 
in a way that further demonstrated their sensitivity to when targets were alone or observed.  
 
8.2.5 Chapter Seven: Alone, Accompanied, Observed – Perceivers’ Sensitivity to Social 
Context 
 The experiment conducted in this chapter investigated perceivers’ sensitivity to the social 
context the targets experienced on both an implicit (eye-tracking) and an explicit level, with an 
additional condition (accompanied). The ‘accompanied’ condition consisted of the experimenter 
seated next to the target, facing the laptop’s screen to watch the movie clips together, which was 
different from the ‘observed’ condition where the experimenter was seated next to the target but 
facing them instead of the screen while simultaneously jotting down notes of the target’s 
behaviour. The results revealed that perceivers were able to discriminate when targets were alone 
or accompanied by another. Furthermore, there was no significant difference in the judgments of 
targets being observed and accompanied.  
 The eye-tracking data yielded a similar pattern of results to that reported in Chapter Six 
where perceivers’ eye movements systematically varied for the different regions depending on 
the social context and emotion targets were experiencing. The Body region was focused on more 
when targets were alone than when they were accompanied or observed and this could be due to 
targets inhibiting less of their movements within this region when left alone. For the Mouth and 
Nose regions perceivers spent less time on these areas when targets were alone than 
accompanied and observed. Meanwhile the Eyes region was least attended in the observed 
condition compared with the alone and accompanied conditions.  
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 A gender difference was found in the eye-tracking data where female perceivers attended 
to the Nose region longer than the male perceivers. Additionally, female perceivers attended to 
the Mouth more than males when targets were observed than accompanied.  
 
Interpretation 
 The findings in Chapter Seven suggest that the mere presence of another individual is 
sufficient for perceivers to detect that targets were accompanied. This was demonstrated on both 
an implicit and an explicit level. Perceivers were able to discriminate when asked explicitly if the 
target was accompanied or alone. Moreover, the eye-tracking data showed perceivers’ dwell time 
for any particular region was affected by the valence of the emotion experienced by the target 
and by the social context. This was similar to the findings reported in Chapter Six. Moreover, the 
results for the ‘accompanied’ condition yielded similar results to the ‘observed’ condition, 
suggesting that the mere presence of another person in the room is sufficient for perceivers to 
detect a modulated reaction in the targets depending on whether they were reacting to something 
positive or negative. Therefore, perceivers are able to know something about the social world by 
interpreting how others express their emotions without needing to have any direct experience of 
the world inhabited by the target. 
 
8.3 Implications 
8.3.1 Retrodictive Mindreading 
 The aim of this thesis was to investigate and further understand people’s ability in 
learning about the world through the minds of other people. The findings demonstrated that 
perceivers are able to make correct inferences about the target’s social context (observed or 
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alone). Past research by Pillai et al. (2012, 2014) and Cassidy et al. (2013, 2015) suggested that 
people have the ability to make backwards inferences from observing the target’s behaviour, to 
their mental state, and from the mental state embodied in behaviour to the antecedent cause of 
that mental state. In these studies, perceivers were able to make systematic inferences about the 
experimenter’s behaviour or the type of gift the experimenter gave to the target. The findings 
reported in this thesis thus extend the scope of research into people’s ability to make retrodictive 
inferences: Perceivers can guess what was said to the target, what was given to the target and we 
now know they can also interpret the target’s emotional reaction to infer the target’s social 
context. Hence, it seems that retrodictive mindreading has a broader scope than suggested by 
research conducted by Pillai et al. and Cassidy et al. The limit of this scope remains unknown but 
at least we have established that it is broader than previously thought. 
 The suggestion that people can interpret the behaviour of others by attributing mental 
states is supported by many (e.g. Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Dennett, 1978). For example, Baron-
Cohen and Cross (1992) found that people are able to infer what someone is thinking by 
observing the direction of their eye gaze. In addition, Ekman and Friesen’s (1971, 1975) studies 
demonstrated that people’s ability to recognise basic emotions indicates that mental states are 
embodied and indeed observable in behaviour, in this case, the face. Baron-Cohen et al. (1997) 
went on to claim that mentalising involves a mix of ‘top-down’ (using prior knowledge or 
context about how one mental state relates to the other), and ‘bottom-up’ process (e.g. mental 
states are expressed in behaviour). In other words he was proposing that our mental states are 
expressed through our behaviour and our behaviour is driven by our mental states. 
 Perceivers’ ratings of the target’s expressiveness seem to support the notion that people 
are able to correctly judge target’s social context from observing target’s behaviour which is an 
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embodiment of their mental states. Instead of finding a straightforward effect such as people 
judging that targets tend to inhibit their expression more when observed than alone (or the 
opposite) across all the emotional reactions, our studies showed that perceivers tend to rate that 
targets were inhibiting their expressions of negative emotions (e.g. disgust, irritation) when in the 
presence of others than when alone. Conversely, perceivers judged that targets tend to exaggerate 
their expressions of positive emotions (e.g. surprise) when in the presence of others than when 
alone. This complex relationship between the target’s expressiveness and the social context that 
modified the expression is also dependent on the emotional movie clips the targets watched. The 
variation in perceivers’ ratings demonstrated that people are sensitive to the effects of social 
context on targets’ expressiveness which raises the possibility that perceivers’ ability to judge 
social context may be based on their understanding of the effects of social context on targets’ 
expressiveness of their emotional reactions.  
 The possibility that perceivers may have relied on the target’s expressiveness of their 
emotional reactions to infer social context is plausible because when a perceiver observes a 
target, not only the emotion of the target needs to be identified, but the intensity of the 
expression and its cause are usually identified together (Hess & Hareli, 2015). Hess and Hareli 
(2015) continued by stating that there is a lack of research on the influence of social norm 
knowledge on the perception of emotions. Even though this thesis is not focused on perceivers’ 
ability to decode social norms or recognise emotions, the investigation of perceivers’ ability to 
identify the social context from observing targets’ emotional reaction can help to address Hess 
and Hareli’s statement.  
Research investigating the effect of social context on behaviour has found that 
individuals tend to exaggerate or inhibit their behaviour when in the presence of others 
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depending on the emotions felt (Kraut, 1982). Some studies have found that individuals tend to 
inhibit their expression of negative emotions (e.g. disgust, fear) when in the company of others 
(Spain et al., 2000), but exaggerate their expression of positive emotions (e.g. happiness, 
surprise) when in the presence of others (Buck, 1984; Ekman & Friesen, 1975).  These findings 
are what Ekman (1972) referred to as display rules which are social and cultural rules that guide 
one’s  behaviour and expression of emotions in a particular social context as deemed appropriate.  
A large body of research has since been developed to further understand the impact of social 
context, especially display rules on the behaviour of targets, particularly their facial expressions 
(Hess & Hareli, 2015).  
The pattern of behaviour found by studies investigating the effects of social context on 
the expression of emotions mirrors that of our perceivers’ judgments of targets’ expressiveness 
for the different social contexts and emotions experienced by the target. Hence, is it possible that 
perceivers use this insight that a target’s expressiveness is moderated by the social context as the 
basis for making a correct inference of the social context? If so, it is not a surprising discovery 
that targets’ expressions vary depending on the social context, since perceivers seem to have this 
knowledge all along. Therefore, it seems plausible that perceivers have acquired the knowledge 
of social norms and display rules through socialisation over the years and applied this knowledge 
when inferring the target’s social context.  
As mentioned earlier in Chapters One and Two, research in the area of mentalising has 
tended to focus on how people infer the mental states of others without taking into account how 
accurate people are at making these inferences. Zaki and Ochsner (2011) suggested that the most 
effective method of investigating people’s ability to mentalise involves not only measuring how 
perceivers mentalise, but also how capable they are at it. Ickes’ (1997, 2003) empathic accuracy 
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comes close to achieving this by relying on targets’ self-report of their own mental state as a 
point of comparison to measure perceivers’ accuracy. By using the retrodictive mindreading 
paradigm (Cassidy et al., 2013; Pillai et al., 2012, 2014), we are able to measure perceivers’ 
ability to infer targets’ social context from observing their spontaneous reactions by comparing 
perceivers’ responses to an objective criterion (observed or alone), as well as gain an insight into 
how perceivers achieved this inference by asking perceivers to rate the expressiveness of targets’ 
behaviour and the use of eye-tracking. This demonstrated the advantage that the retrodictive 
mindreading paradigm has over methodologies used in previous research.  
  Additionally, our findings provide further support that individuals are able to learn about 
the target’s world by observing the target’s behaviour. In other words, we are able to learn about 
the world through the lens of other minds (Pillai et al., 2012). It is useful to be able to infer the 
social context from a brief observation of another since it allows us to learn about the social 
world through the experiences of others without the need to have a first-hand experience (Frith & 
Frith, 2007).  In turn, we are able to use this information to guide our own response to the novel 
situation (also known as social referencing). For instance, we are able to gauge whether the 
context is approachable or threatening from observing the behaviour of others. Additionally, by 
being able to detect a target’s social context from observing their behaviour, it seems that 
perceivers are aware that people are able to manipulate their own behaviour in various social 
situations (e.g. inhibiting or exaggerating their expressions when in the presence of others) which 
in response, perceivers are then able to manage their own reactions and behaviour which is vital 
when interacting with others.  
 Overall, the findings described in this thesis demonstrate how sensitive and able 
perceivers are in making retrodictive inferences. Apart from being able to detect the 
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experimenter’s behaviour (e.g. Pillai et al., 2012, 2014) and the cause of the target’s reaction 
(e.g. Cassidy et al., 2013, 2015), our findings provided evidence that perceivers were able to 
infer the presence or absence of an experimenter which modified targets’ emotional reactions. 
The results thus testify to the versatility of our ability to mentalise. 
  
8.3.2  Eye-tracking  
 From our studies, it is evident that perceivers do not look more at a particular region 
when targets were alone (or when targets were observed); instead perceivers’ eye movement 
pattern differed depending not only on whether the target was observed or alone but also on the 
valence of the target’s emotional reaction. For instance, perceivers tended to look at the Body 
region more when targets were alone than observed for irritation and disgust, but for surprise the 
opposite effect was found where perceivers attended to the Body more when targets were 
observed than alone. This could be due to targets inhibiting their expressions of disgust and 
irritation less when left alone as compared to when they were being observed. Based on Pillai et 
al.’s (2012, 2014) studies which demonstrated that perceivers’ eye movements varied according 
to the scenarios experienced by the target, this variation in eye movements suggest that 
perceivers are able to discriminate between the scenarios on an implicit level. In addition, 
Cassidy et al.’s (2013) study also revealed that perceiver’s eye gaze patterns varied according to 
the gift the target received, instead of a simple effect between the time spent on a region and the 
type of gift received. Hence, the different time spent looking at the various regions for the social 
contexts suggests that the effect of social context on the target’s behaviour impacted on 
perceivers’ eye movements which demonstrate their sensitivity to the target’s social context and 
emotional reaction at an implicit level.  
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 It has become common in social cognition research as well as mentalising research to 
examine the evidence for implicit and explicit understanding. For example, Piaget (1968) found 
that infants aged eight months demonstrated object permanence through reaching behaviours, 
while Baillargeon (1987) discovered that infants as young as four months demonstrated similar 
understanding via looking times. This type of discovery led some researchers to suppose that 
these two types of measures index different types of knowledge (Ruffman, Garnham, Import, & 
Connolly, 2001).  Frith and Frith (2008) defined implicit as a lower level of cognition which 
occurs rapidly, automatically, and without awareness. Explicit process, on the other hand, is a 
higher level cognition that requires mental effort. To illustrate the difference between these two 
processes in a false belief task, it is commonly found that children around the age of five years 
are able respond correctly, thus revealing an explicit knowledge of false belief (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). However, Clements and Perner (1994) then found that children around age three 
will search at the correct location but give an incorrect response when asked directly, hence 
demonstrating an implicit understanding of false belief. The implicit understanding of false 
belief was further shown in Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) study with the eye movements in 
infants aged between 12 and 15 months. In addition, Schneider et al. (2012) tested adults with a 
false belief task and incorporated the use of eye-tracking technology. The participants’ eye 
movement patterns and responses from the post-experimental debriefing procedure indicate false 
belief processing without the awareness of such behaviour. In other words, people have the 
ability to implicitly monitor the mental states of others (Schneider, Slaughter, & Dux, 2015). 
However, recent research suggests that explicit and implicit mentalising processes overlap, and 
should not be viewed as distinct processes from one another since they both share certain 
functional features (e.g. the demand on working memory) (Schneider et al., 2015).  
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 The studies presented in this thesis are enlightened by Cheesman and Merikle’s (1984) 
definition of objective and subjective threshold of consciousness in connection with the implicit-
explicit distinction. The objective threshold is related to whether individuals perform above 
chance on a task, and the subjective threshold is whether individuals believe they are guessing, 
indicating a lack of awareness of their knowledge (Ruffman et al., 2001). For instance, Clements 
and Perner’s (1994) study on false belief suggests that children have an implicit knowledge of 
false belief via their eye gaze data; however, there is no evidence on whether the children were 
aware of the knowledge implied by their eye gaze. Therefore, although, the study showed that 
the children have an implicit understanding of false belief at the level of their eye movements, it 
is undetermined whether this understanding is actually implicit (i.e., without awareness). Hence, 
for the eye-tracking studies described in this thesis, when we use the term ‘implicit’ we meant  
on the eye movement level, not that the perceivers have an implicit understanding since we are 
not able to evaluate perceivers’ awareness of the knowledge indicated by their eye movements. 
Therefore, by connecting perceivers’ varied eye gaze pattern at the different regions of the target 
to perceivers’ responses, it is evident that they are able to discriminate between the target’s social 
context on both explicit and implicit levels. 
  
8.3.3 Gender Differences 
 An incidental aspect this thesis investigated whether there were any gender differences in 
performance. In folk psychology, female perceivers are viewed to be more emotional, sensitive 
and better mind readers than male perceivers (Krach et al., 2009). Some research has 
demonstrated that girls perform better than boys in mental state talk (Hughes & Dunn, 1998) and 
emotion understanding (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991). In addition, various studies have 
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found a female advantage in mentalising abilities among children (e.g. Bosacki & Astington, 
1999) and adults (e.g. Baron-Cohen & Hammer, 1997). However, other studies did not find such 
gender difference in performance (Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, & Jimenez, 2000).  
In the research on emotion recognition, findings are inconsistent as to whether female 
perceivers are more accurate at recognising emotional expressions than male perceivers 
(Coleman, 1949), with some studies indicating no differences in performance between male and 
female perceivers (e.g. Rahman et al., 2004), and others suggesting female perceivers are more 
sensitive in observing subtle emotional expressions (Hall & Matsumoto, 2004).  
The studies presented in this thesis only found gender differences in performance for 
Experiment 1c (for fearful stimuli only) and Experiment 2 (for neutral and sadness stimuli, 
where females tended to respond ‘observed’ more than males when it was true) when all seven of 
the target’s emotional reactions were used but not in other experiments when the number of 
emotional reactions was limited. With the exception of the eye-tracking data in Experiment 7 
where female perceivers attended to the Nose region longer than the male perceivers, female 
perceivers also attended to the Mouth more than males when targets were observed than 
accompanied. Due to lack of evidence, we are inclined to suppose that gender differences are not 
an important factor in performance when perceivers were asked to infer targets’ social context 
and the intensity of their expressions. It seems that male and female perceivers performed 
similarly in detecting targets’ social context on an explicit and implicit level.  
This contrasts with Baron-Cohen et al.’s (1997) finding of a female advantage in the 
‘Reading of the Mind from the Eyes’ task where perceivers were shown photographs of the eye 
region to infer what the target might be thinking or feeling. Moreover, the lack of gender 
differences in performance reported in this thesis supports the many studies on mentalising that 
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found no gender differences or a female advantage (Nash & Grossi, 2007). Thus, the robustness 
of such a gender effect is questionable. 
 
8.4 Limitations and Future Research 
 One of the limitations of the studies reported here is that it is confined to Asian targets 
and perceivers only. As suggested by various studies, there is an in-group advantage when it 
comes to recognising emotions, whereby members of the same nationality and/or ethnicity find it 
easier to recognise the emotions expressed by targets from the same group (Elfenbein & 
Ambady, 2002). Wallis (2015) investigated similar effects we examined in this thesis with other 
nationalities and ethnicities, predominantly British targets and perceivers, and found similar 
results where perceivers were able to distinguish targets’ social context. Hence, this suggests the 
possibility of generalisability across cultures in perceivers’ ability to infer social context from 
brief observations of targets.  
In addition, cross-cultural studies examining mentalising abilities among children did not 
find any differences in performance (e.g. Avis & Harris, 1991); however, Lillard (1998) suggests 
that cultural differences could play a larger role in adult mentalising (Frith & Frith, 2003).  Thus, 
it will be interesting to further investigate whether there are any differences in performance 
cross-culturally, especially when research in display rules has indicated differences between 
cultures in the way people behave and express themselves in various social situations (Ekman, 
1972, Hochschild, 1979). Furthermore, Fischer et al. (2003) suggested that individuals from a 
more collectivistic culture often relied on the judgments and behaviour of others in social 
interactions, while individuals from a more individualistic culture tend to refer to their own 
concerns and self-esteem when interacting with others. In addition, recent studies in face 
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perception found cultural differences in the strategies employed when attending to faces (e.g. 
Blais et al., 2008, Kelly et al., 2010, Tan et al., 2012). Therefore, by including targets and 
perceivers from different cultures (i.e., collectivistic vs individualistic), it might provide further 
insight as to whether there are any cross-cultural differences in retrodictive mindreading on both 
implicit and explicit level, and whether perceivers attend to display rules  when making such 
inferences.  
 Another limitation of the research presented here is the lack of concrete evidence of a 
direct association suggesting that perceivers rely on the target’s expressiveness to discriminate 
the social context. Wallis (2015) asked perceivers to rate the targets’ expressiveness (1 = Non-
expressive… 6 = Very expressive) and the probability that the targets were accompanied (1 = 
Not likely… 6 = Very likely). The results indicated that perceivers made a connection between 
targets’ expressivity and their social context. This supports the suggestion that perceivers rely on 
both low-level cues (i.e., target’s facial expressions) and higher-level clues (i.e., knowledge of 
display rules) to infer the social context. However, Wallis’ (2015) study revealed that perceivers 
who are better at inferring social context did not base their judgments solely on the target’s 
expressiveness: Other factors may also contribute in making such an inference.  
 In addition, it will be interesting to extend current research by involving different types of 
observers (e.g. friends, higher or lower status observer, different genders) to expand on the 
influence it has on the target’s behaviour to investigate whether perceivers are more able to 
detect the social context for one type of observer than another. In short, different types of 
observer affect the way targets behave (e.g. Devereux & Ginsburg, 2001), and it will be 
informative to investigate perceivers’ scope of inferring social context, and specifically whether 
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perceivers are more able to determine targets’ social context depending on who is observing the 
targets.  
 There has been an increasing interest in recent years in the neural basis of mentalising 
(Frith & Frith, 2006). Results have implicated a set of regions that include the superior temporal 
sulcus (pSTS) and temporoparietal junction (TPJ); generally, the medial prefrontal cortex and the 
temporal poles are activated when perceivers think about the mental states of others (Frith & 
Frith, 2003, 2006). For example, Funnell (2001) found that damage to temporal lobes can hinder 
one’s ability to use the knowledge we have about the world from how feelings affect behaviour 
to knowing the types of situations we should avoid because they are dangerous. This knowledge 
is crucial for the process of mentalising.  
However, there is a lack of research into the neural basis of retrodictive inferences; thus, 
incorporating neuroimaging techniques into the investigation allows further insight into the 
processes involved when making these kinds of judgment. It also enables us to further 
investigate the implicit level of understanding perceivers have on making such inferences.  
Lastly, Ickes’ (1997, 2003) empathic accuracy research prides in its naturalistic approach 
where the target’s behaviour occurs in a natural social environment with at least one other 
individual as their interaction is recorded. The video stimuli created for the studies reported in 
this thesis were similar whereby targets’ behaviour was video recorded covertly as the targets 
were observed by the experimenter or alone in the room. Even though the targets’ behaviour was 
spontaneous, the setting in which the targets were recorded was still somewhat controlled. 
Therefore, in future research, it would be beneficial to create an even more naturalistic setting for 
the targets and the observers in order to construct more ecologically valid stimuli.   
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8.5 Conclusion 
 In summary, the studies presented in this thesis suggest that perceivers were able to know 
about the social world through observing the behaviour of others. Specifically, perceivers were 
able to distinguish targets’ social context from a brief sample of target reactions to emotional 
movie clips on both an explicit (response) and an implicit (eye movements) level. Moreover, the 
mere presence of another person, who did not overtly observe the target, is sufficient for 
perceivers to detect that the target was accompanied rather than alone. It seems plausible to 
suppose that perceivers rely on the target’s expressiveness to infer the target’s social context. 
This is evident from perceivers’ ratings of the intensity of target expressions – perceivers rated 
that targets tended to inhibit their expressions of negative emotions when being observed than 
when alone and they rated that targets tended to exaggerate their expressions of positive 
emotions when observed than when alone. This accords with previous studies which examined 
the effect of social context on behaviour, especially facial expressions. However, past studies 
conducted in the field of social context and facial expressions mainly focused on the targets, and 
how their behaviour is influenced by different situations, but there is a lack of research which 
directly examines perceivers’ ability to gauge social context from observing the behaviour of 
others. It is nevertheless important to investigate what perceivers can infer from observations of 
target behaviour since it draws upon an ability that not only allows perceivers to learn something 
about the world indirectly through observing others, but it also demonstrates the power of an 
inference that can be drawn from a tiny amount of information contained in a brief sample of 
behaviour when interacting with others.  
This research offers a further demonstration of the value of Pillai et al.’s (2012, 2014) 
and Cassidy et al.’s (2013, 2015) retrodictive mindreading paradigm. It extends Pillai et al’s and 
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Cassidy et al’s research which demonstrated that perceivers have the ability to infer an aspect of 
a social interaction with the experimenter (e.g. the experimenter’s behaviour, the gift received 
from experimenter), to now indicating that people are sensitive enough to also infer the presence 
or absence of an experimenter. With this design, we are able to gauge perceivers’ mentalising 
ability (accuracy), and shed some light on the processes involved in making such retrodictive 
inferences. This is a major strength since it incorporates the aims of person perception research 
and mentalising research which tended to focus on investigating either perceiver’s accuracy in 
making a social judgment or how they made such decisions (but not both). This enables us to 
understand the scope and activity involved in reading others’ minds.  
Since early in development we are able to learn about the nature of an environment 
(whether it is safe or not) from observing our caregiver; it is possible that this ability to learn 
about the world from others develops over the years to enable individuals to infer the presence or 
absence of another individual from a brief observation of the behaviour of a third party. In turn, 
we are able to use this knowledge to guide our own behaviour to ensure smooth interactions with 
others.  
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Appendix 1 
List of video clips used in Experiment 1a and its sources: 
1. Anger Clip 1: YouTube: “The Most Annoying Video on YouTube”  
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O6D2g_txXZ4  
2. Anger Clip 2: YouTube: “The Most Irritating 9:36.47 Minutes of Your Life” 
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z-TykljBz-
E&feature=share&list=PLEC5EABF55CD6EDF6  
3. Anger Clip 3: YouTube: “Baby Crying” 
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qS7nqwGt4-I  
4. Anger Clip 4: YouTube: “NyanCat: Trollololol Edition” 
Source:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hvj8b1Ia1hw&feature=share&list=PLEC5EA
BF55CD6EDF6  
5. Anger Clip 5: YouTube: “I Will Respect Anyone Who Can Watch the Whole 
Thing” 
Source:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vxOuECN03RQ&list=PLEC5EABF55CD6ED
F6&index=43&feature=plpp_video  
6. Disgust Clip 1: “127 Hours” by Danny Boyle 
7. Disgust Clip 2: YouTube: “Pituitary Surgery” 
8. Disgust Clip 3: “Requiem for a Dream” by Darren Arnofsky 
9. Disgust Clip 4: “V/H/S” by Joe Swanberg 
10. Disgust Clip 5: “Excision” by Richard Bates Jr. 
11. Fear Clip 1 & 2: “Insidious” by James Wan 
12. Fear Clip 3: “The Woman in Black” by James Watkins 
13. Fear Clip 4: “American Horror Story, Pilot” by Ryan Murphy 
14. Fear Clip 5: “American Horror Story, Piggy Piggy” by Michael Uppendahl 
15. Happy Clip 1: “FRIENDS, The One Where Joey Speaks French” by Gary Halvorson 
16. Happy Clip 2: “FRIENDS, The One with the Cop” by Andrew Tsao 
17. Happy Clip 3: “FRIENDS, The One with Unagi” by Gary Halvorson 
18. Happy Clip 4: “FRIENDS, The One Where Emma Cries” by Sheldon Epps 
19. Happy Clip 5: “FRIENDS, The One with Ross’s Tan” by Gary Halvorson 
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20. Neutral Clip 1: “The Love We Make” by Bradley Kaplan & Albert Maysles 
21. Neutral Clip 2-4: “Secrets of Middle-Earth: Inside Tolkien’s ‘Lord of the Rings’ by 
Chris Gormlie 
22. Sad Clip 1: YouTube: “Very Sad Thai Insurance Commercial” 
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hyVfKDrAAJg  
23. Sad Clip 2: “The Champ” by Franco Zeffirelli 
24. Sad Clip 3: “Marley & Me” by David Frankel 
25. Sad Clip 4: YouTube: “TC Bank, The Courage of Mother” 
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ngHfyUIH6hM  
26. Sad Clip 5: “Up” by Pete Docter & Bob Peterson 
27. Surprise Clip 1: YouTube: “Mike Henderson – Britain’s Got Talent 2009” 
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TfsHBLuZkE  
28. Surprise Clip 2: YouTube: “A Giant Dead Snake”  
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z2i-Cl0vxbI  
29. Surprise Clip 3: YouTube: “Relaxing Car Drive”  
Source: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GMgsFZ4rkEI  
30. Surprise Clip 4: “Grave Encounters” by The Vicious Brothers 
31. Surprise Clip 5: “Mulholland Dr” by David Lynch 
